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FUNDING PROBLEM AND DEMOCRATIZING
ACCESS TO CAPITAL
ALMA PEKMEZOVIC
GORDON WALKER*
ABSTRACT
This Article provides a comprehensive review of the crowd-
funding phenomenon. It argues that equity crowdfunding (ECF) 
and, to a lesser extent, peer-to-peer lending (P2PL) offer the pos-
sibility of a global solution to the small and medium-sized enterprise
(SME) funding problem. In the United States, the SME funding 
problem is exacerbated by the markedly diminishing rate of startup
formation, a factor that injects a degree of urgency into resolving
the optimal means to implement ECF. Here, as with the fin-tech 
revolution, the law lags behind technological developments. The
second main argument is that ECF enhances access to capital for
SMEs globally while simultaneously democratizing access to in-
vestments for ordinary citizens. The Article begins by providing
definitions, business models, and historical background before
outlining the SME funding problem and new constraints on SME
lending since the global financial crisis. ECF is placed within the
so-called financing escalator and is distinguished from venture 
capital and angel financing. The global market for crowdfunding
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is reviewed in order to indicate growth trends in the sector. Some
common legal issues associated with crowdfunding are presented
before a review of crowdfunding globally. Dominant models in
some Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD)countries and the potential for crowdfunding to assist
SMEs in the undeveloped world are explored. The conclusion
outlines key considerations and choices for legislators considering
the regulatory puzzles presented by crowdfunding.
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INTRODUCTION
ThisArticlereviewscrowdfunding and considersitsimplica-
tionsforsecuritiesregulation andfundraisinglaw.1 Weconsider
theutilityofcrowdfundingforsmalland medium-sizeenterprises
(SMEs) and the regulatory approach taken in OECD jurisdic-
tionssuchasNew Zealand, Australia, theUnitedStates, theEuro-
pean Union, and the United Kingdom to equity crowdfunding
(ECF) and, to a lesser extent, peer-to-peer lending (P2PL).2
Thesealternativeformsoffundraisinghavegrown asaresultof
technologicalinnovation andthefalloutfrom theglobalfinancial
crisis (GFC) in 200809, which resulted in tightened bank 
credit and increased constraints on SMEs access to capital.3 Re-
strictionson SME accesstocapitalareespeciallyprevalentin the
early-stagerisk capitalmarket, anditisherethatECF andP2PL
areattractivesolutions.
Thesenew sourcesofentrepreneurialfinancesignificantly ex-
pand the sourcesoffinancing available to SMEsby permitting
equityinvestingandlendingfrom microangelandretailinvestors
who can now participate in venture capital or angel financing i.e., 
early startup financing to fledgling com panies with significant
potential.4 Crowdfunding hasthe potentialnotonly to improve
access to finance for SMEs (thereby enhancing dom estic re-
source mobilization), butalso to democratize access to invest-
mentopportunities. Crowdfundinginvestmentopportunitiesare
1 See, e.g., NeilParmar, Crowdfunding is Opening Investment Doors, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/crowdfunding-is-opening-in
vestment-doors-1415569542 [https:/perma.cc/48HX-88UW];see also, e.g., Angus
Loten & Ruth Simon, Small-Business Optimism Surges With Solid Economy,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2015, atB1.
2 See, e.g., FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., CP13/13:THE FCAS REGULATORY APPROACH
TO CROWDFUNDING (AND SIMILAR ACTIVITIES), (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.fca
.org.uk/news/cp13-13-regulatory-approach-to-crowdfunding [https://perma.cc
/K43X-9KXN].
3 AUSTL. GOVT CORPS. & MKTS. ADVISORY COMM., CROWD SOURCED EQUITY
FUNDING REPORT (May2014).
4 See Caitlin Fitzsimmons, Crowdfunding: How to become your own venture
capitalist, AUSTL. FIN. REV. (Mar. 19, 2015), http:/www.afr.com/personal-finance
/how-to-become-your-own-venture-capitalist-20150319-1m2soe [https://perma.cc
/UUW4-HYNM].
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now availabletoa largerpoolofinvestors, including retailand
noninstitutionalinvestors. Theyarenolongerrestrictedtoaccred-
itedinvestors, asisthecaseundersom elegislativeframeworks.5
ECF, in particular, should facilitate the flow offunding to
SMEs and m icrofirm s, which are unable to access traditional
sourcesoffinance.6 Although thiskind ofinvestingcarrieswell-
documented risks, it offers significant im provements in SME
accesstofinanceandthepotentialtoenhanceportfoliodiversifi-
cation forretailinvestors.7 Asa result, wearguethatECF and
P2PL offertheprospectofa solution totheSME funding prob-
lem in thosecountrieswith goodcomm unicationsinfrastructure,
includingInternetandm obiletelephony. Moreover, ECF hasthe
potentialtodriveeconom icrecoveryfrom theGFC bym obilizing
thesmallbusinessengineforjob creation.8 Governmentsarewell
aware ofthe potentialofthese new forms offundraising.9 For
5 Id. at29. Fora discussion oftheU.S. position, seeDarian M. Ibrahim,
Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 101 (forth-
coming2016).
6 Ithasbeen estimated thatmorethan 200 million SMEslack accesstotra-
ditionalfinanceworldwide. Rep. oftheComm. ofExpertson SustainableDev.
Fin., at25, U.N. Doc. A/69/315 (2014), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc
.asp?symbol=A/69/315&Lang=E [https://perma.cc/JQT6-VUWH]. The World
BankGroupstates:
There are 420510 m illion micro, small, and m edium  enter-
prises worldwide, of which 360440 m illion are in em erging 
markets. When askedtolisttheirmain constraintstogrowth,
access to finance tops the list for entreprenuers in lower-
incomecountries. Globally, fewerthan 30 percentofthesefirms
useexternalfinancing, ofwhich halfareunderfinanced. The
totalunmetneedforcreditamongMSMEsinemergingmarkets
is estim ated at US$2.12.5 trillion, approximately 14 percent 
oftheGDP ofthesecountries.
WORLD BANK, FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT POST-2015 32 (Oct. 2013),
https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam /Worldbank/document/Poverty%20doc
uments/WB-PREM%20financing-for-development-pub-10-11-13web.pdf[https:/
perma.cc/9LZ2-5T4L].
7 TIM KOLLER ET AL., VALUATION:MEASURING AND MANAGING THE VALUE
OF COMPANIES 33 (5th ed. 2010). See generally BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE (1986).
8 Sara Hanks, Online capital-raising by small companies in the USA after
the JOBS Act compared to the same process in the European Union, 8(3)CAP.
MKTS. L.J. 261, 265 (2013).
9 Id.
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example, thenew ECF and P2PL regimein New Zealand flows
directly from the so-called Business Growth Agenda of the New 
Zealandgovernm ent.10
Asweshallsee, however, thecentraldilemm a forregulators
ishow totailorsecuritieslawsand anyapplicableECF orP2PL
exem ptions to the financialneeds ofSMEs, while atthe same
timeensuring an adequatelevelofinvestorprotection. Because
ECF and P2PL aresusceptibletoinform ation asym metriesand
agency costs, thenew regulatory fram eworkstypically mandate
certain safeguardsdesigned to protectthe investor.11 Weidentify
threecommon regulatorymechanismsthatfocuson (1)regulating
crowdfundingintermediariesvia a licensingregime;(2)regulat-
ingtheinvestmentopportunitiesofthecrowdinvestor;and(3)ex
postgovernance regulation ofthe crowdfunded firms. Thus, in-
term ediaries that operate ECF and P2PL platforms are often
required to obtain a license, maintain a disclosure regim e, and
ensurethatinvestorsareabletoexercisean informedchoice. An
alternative and com plimentary regulatory mechanism requires
crowdfunded firm stomakeadisclosureandcomplywith various
corporate governance requirements intended to enhance trans-
parency. Anotherm echanism focuseson theregulation ofnonac-
credited investors investment opportunities and typically results 
in limitationsplaced on the ability ofsuch investorsto partici-
pate in ECF and P2PL campaigns. Nonaccredited investorsmay
participatein crowdfunding subjecttocertain restrictions;forex-
ample, theycanonlyinvestafractionoftheirnetwealthorassets
in ECF and P2PL and arehencesubjecttoinvestm entcapsim-
posedbythelegislature.12
Differentregulatory toolshaveim plicationsforinvestorpro-
tection and com pliancecostsforfirm sseeking funding via ECF
10 See Alm aPekmezovic& Gordon Walker, Equity Crowd Funding in New
Zealand, 33(1)CO. & SEC. L.J. 63, 64(2015).
11 For a discussion on agency costs, see, for example, Kickstarter Game
Scam: A Non-Starter, STUFF (May3, 2012), http://www.stuff.co.nz/technology
/games/6846137/Kickstarter-game-scam-a-non-starter [https://perma.cc/8HHZ
-JF39]. See generally M. C. Jensen & W. H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305 (1976).
12 AUSTL. GOVT CORPS. & MKTS. ADVISORY COMM., CROWD SOURCED EQUITY
FUNDING REPORT §§ 6.4.16.4.2 (May2014).
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orP2PL. Weexplorevariousregulatoryapproachesand comment
on theirlikelyeffectiveness. Investorsafeguardsmustbebalanced
against economic utility for exam ple, job creation and SME 
dem and forcrowdfunding and peer-to-peerfinancing.13 Itisno-
toriousthatSMEsin allcountriesfacefunding constraints, but
alsothatsuch entitiesarea keydriverofprivatesectoremploy-
ment.14 Thus, there is a policy imperative to encourage funding
optionsforSMEsand craftexemptionsin securitiesregimesto
facilitatecrowdfunding.15
13 Id. §6.6.2.
14 Id. §A4.1.
15 See id. § 2.1.2. In Decemberof2014, the Commonwealth ofAustralia
released itsFinancialSystem Inquiry:FinalReport. TheFinalReportstated
thatfunding forSMEswasessentialtofacilitateproductivity growth in the
Australian econom y. See generally DEPT OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL SYSTEM
INQUIRY:FINAL REPORT (2014)(Austl.), http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/12/FSI_Final
_Report_Consolidated20141210.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8P8-MWV3]. Recom-
mendation 18 approved a graduated regime for fund raising to facilitate
crowdfunding. Id. at 14392. The recom mendation was m et with approval 
from theindustry. See JamesEyers, Change laws to make crowdfunding easier,
AUSTL. FIN. REV., Dec. 8, 2014, at 6;Nassim Khadem, Crowdfunding in
Australia goes under public microscope, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 9,
2014, at23;Richard Gluyas, Review falls short for P2P lenders, AUSTRALIAN,
Dec. 9, 2014. A discussion paperon crowdfundingwaspromulgated in Decem-
berof2014;see DEPT OF TREASURY, CROWD-SOURCED EQUITY FUNDING (2014)
(Austl.), http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Consultations%20and%20
Reviews/Consultations/2014/Crowd%20Sourced%20Equity%20Funding/Down
loads/PDF /CSEF%20Discussion%20Paper.ashx[https://perma.cc/9YBF-D8TP].
The Australian federal governments 20152016 budget introduced an AU$5.5 
billionGrowingJobsandSmallBusinesspackage, whichincludedaprovisionfor
crowdfunding. Thesemeasureswerefurtherelaboratedin DEPT OF TREASURY,
FACILITATING CROWD-SOURCED EQUITY FUNDING AND REDUCING COMPLIANCE
COSTS FOR SMALL BUSINESSES (2015) (Austl.), http://www.treasury.gov.au/~
/media/Treasury/Consultations%20and%20Reviews/Consultations/2015/Crowd
-sourced%20equity%20funding/Key%20Documents/PDF/Crowd-sourced-equity
-funding.ashx [https:/perma.cc/5CN9-9N2E]. Thepolicy rationalebehind these
initiativeswasclear:to increase fundraising opportunitiesforSMEs and in-
creaseemployment. SimilarconcernspromptedtheintroductionofanECF regime
in Malaysia. The Malaysian SecuritiesCommission (SC)and the Malaysian
BusinessAngelsNetwork (MBAN)sponsoredtheSynergyandCrowdfunding
Forum on September14, 2014. TheSC issuedapublicconsultation document
on Crowdfunding. See SEC. COMMN MALAY., PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAME-
WORK FOR EQUITY CROWDFUNDING PUBLIC CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 2/2014
(Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.sc.com.my/wp-content/uploads/eng/html/consulta
tion/140821_PublicConsultation_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/FFB3-5T9B]. In Feb-
ruary of2015, the SecuritiesCommission Malay released new guidelinesto
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PartI ofthis Article exam ines definitions ofcrowdfunding
and P2PL and provides an historicalbackground. We look at
portals that match crowdfunding investors and investees and
offerinsightsintocrowdfundingpracticesin variouspartsofthe
world including developing countries. We explore a variety of
crowdfunding models including donation-based, reward-based,
lending, andequitycrowdfunding.
PartsII and III considerthe SME financing problem in the
contextoftheGFC, which imposed lendingconstraintson tradi-
tionalprovidersoffinance. Wereview thelowerend ofthefund-
raising spectrum including venture capital, angel investing, and 
public equity financing via lower-tier market segments at ex-
isting securitiesexchangessuch asthe Alternative Investment
Market(AIM)atthe London Stock Exchange. We then turn to
place crowdfunding within thatspectrum . Here, our aim is to
add tothenascentliteratureon crowdfunding and SMEs access 
tocapital. Crowdfundingisan underresearched area offinance,
despiteitspotentialtoclosetheentrepreneurialfundinggap.
PartsIV and V focuson theECF m odeladopted in New Zea-
landandotherjurisdictions, includingtheregulatoryframeworks
in theEuropean Union and theUnited States. Wediscussregu-
latoryconvergenceanddivergenceattheinternationalleveland
pointtocommonlegalissuesassociatedwithECF andP2PL. This
leadstoaconsiderationofhow tooptimallydesignsecuritiesregu-
lation carveoutsforSMEsusing crowdfunding and P2P portals.
Given thattheECF and P2PL are relatively new activities, the
regulatoryapproachisevolvinginthejurisdictionsunderreview in
thisArticle. Wesumm arizeinsightsfrom ouranalysisand pro-
viderecommendationsforfurtherreform. Theserecommendations
m aybeutilized bypolicym akersin developingregulatoryframe-
workstodealwiththerisksandissuesraisedbyECF andP2PL.
facilitiateequity crowdfunding undersection 34 oftheCapitalMarketsand
Services Act 2007. On Septem ber 22, 2015, am endm ents to Malaysias securi-
tiesregulation regimewerepassedthatenabledECF. See CapitalMarketsand
Services(Amendment)Act2015 (Malay.)(CMSA)and SecuritiesCommission
(Amendment)Act2015 (Malay.)(SCMA). PursuanttotheCMSA amendment,
privatecompanieshostedonaregisteredECF platform aregivenasafeharbor
from provisionsin the CompaniesAct1965 thatprohibitprivate companies
from offeringsharestothepublic. Asia-Pacificcrowdfundingiscoveredbythe
websiteCrowdfund Vibe. CROWDFUND VIBE, http://crowdfundvibe.com [https://
perma.cc/V464-ESE7].
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I. CROWDFUNDING AND P2PL:DEFINITIONS, BUSINESS MODELS,
AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Definitions
The term crowdsourcing has been defined as the practice of 
obtaining needed services, ideas, orcontentby soliciting contribu-
tionsfrom a largegroup ofpeople, especiallyfrom theonlinecom-
munity.16 Typically, crowdsourcing involves the outsourcing of
taskstoan undefined group ofpeoplethrough an open call. By
contrast, crowdfunding enables entrepreneurs who traditionally 
face financing constraintsto obtain capitalfrom anyone in the
world via theInternet.17 Crowdfunding as a form of crowdsourc-
ing is designed to facilitate raising capital.18 Thekeydifference
between crowdsourcing and crowdfunding isthatin crowdsourc-
ing, thecrowd provideslabor. Underthecrowdfundingmodel, the
crowd provides funds.19 Related terms are crowd intelligence 
(knowledge of the crowd), crowd production (creation of the crowd), 
and crowd evaluation (thoughts of the crowd).20
According to IOSCO, crowdfunding is an umbrella term de-
scribingtheuseofsmallamountsofmoney, obtainedfrom alarge
numberofindividualsororganizations, tofundaproject, abusiness
orpersonalloan, and otherneedsthrough an onlineweb-based
platform.21 The advantage ofraising funds online is thatthe
16 Crowdsourcing, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.mer
riam-webster.com/dictionary/crowd-sourcing [https://perma.cc/QB8A-MTPH].
See generally JeffHowe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED MAGAZINE, June
2006, at 14, http:/archive.wired.com/wired/archive/14.06/crowds.html, [https:// 
perma.cc/TLV3-E6WP](The identification and naming ofthe phenomenon of
crowdsourcingisgenerallyattributedtothisseminalarticle).
17 Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012).
18 Wikipediaitselfisan exampleofcrowdsourcing. See TonyWeimer, Ten
examples of crowdsourcing, CALLCENTREHELPER.COM (Nov. 24, 2010), http://
www.callcentrehelper.com/ten-examples-of-crowdsourcing-14133.htm [https://
perma.cc/N3ME-NKVY].
19 Sammie Schweissguth, Crowdsourcing vs. Crowdfunding: Whats the 
Difference, CROWDSOURCE (July 23, 2013), http://www.crowdsource.com/blog
/2013/07/crowdsourcing-vs-crowdfunding-whats-the-difference/[https://perma.cc
/J6NV-8FEE].
20 See generally JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURCING:WHY THE POWER OF THE
CROWD IS DRIVING THE FUTURE OF THE BUSINESS 47 (2008).
21 Eleanor Kirby & Shane Worner, Crowd-funding: An Infant Industry
Growing Fast 4 (Int. Org. Sec. Com mn, Working Paper No. SWP3/2014, 
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Internet substantially reduces transaction costs and m akes it
possible to collectsm allamounts offunds from a large poolof
funders.22 Theaggregation ofa largenumberofsm allcontribu-
tionscan resultin considerable am ountsofcapital.23 Examples
ofcrowdfundingInternetsitesincludeMyMajorCompany,24Kiva,25
Kickstarter,26 Crowdcube,27 and IndieGoGo.28 These sites allow
companies and entrepreneurs to turn to a crowd of potential in-
vestorsforfinancing.29
Crowdfunding exists because of Internet technology.
Schwienbacher et al. define crowdfunding as [an] open call, 
essentially through the Internet, for the provision offinancial
resources either in form ofdonation or in exchange for some
form ofreward and/orvoting rights in orderto supportinitia-
tives for specific purposes.30 A narrowerdefinition used in the
entrepreneurial context refers to the efforts by entrepreneurial 
individuals and groups cultural, social, and for-profit to fund 
theirventuresbydrawingon relativelysmallcontributionsfrom
a relatively large num ber of individuals using the Internet,
without standard financial interm ediaries.31
Thethreekeycomponentsofcrowdfundingare(1)alargenum-
berofinvestors;(2)theprovision ofrelatively smallam ountsof
2014), http://www.iosco.org/research/pdf/swp/Crowd-funding-An-Infant-Industry
-Growing-Fast.pdf[https://perma.cc/K4B5-K5WN].
22 Id. at22.
23 See KarenE. Wilson& MarcoTestoni, Improving the Role of Equity Crowd-
funding in Europes Capital Markets, 9 BRUEGEL POLY CONTRIBUTION 2 (2014).
24 MYMAJORCOMPANY, https:/www.mymajorcompany.com/[https://perma.cc
/W2MY-Q3C2].
25 KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/[https://perma.cc/J9RJ-46PV].
26 KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/[https:/perma.cc/9AQH-ULZ9].
27 CROWDCUBE, http://www.crowdcube.com/[https://perma.cc/YC73-XM3T].
28 INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/[https://perma.cc/Y7UG-ZW2H].
29 See, e.g., MYMAJORCOMPANY, supra note24, see also PaulBelleflamme
etal., Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd, 29(5)J. BUS. VENTURING
585, 585 (2014).
30 Belleflammeetal., supra note29, at588. See ARMIN SCHWIENBACHER ET
AL., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE 36990 (David 
Cummingsed., 2012). Thisdefinition buildson a definition ofcrowdsourcing
provided in Frank Kleeman etal., Un(der)paid Innovators: The Commercial
Utilization of Consumer Work Through Crowdsourcing, 4(1)SCI., TECH. &
INNOVATION STUD., 526 (2008). 
31 Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Explanatory Study,
29 J. BUS. VENTURING 1, 2 (2014).
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moneyfrom each investor;and(3)theuseoftheInternet, which
is used for its convenience and ability to connect individuals
acrosstheglobe.32 Forexample, individualsmay seek relatively
small amounts of capital often under $1,000 in order to fund 
a one-tim eprojectorevent, and thecapitalmay beprovided by
family orfriends.33 Alternatively, entrepreneursusecrowdfund-
ing asa form ofseed financing in ordertofund thestartup ofa
firm.34 Thus, equity crowdfunding may be used asa substitute
fortraditionalformsofformalventurefinancing, wherefunders
are treated as investors who receive equity stakes or sim ilar
consideration in exchange for funding a projectorproduct. As
stated, werefertothistypeoffundingasECF.35 Theadvantage
ofutilizingECF isthattheem ergingcom panyneednotrelyona
substantialinvestm entfrom a smallnumberofventurecapital-
istsorangelinvestorsbutcan turn toa largenumberofinves-
tors for small contributions, which makes backing new businesses 
[more] affordable.36 In a setting like New Zealand, where there
are no m ore than one hundred angelinvestors, this can be a
significantadvantage.37 Thesamecouldbesaidofotherjurisdic-
tionswhereprivateequityisrelativelyundeveloped.
Crowdfunding may also be used as a lending m odel. Here,
funderstypicallyoffercapitalin theform ofa loan, expectingto
receiveareturnofthecapitalinvested. Theycanalsoinvestonthe
basisofphilanthropicgoalssuch aswantingtopromotea certain
socialgoodorobjective.38 TheBritish Peer-to-PeerFinanceAsso-
ciation provides the following definition ofpeer-to-peer finance:
32 Id. at1.
33 Id. at3.
34 Id.
35 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note2.
36 MichaelMurray, Want to Grow Your Business? Its Time to Get Social,
INDEP., Mar. 10, 2011, §2, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/sme
/want-to-grow-your-business-itrsquos-time-to-get-social-2238088.html[https://
perma.cc/Z9AX-5CA5].
37 MINISTRY OF ECO. DEV., BASELINE REVIEW OF ANGEL INVESTMENT IN
NEW ZEALAND 47 (2007) (N.Z.), https://www.med.govt.nz/about-us/publica
tions/publications-by-topic/evaluation-of-government-programmes/archive/report
.pdf[https://perma.cc/45PE-QYN6]. Theemergenceofinformation exchanges
in New Zealand, notably the United Kingdombased Angel Investment Network, 
mayhavecontributedtoanincreaseinthatnumber.
38 Mollick, supra note31, at3.
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platform s that facilitate financial services via direct, one-to-one 
contractsbetween a singlerecipientand oneorm ultipleprovid-
ers.39 Thus, P2PL is a form ofcrowdfunding and is usually re-
ferred to as crowd lending or debt crowdfunding.40 Borrowers
seek capitaland lenders provide capitalvia websites.41 A P2PL
platform , ratherthan a bank, actsasan interm ediary between
borrowerandlender.42 Thisoften allowslenderstoobtain higher
returns. Thewebsitehandlesthecontractualrelationshipsanddis-
burses the funds.43 In the United Kingdom, Zopa was the first
platform toofferthiskindofservicein2005.44RateSetterisanother
U.K. P2PL platform thatalsorecentlylaunchedin theAustralian
market.45 SmavaisaGermanplatform,46 andBabyloanisaFrench
provider.47 AnotherexampleistheBritish crowdfunding platform
Buzzbnk;however, this platform primarily focuses on donation-
basedloans, withlendersreceivingonlyasymbolicpaymentback.48
TheU.S.-basedProsperiscurrentlyregardedasthemarketleader
39 See PEER-TO-PEER FIN. ASSN, LAUNCH OF PEER-TO-PEER FINANCE
ASSOCIATION, http://p2pfa.info/p2pfa-launch [https://perma.cc/T8X3-D4NL].
40 See generally ScottE. Hartley, Kiva.org: Crowd-Sourced Microfinance
and Cooperation in Group Lending (Harv. U. Berkman Ctr. Internet & Socy, 
Working Paper, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1572182 [https://perma.cc/9B
5C-YN2M].
41 Id. at7.
42 How peer-to-peer lending works, ZOPA, http://www.zopa.com/peer-to-peer
-lending[https://perma.cc/R7DU-7FFZ].
43 How lending works, ZOPA, http://www.zopa.com/lending/how-lending-mon
ey-works[https://perma.cc/6275-822D].
44 Peer-to-peer lending: Banking without banks, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 2014,
at 6970, http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21597932-of 
fering-both-borrowers-and-lenders-better-deal-websites-put-two [https://perma
.cc/CST6-EW6G].
45 MitchellNeems, RateSetter launches in Australia, Plans to Challenge Banks,
AUSTL. BUS. REV. (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business
/financial-services/ratesetter-launches-in-australia-plans-to-challenge-banks/story
-fn91wd6x-1227119113243 [https://perma.cc/DH29-TCET].
46 See SMAVA, http://www.smava.de/[https://perma.cc/96RH-YDTT].
47 See BABYLOAN, http://www.babyloan.org/fr/[https://perma.cc/3QLM-K8BJ].
48 See BUZZBNK, https://www.buzzbnk.org/[https://perma.cc/G3CB-BDT5].
Thesiteincludesthefollowingproviso:Buzzbnk isa platform toraisesocial
loanswhich meanstheprimarypurposeforbackingaventureisthesocialor
environmentaloutcometheyseektoachieveandanyfinancialreturnssecondary.
Id. Theloansarenotsecured. Id.
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in P2PL.49 Another U.S.-based P2P lending site is the Lending
Club.50 These sitesgained particularpopularity in the wake of
risingbankinterestratesfollowingtheGFC.
Some websitesalso facilitate peer-to-peerforeign exchanges
connecting individualsand corporationsonlinetoexchangecur-
renciesdirectly.51 Exam plesofP2PL foreign exchangeplatform s
are CurrencyFair, launched in Ireland in 2010, and Transfer-
Wise, launched in the United Kingdom in 2011.52 A U.K. site,
Kantox, offers peer-to-peerforeign exchange hedging.53 The re-
wardforfinancingaprojectm ayoften benonfinancialin nature,
such asbeingcreditedin am ovie, havingcreativeinputintothe
design ofa product, orbeinggiven theopportunitytomeetwith
the creators ofthe project.54 Funders m ay also receive special
rewardsand benefitsbygainingaccesstofunded productsatan
earlierdate, atabetterprice, orwith specialconditionsattached
to the product.55 We refer to this type of crowdfunding as re-
ward crowdfunding or pre-sales crowdfunding.56 Both reward
crowdfunding and donation crowdfunding can be thoughtofas
crowd sponsoring;there is no financialreturn involved forthe
backers.57 One ofthe main platform soffering crowd sponsoring
49 See How it Works, PROSPER, https://www.prosper.com/welcome/how-it
-works/[https://perma.cc/C9QH-FEYV].
50 LENDINGCLUB, http://www.lendingclub.com [https:/perma.cc/L87D-D2SH].
51 See Sebastian C. Moenninghoff& AxelWieandt, The Future of Peer-
to-Peer Finance, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTLICHE FORSCHUNG
46687, at 3 (2013). 
52 See CURRENCYFAIR, http://www.currencyfair.com [https://perm a.cc/FEP6
-XDUU];see also TRANSFERWISE, http://www.transferwise.com [https://perma
.cc/2T5Y-27L9].
53 How it Works, KANTOX, http://kantox.com/en/how-it-works-kantox [https:/
perma.cc/M639-GBS7].
54 Ethan Mollick, The Danger of Crowding out the Crowd with Equity Crowd-
funding, 2 U. PENN. PUB. POLY INITIATIVE 1 (2014), http:/publicpolicy.wharton
.upenn.edu/live/files/201-a[https://perma.cc/UCW4-5WZ4].
55 Id.
56 See generally Ethan Mollick & VenkatKuppuswamy, After the Cam-
paign: Outcomes of Crowdfunding (U.N.C. Kenan-Flager Bus. SchoolRes.
Paper Series, Research Paper No. 2376997, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2376997 [https://perma.cc/B5KV-8BY7].
57 ThewebsiteBetterPlace.orgisaGerman donorpoolingplatform. Crowd-
fundingorcrowd sponsoringcan beused forpoliticalpurposes. BETTERPLACE
.ORG, http:/www.betterplace.org/de/[https://perma.cc/MN9B-CVUA]. Forexample,
Barack Obam a collected about$750 million forhispresidentialcampaign in
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istheU.S.-based Kickstarterplatform .58 Sim ilarplatform shave
emerged in the European setting.59 The Open Source Science
Project allows researchers to propose research projects to the
crowd and pitch forfunding online.60 Thisprojectisintended to
give researchers access to alternative funding models and by-
passtraditionalfunding routessuch asthosethataretypically
availablethrough thegovernment, charity, orindustry.61
Crowd sponsoring should be distinguished from equity crowd-
funding (crowd investing) and P2PL (crowd lending) sometimes 
collectively referred to as financial reward crowdfunding and 
thefocusofthisArticle. Financialreward crowdfunding carries
higher risks than crowd sponsoring, and hence, necessitates a
specialregulatoryresponse. Investorprotection, in particular, is
an im portantconsideration forfinancialreward crowdfunding.62
The main risks thatcontributors face in crowd investing and
crowd lending m odels are loss ofinvested capital, fraud, and
lack oftransparencywith respecttocharges, aswellasinterest
ratesandexpectedyields. Furthermore, thelevelofuncertaintyin
crowd investingand crowd lendingisgreatercom pared toother
m odelsbecauseitisdifficulttoassessthequalityoftheprojects
andtheabilityoftheentrepreneurtogenerateequityvalue.
Thereisconsiderableinterestin thepotentialofcrowdfund-
ing to im prove accessto finance in developing countries.63 Asa
2008. Mostofthisamountwasraised via theInternetand camefrom small
donorswhocontributed$200 orless. See Tahman Bradley, Final Fundraising
Figure: Obamas $750M, ABC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com
/Politics/Vote2008/story?id=6397572&page=1 [https://perma.cc/QT4C-PFGH];see
also JoseAntonioVargas, Obama Raised Half a Billion Online, WASH. POST
(Nov. 20, 2008), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/11/obama-raised-half
-a-billion-on.html[https://perma.cc/3QQW-Y6FM].
58 See KICKSTARTER, supra note26.
59 See EURO. CROWDFUNDING NETWORK, http://eurocrowd.org/directory-of
-m embers/[https://perma.cc/HX88-4QNT].
60 See OPEN SOURCE PROJECT, http://www.theopensourcescienceproject.com/
[https://perma.cc/X7K4-8BXE].
61 Id.
62 AndyKollmorgen, Crowdfunding Risks and Rewards: Is It Time to Regu-
late Crowdfunding in Australia, CHOICE (June25, 2014), https://www.choice
.com.au/money/financial-planning-and-investing/stock-market-investing/articles
/crowdfunding-risks-and-rewards[https://perma.cc/64M3-BG57].
63 WORLD BANK, CROWDFUNDINGS POTENTIAL FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD
45 (2013), http://www.infodev.org/infodev-files/wb_crowdfundingreport-v12.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B8V4-CNY6].
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result, thereisnodoubtthattheriseoffinancialcrowdfunding
has significantpotentialto contribute to econom icgrowth and
development. However, this form offinance is also associated
with various risks. 64 The various issues and risks that ECF
givesrisetoareexploredinlatersectionsofthisArticle.
B. Crowdfunding Business Models
In this Section, we consider crowdfunding business m odels
adopted by existing portals. We can distinguish between these
m odels along severaldim ensions, including the form ofsecuri-
tiesoffered tothecrowd (i.e., equityordebtsecurities);themin-
im um investm ent required; the fee structures adopted; and
whetherinvestors can investdirectly into startups orwhether
theirinvestmentsarepooledviaspecialpurposevehicles.65
The typicalcrowdfunding model may be described as fol-
lows.66 First, a funding target the sum  to be raised is set.67
Second, fundersareencouraged todonate orpledgeortom ake
advancepurchasesofitems.68 Third, wherethetargetisreached,
the funds are released, m inus any fees payable to the crowd-
funding intermediary.69 Where the target is not reached, the
contributionsarereturnedtothefunder.70 This model is the all-
or-nothing model or the threshold pledge model.71 The key
featureofthismodelisthattheplatform and theprojectowner
agreeon a concretepledging period and thefundingtarget.72 The
fundersprom isetopaya specified am ountonlyifthesettarget
64 EURO. SECU. MKT. AUTH., POSITION PAPER:CROWDFUNDING 3 (Apr.
2014), http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2014-smsg-010.pdf[https://perma
.cc/T6NZ-NB8B].
65 LarsHornuf& Armin Schwienbacher, The Emergence of Crowdinvesting
in Europe 2 (U. of Munich Dept of Econ., Discussion Paper No. 2014-43, 
2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2481994[https://perma.cc/6HDF-X5XB].
66 See J. Barrett, Crowdfunding: Some Legal and Policy Considerations, 18
N.Z. BUS. L. QUARTERLY 296, 296 (2012).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Joachim Hemer, A Snapshot on Crowdfunding 1516 (FraunhoferInst.
forSy. and Innovation Res., Working PaperNo. R2/2011, 2011), http://www
.econstor.eu/handle/10419/52302 [https://perma.cc/5EYR-DTLE].
72 Id. at15.
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thresholdisreachedwithinaspecifiedperiod. Theyprovidepledges
andthepledgedamountsaretypicallyheldin an escrow account
managed eitherbythecrowdfundingplatform ora partnerfinan-
cialinstitution.73 Interested funderscan view thecurrentstatus
oftheprojectandthenumberandamountofincomingpledges.74
Paym entsareonly released from theescrow accountand trans-
ferred totheprojectownerifthefundingtargetisreached.75 This
isintended toprotectthesingleinvestor, asfundsareonlypay-
ableifalargenumberofinvestorsarewillingtofundaproject.
Underacrowdlendingmodel, thethresholdprincipleisapplied
toreleaseloanpledgesfrom thecrowdoncethetargetloanamount
isreached.76 TheP2PL providerthen collectstherepaym entin-
stallm entsfrom the debtor(the projectinitiator), and forwards
them toeachcrowdlender.77
In an equityorinvestm entm odel, theplatform and theproj-
ectinitiators define a time period and targetthreshold.78 This
targetisthen divided intothousandsofequalslices, which are
offered as equity shares or to crowd investors at a specified price
forexam ple, $10 pershare.79 Crowdinvestorsthen pledgetobuy
thesharesifthetargetthresholdisreached.80 Someplatforms, such
asthe French platform wiseed.com , may also create subsidiary
companiestohold allofthesharesin thecrowdfunded venture,
which arethen on-soldtothecrowd.81 Here, asubsidiarycompany
actsasasingleinvestorin theproposedventureandsellsshares
tocrowd investors.82 From theperspectiveoftheissuingfirm, one
advantage ofa specialpurpose vehicle (SPV)holding sharesin
an issueron behalfofinvestorsisthatinvestm entsarepooled.83
Rather than having a fragmented share register with a large
num ber ofsm allinvestors, the crowdfunding firm can reduce
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at16.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 GUIDE ENTREPRENEUR, https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/wiseed-pub
lic-fr/mediatheque/guide_entrepreneurs.pdf[https://perma.cc/QA73-736B].
82 Id.
83 Id.
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transaction costsby utilizing an interposed SPV between itself
anditsinvestors.84
Finally, somecrowdfundingplatform smayonlytargetmem-
bers ofa closed circle ofpotentialinvestors, and function in a
similarvein to investm entclubs or angelinvestor groups. For
exam ple, theymayonlytargetaccreditedinvestors. Thismaybe
referred to asthe club model.85 Two examples ofthis modelin
theUnited States, CircleUp and FundersClub, arerestricted to
accredited investors.86 Theaim istoreducethesizeofthecrowd
tothoseforwhom investmentsaremadeavailable.87 Thismayalso
beachievedthrough theimposition ofhigh investmentminimums,
theeffectofwhich istomakeplatformsonly availabletoinves-
torswhoareabletoadheretosuch limits.
C. Historical Background
Crowdfunding is not a new phenom enon. For instance, a
cam paign in 1884 led by the newspaperproprietorJoseph Pu-
litzerhelped fund theinstallation ofthepedestalfortheStatue
ofLiberty in New York Harbor with donations of$1 orless.88
84 ThisstructureisutilizedbytheU.K. equitycrowdfundingplatform Seedrs.
See SEEDRS, http://www.nea2fguide.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/FAQ-SEE
DRS.pdf[https:/perma.cc/6M7D-8FNU]. Seedrsusesthefollowingdisclaimer:
Thenomineestructureallowsustomanagetheinvestmentfor
you whilestillgivingyou thefulleconomicinterestin thebusi-
ness. Ifyou held the sharesdirectly, you would have to deal
with the various obligations and hassles of being a legal
shareholder, and the start-up would have to manage the ad-
ministrative complexities ofhaving a large number ofshare-
holders. Byusinganomineestructure, you getthebenefitsof
being a shareholder financial returns as well keeping in-
form ed about the businesss progress and the start-ups gets 
thebenefitsofyourinvestmentwithouteitherofyou having
tofacetheburdensofadirectshareholding.
Id.
85 Hemer, supra note71, at17.
86 See CIRCLEUP, https:/circleup.com/faq/#investors-q-can-non-accredited-in
vestors-invest[https:/perma.cc/L5UF-V696];FUNDERSCLUB, https:/support.fund
ersclub.com/hc/en-us/articles/204968777-How-do-I-start-investing-with-Funders
Club[https://perma.cc/6U5X-32LT].
87 Hemer, supra note71, at17.
88 The Statue of Liberty and Americas Crowdfunding Pioneer, BBC
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-21932675 [https://perma
.cc/7GQ8-FCGM].
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Pulitzer helped raise m ore than $100,000 in six m onths from
125,000 people.89
In itsmodern iteration, crowdfunding can be traced back to
the microfinance and microcreditmovements.90 Thus, crowdfund-
inghasbeen described asthefusion oftwopreexistingconcepts,
namely crowdsourcing and microfinance, 91 and is generally re-
garded as a progression of the crowdsourcing model described
above.92 Theobjectiveofthemicrofinancem ovementistoreduce
poverty among im poverished communitiesby facilitating access
to finance for individuals who cannotaccess traditionalbank-
based financing.93 Receiving parties demonstrate creditworthi-
nessto financiersordonorsby aggregating individualclaim s.94
A keycharacteristicofm icrofinanceisthatindividualsdonating
orlendingmoneycan developapersonalconnection tothebene-
ficiariesoftheircontributionsbecausethey provideloansbased
on theprofilesofthebeneficiariesand theirgoals, asopposed to
providingfundingthrough opaqueintermediariesorotherlending
channels.95 TheGrameen Bank, established overthirty yearsago
toassistthepoorin thedevelopingworld, isregardedasapioneer
in thefieldofm icrofinanceandaprecursortocrowdlending.96 A
crucial difference between crowdfunding and microfinance is
thatunderacrowdfundingmodel, thesizeofinvestmentisscaled
89 Id.
90 See generally BEATRIZ ARMENDARIZ & JONATHAN MORDUCH, THE ECO-
NOMICS OF MICROFINANCE (2d ed. 2010);ABHIJIT BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO,
POOR ECONOMICS:A RADICAL RETHINKING OF THE WAY TO FIGHT GLOBAL
POVERTY (reprint ed. 2012); 5 HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS:
470377 (Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig eds., 2009) (Neth.); see also J.
Morduch, The Microfinance Promise, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1569 (1999).
91 Richard Harrison, Crowdfunding and the Revitalization of the Early
Stage Risk Capital Market: Catalyst or Chimera?, 15(4)VENTURE CAP.:INTL
J. ENTREPRENEURIAL FIN. 283, 285 (2013).
92 STEVEN DRESNER, CROWDFUNDING:A GUIDE TO RAISING CAPITAL ON THE
INTERNET 45 (2014).
93 Anand Giriharadas& Keith Bradsher, Microloan Pioneer and His Bank
Win Nobel Peace Prize, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com
/2006/10/13/business/14nobelcnd.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/42L9-BMUB];see
also Jon Westover, The Record of Microfinance: The Effectiveness/Ineffectiveness
of Microfinance as a Means of Alleviating Poverty, ELEC. J. SOC. (2008).
94 Giriharadas& Bradsher, supra note93.
95 See KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/lend [https://perma.cc/FM7G-AB8U];see
also KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about/microfinance[https://perma.cc/W9LZ-EJ4P].
96 See GREENBANK, http://www.grameen-info.org/[https://perma.cc/55TP-H
9JA].
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down owingtomasssupportorcrowd support, whereasundera
microfinancemodel, theaggregateamountsoughtisscaleddown.97
Thisdoesnotprecludethecrowdfundingofmicroloansormicro-
donation cam paigns.98
In the developed world, crowdfunding firstemerged in the
musicand film industries.99 Thisisconsistentwith privatespon-
sorship and donationshistoricallyfavoringtheartsand culture.
McFedries suggests the term crowdfunding was first used in 
2006.100 MichaelSullivan coinedtheterm todescribehiswebsite
fundavlog.com , which promoted videoblogs.101 In 2009, theterm
gainedprominencewith theestablishm entofthepopularcrowd-
fundingplatform Kickstarter.102 Theriseofwebsitessuch asFace-
book, Twitter, and LinkedIn websitesgenerallyassociatedwith
the emergence of Web 2.0 as well as the popular paym ent ser-
vicessitePayPal, enabledcrowdfundingtogaingreatervisibility.103
II. SME FINANCING AND THE GFC
A. The Financing Problem for SMEs
SMEscom prisethem ajorityofbusinessesin mostEuropean
Union countries and are the key private sector em ployment
driver.104 Forexam ple, in theEuropean Union, SMEsrepresent
99 percentofallEuropean enterprises.105 They accountfor58.6
97 DRESNER, supra note92, at35.
98 Id.
99 See Tim Kappel, Ex Ante Crowdfunding and the Recording Industry: A
Model for the U.S.?, 29 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 375 (2009).
100 Paul McFedries, Crowdfunding, WORDSPY (2013), http://www.word
spy.com/words/crowdfunding.as[https://perma.cc/8H66-TX7E]; see also KEVIN
LAWTON & DAN MAROM, THE CROWDFUNDING REVOLUTION:SOCIAL NETWORK-
ING MEETS VENTURE FINANCING 49 (2010).
101 Daniela Castrataro, A Social History of Crowdfunding, SOC. MEDIA
WEEK (2011), http://socialmediaweek.org/blog/2011/12/a-social-history-of-crowd
funding/[https://perma.cc/P5BR-PJXJ].
102 Id.
103 DRESNER, supra note92, at11.
104 EUROSTAT, KEY FIGURES ON EUROPEAN BUSINESS, 1011 (2011), http://ec 
.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3930297/5967534/KS-ET-11-001-EN.PDF [https:
//perma.cc/HUV4-TJLS];see also EUR. COMMN, EUROPEAN COMMISSION ACTION
PLAN 1 (2011), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-879_fr.htm?lo
cale=en[https://perma.cc/7T5E-JAM5].
105 EUROSTAT, supra note104, at11.
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percent of the total gross value added (GVA) produced by pri-
vatebusinessesand providemorethan two-thirdsofallemploy-
mentopportunitiesintheprivatesector.106
The continued economicrelevance ofSMEsiscontingenton
theirabilitytoobtain financeforsustainablegrowth. SME access
tofinancetendstobeacommon issueconfrontingboth developing
and developed countries.107 Forexam ple, 97 percentofallenter-
prises in New Zealand have fewer than twenty employees and
arehenceSMEs.108 TheformerMinistryofEconomicDevelopment
in New Zealand notes that access to financing can be an issue 
for startup firms and firms thathave intellectualproperty on
account of their lack of collateral and likely cash flow.109 Simi-
larly, a recentWorld Bank study notesthat, whileSMEsmake
up alargepartoftheem ergingprivatesectorin mostcountries,
they are more constrained in theiraccessto capitalthan large
firms.110 These constraints are more pronounced in developing
asopposed todeveloped countries, with SME loansconstituting
13 percentofGDP in developedcountries, comparedto3 percent
in thedevelopingworld.111
The GFC downturn resulted in a deterioration offinancing
conditions. 112 The European Com mission in its Consultation
Paperon Crowdfundingin theEU observesthat European SMEs 
106 Id.
107 Thorsten Beck etal., Is Small Beautiful? Financial Structure, Size and
Access to Finance 2 (WorldDev., WorkingPaperNo. 5806, 2011), https://www
.researchgate.net/publication/228202340_Is_Small_Beautiful_Financial_Structure
_Size_and_Access_to_Finance[https://perma.cc/B2PY-HALS].
108 New Zealand Business Demography Statistics: At February 2014, STA-
TISTICS N.Z. (2014), http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/businesses/busi
ness_characteristics/BusinessDemographyStatistics_HOTPFeb14.aspx [https://
perma.cc/E44G-9X85].
109 MINISTRY OF ECO. DEV., supra note37, at9.
110 Becketal., supra note 107, at 1314. 
111 Oya PinarArdicetal., Small and Medium Enterprises: A Cross-Country
Analysis with a New Data Set 5 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 5538,
2011), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/[https://perma.cc/CGX8-RBX4].
112 See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE IMPACT OF
THE GLOBAL CRISIS ON SME AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP FINANCING AND POLICY
RESPONSES 17 (2009), http://www.oecd.org/cfe/smes/43183090.pdf[https://perma
.cc/XH46-JYW4](Ger.). In theGerman context, see MichaelBräuninger& Jörg
Hinze, Konjunkturschlaglicht: Deutschland in der Rezession, 88(12)WIRT-
SCHAFTSDIENST 823 (2008)(Ger.)and Mechthild Schrooten, Internationale
FinanzkriseKonsequenzen für das deutsche Finanzsystem, 88(8) WIRT-
SCHAFTSDIENST 508 (2008)(Ger.).
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largely depend on bank financing, butsince the financialcrisis
banks are m uch m ore restrictive in their lending.113 Forexam -
ple, in the United Kingdom alone, there wasan estimated gap
between thedemand and supplyofSME lendingofbetween £26
billion and£59 billion in 2012.114 Similarly, in theUnited States,
oneofthemain negativeoutcomesoftheGFC crisiswastheloss
ofbank funding forSMEs.115 According to the FederalDeposit
InsuranceCorporation, banksheldroughly$590 billion ofsm all-
business loans in the third quarter in 2014 still 17 percent 
below 2008 highs.116 This phenomenon has far-reaching effects
on economic development and job creation because new firms
have specialimportance in generating new jobs. In the United
States, emergingcompaniesgeneratean averageofthreem illion
jobsin thefirstyear, whereasoldercom paniesloseonem illion
jobsannually.117 Theproblem iscompoundedintheUnitedStates
byaslowdowninthenumberofstartups.118
In the Eurozone, there is em piricalevidence to show that
SMEsplaceincreased im portanceon non-bank lending and the
institutionsprovidingit, with SMEsrelyingon alternativeforms
offinancesuch asleasingcontracts.119 A 2013 reportbytheEu-
ropean CentralBanksuggeststhatthesm allerafirm , thelarger
thelikelihood thatitsfunding application willbedeclined by a
113 EUR. COMMN, CONSULTATION PAPER:CROWDFUNDING IN THE EU
EXPLORING THE ADDED VALUE OF POTENTIAL EU ACTION 6 (2013).
114 GR. BRITAIN DEPT FOR BUS., INNOVATION AND SKILLS, BREEDON
REPORT:BOOSTING FINANCE OPTIONS FOR BUSINESS 16 (2012), https://www
.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32230/12-668
-boosting-finance-options-for-business.pdf[https://perma.cc/3V3Q-5L93].
115 DRESNER, supra note92, at9.
116 Loten& Simon, supra note1, atB5.
117 See TIM KANE, KAUFFMAN FOUND., THE IMPORTANCE OF STARTUPS IN JOB
CREATION AND JOB DESTRUCTION 2, 6 (2010), http:/www.kauffman.org/~/media
/kauffman_org/research%20reports%20and%20covers/2010/07/firm_formation_im
portance_of_startups.pdf[https://perma.cc/VWK7-ADL8].
118 See RobertLitan, Start-Up Slowdown, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2015), https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2014-12-15/start-slowdown[https:/per
ma.cc/LDL9-Q7NE].
119 HelmutKraemer-Eis& FrankLang, The Importance of Leasing for SME
Finance (Eur. Inv. FundResearch& Mkt. Analysis, WorkingPaperNo. 2012/15,
2012), http://www.eif.org/news_centre/research/eif_wp_2012_15_The%20impor
tance%20of%20leasing%20for%20SME%20finance_August_2102.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Z8CR-UR44].
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bank.120 The rate for rejection was 17.9 percentformicro enter-
prises, followedby13.5 percentforsm allenterprises, 5.7 percent
for m edium-sized enterprises, and 3.4 percentfor large enter-
prises.121 There are alsosignificantvariationsbetween member
states with respectto SMEs access to banking finance.122 Ac-
cordingly, itis pertinentto review SME financing and explore
alternativesourcesoffinancing. Whiletherearem anysourcesof
financing, ourfocusisonSME accesstoP2PL andECF.123
B. Sources of Finance for SMEs
1. Public Equity
Stock exchangesplaya keyrolein m obilizing equity capital.
However, in som e jurisdictions, where the legalprotections of
creditors are strong, a preference has arisen forbank-oriented
financing models.124 The introduction ofthe BaselCapitalAc-
cords Basel II and Basel IIIandtheGFC downturn, however,
haveled to a tightening ofbank creditpolicies.125 BaselII trig-
gered a fundamental change in banks attitudes towards SMEs.126
The recom mendationsadopted by the BaselCommittee require
bankstoestablish rating processes, which areintended tomore
accurately assess the risks ofgranting a loan.127 Quantitative
120 See EUR. COMMN, SURVEY ON THE ACCESS TO FINANCE OF ENTERPRISES
4 (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/growth/access-to-finance/data-surveys/index_en
.htm [https://perma.cc/6U6G-DT24];EUR. COMMN, EVALUATION OF MARKET
PRACTICES AND POLICIES ON SME RATING 6 (2014)http://ec.europa.eu/enter
prise/policies/finance/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/6D4B-NPEQ].
121 EVALUATION OF MARKET PRACTICES AND POLICIES ON SME RATING,
supra note120, at6.
122 Id.
123 On generalsourcesoffinance, seeAllen N. Berger& GregoryF. Udell,
A More Complete Conceptual Framework for SME Finance, 30 J. BANKING &
FIN. 2945, 294852 (2006). 
124 RAFAEL LA PORTA ET AL., WORLD BANK, INVESTOR PROTECTION:ORIGINS,
CONSEQUENCES, REFORM 1718 (1999), http://www1.worldbank.org/finance
/assets/images/Fs01_web1.pdf[https://perma.cc/N43T-P5EW].
125 Dorothea Schäfer, The New Basel Capital Accord and its Impact on
Small and Medium-sized Companies, 40(6)ECON. BULL. 209, 209 (2003).
126 Id.
127 See Alexandra Schindele & Andrea Szczesny, Debt Costs of German
SMEs in the Dilemma of Basel II and the Financial Crisis (Univ. ofWuerzburg
WorkingPaper, 2013), http://www.researchgate.net/publication/281088344 _The
_impact_of_Basel_II_on_the_debt_costs_of_German_SMEs [https://perma.cc/X9
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and qualitative aspects are taken into account.128 One conse-
quence ofBaselII has been to reduce the ability ofbanks to
grantloans during economic downturns.129 Banks are required
to apply theirratings, which increasestheirrisk awareness.130
Banksnow demand more transparency when lending and gen-
erallyareonlywillingtolendtowell-establishedcompanies.131
Asaresult, SMEsfacehurdlesin satisfyingtherisk require-
m entsofbanks, makingitcriticalforthem toconsideralternative
sourcesoffinance, suchasshadow banking132 andpublicequity.133
Butwhilean IPO allowscompaniestoraisenew capital, italso
triggersarangeofdisclosureobligations. New entrantsencounter
a multitudeofcoststhrough both theIPO processand thecon-
tinuingobligationsand expensesassociated with goingpublic.134
Thefixednatureofsomecompliancecostscreatesadisproportion-
ateburden onSMEs, reducingtheattractivenessofan IPO.135 In
fact, IPOsforstartupsarerelativelyrare.136
NH-LTVB];see also Monica Bartolinietal., International Financial Report-
ing Standards and SMEs: The Effects on Firm Rating According to Basel II,
10(1)INTL J. ACCT., AUDITING & PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 43, 48 (2014).
128 Bartolinietal., supra note127, at55.
129 RYM AYADI & ANDREA RESTI, THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND THE
FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM, CTR. FOR EUR. POLY STUDIES
44(2004).
130 HENDRIK HAKANES & ISABEL SCHNABEL, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR RESEARCH
ON COLLECTIVE GOODS, BANK SIZE AND RISK TAKING UNDER BASEL II 2123 (2011), 
http:/www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2005_06online.pdf[https:/perma.cc/94UU-4XL4].
131 Crowdfunding: Many Scrappy Returns, ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 2011, at
36;see also AYADI & RESTI, supra note129, at45;JEFF MADURA, FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS 507 (MichaelR. Reynolds, 8th ed. 2008);WORLD
BANK, GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014:FINANCIAL INCLUSION
129 (2014).
132 See Shadow and Substance, ECONOMIST, May 10, 2014, at 116. 
133 MittelstandsMonitor 2009: Deutsche Wirtschaft in der RezessionTalfahrt 
auch im Mittelstand 53, KFW BANKENGRUPPE (2009)(Ger.), ftp://ftp.zew.de
/pub/zew-docs/mimo/MittelstandsMonitor_2009.pdf.
134 XiaohuiGao etal., Where Have All the IPOs Gone?, 48(6)J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1663, 1675, 1687 (2013).
135 MichaelDambra etal., The JOBS Act and IPO Volume: Evidence that
Disclosure Affects the IPO Decision, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 121, 12425. See
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE:EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 293
(BjörnEspenEckboed., 1sted. 2007).
136 Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting: Hearing
Before Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong.
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Thepastdecadehaswitnessed a waveofregulatorychanges
thathaveincreased the costsassociated with going public. The
proliferation offraud casesin the wake ofthe corporate gover-
nancecrisisattheend of1990screated a shifttowardsgreater
corporate transparency and accountability.137 In particular, the
post-Enron American crisis provided an im petus for increased
regulation ofIPO markets.138 As a result, SMEs faced higher
entrybarriers, reducingthebenefitsofanIPO.139
In response to increased regulation, a number ofsecurities
exchangeshavereorganizedtheirmarketsegmentswith theaim
ofreducing the costs ofentry and prom oting greater access to
publicequitycapital.140 A featureofthenew frameworksisthat
initiallisting and subsequentdisclosure requirem entsprogress
from thelowesttothehighestmarketsegment.141 Theemergence
oflower-tiermarketsegments, such astheAlternativeInvestment
Market(AIM)atthe London Stock Exchange (LSE), Alternext
on the NYSE Euronext, accesson the Munich Stock Exchange,
the AlternativeMarket(NZAX)and itssuccessor(NXT)on the
New ZealandExchange, ortheGrowth EnterpriseMarket(GEM)
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, represent a major experi-
m ent in m arket design.142 However, thesemarketsegmentsare
13 (2011) (statement of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor 
ofLaw, ColumbiaUniversityLaw School).
137 CORPORATE, PUBLIC AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:THE G8 CONTRIBUTION
68 (MicheleFratiannietal. eds., 2007). See OLIVER MARNET, BEHAVIOUR AND
RATIONALITY IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 175 (2008); Gregory A. Mark,
Realms of Choice: Finance Capitalism and Corporate Governance, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 969, 979 (1995);EdwardB. Rock, Americas Shifting Fascination with 
Comparative Corporate Governance, 74 WASH. U. L. QUARTERLY 367, 37577 
(1996);Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Com-
parative Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 2021, 2029 (1993); Margaret OSullivan, 
Corporate Governance and Globalization, 570 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 153, 154(2000).
138 Sharon Hannes, Managers vs. Regulators: Post-Enron Regulation and
the Great Depression, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 279, 31819 (2013). 
139 Id.
140 Valerie Revest & Alessandro Sapio, Does the Alternative Investment
Market Nurture Firm Growth? A Comparison between Listed and Private
Companies, 4INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 953, 956 (2013).
141 Id. at955;see LONDON STOCK EXCH. PLC, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR
MAIN MARKET AND AIM COMPANIES 94(NigelPageed., 2012).
142 LauraBottazzi& MarcoDaRin, Europes New Stock Markets (EFA 2003
AnnualConference Paper, Innocenzo GaspariniInst. for Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 218, 2002), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
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rarely accessed by SMEs. Asa result, smallentrepreneurscon-
tinuetofacefinancingconstraints, despitetheseinnovations.
Againstthisbackground, crowdfunding offersa viablealter-
nativeforSME fundraising. Moreover, crowdfunding can precede
otherform soffinancingsuch asbank financing, angeland ven-
turecapitalfinancing, and IPOs, therebyhelpingstartupsmove
up the funding escalator.143 In particular, crowdfunding has
thepotentialtofunction wellin theseed phaseoffinance, when a
relatively smallam ountofm oney m ightbe sufficientto geta
projectoffthe ground. Seed financing isparticularly im portant
in the design and developmentphase ofthe venture financing
lifecyclewhilethebusinessisstilltakingshape.144 Thisstagepre-
cedesthestartupphase, wherefirm sarebeginningtorealizean
idea orproductand enterintotheproductdevelopmentstage.145
Duringthisstageoffinancing, capitalisneededtodevelopan idea
orproductandthefirm isunlikelytohavem adeanycom mercial
profityet.146 Later, oncethefirm hasdeveloped itsproducts, the
firm islikelytoenterintoanexpansion-developmentstagerequir-
ing additionalcapitalto further finance increased production,
m akenew acquisitions, andincreaseitsworkingcapital.147
2. Private Equity
Priortothe IPO stage, SMEsrely on severalheterogeneous
providersoffinance.148 Atlaw, theseprovidersaccesscarveouts
_id=319260 [https://perma.cc/CK5H-73BD]. See Stephanie Rousseau, London
Calling? The Experience of the Alternative Investment Market and the
Competitiveness of Canadian Stock Exchanges, 23 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 51,
53 (2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=319260 [https://
perma.cc/T8YW-J46C].
143 EUR. COMMN, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE
AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS:UNLEASHING THE POTENTIAL OF CROWD-
FUNDING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 2 (2015), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/[https://
perma.cc/BS2F-VYEP].
144 MateoRossi, The New Ways to Raise Capital: An Explanatory Study of
Crowdfunding, 5(2) INTL J. FIN. RES. 8, 9 (2014), http://www.sciedu.ca
/journal/index.php/ijfr/article/viewFile/4536/2618 [https:/perma.cc/J3R7-P35J].
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 OECD, GLOBALISATION AND SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES (SMES)
117 (1997).
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orexclusionstoprospectusrequirements, such asthoseapplying
to sophisticated or accredited investors.149 The private equity
m arketiscom prised ofinform alnetworksandinstitutions, such
as high net worth individuals known as angels and specialized 
financial interm ediaries venture capitalists who provide di-
rectcapitaltopromisingfirms.150 Privateequityprovidescapital
to firmsthathave difficultiesraising sufficientdebtfinance or
obtainingpublicequitycapital.151 Accordingly, theprivateequity
markethas the potentialto fillthe gap between self-financing
and conventionalcapitalmarketactivityby offeringentrepreneurs
an attractivem idpoint.152
Privateequityoffersanumberofbenefits.153 First, in compari-
son to debt, private equity does notresultin fixed repaym ent
obligations.154 Another advantage is availability at an earlier
stage than debtfinancing.155 This is usefulfor firm s thatlack
assetscapableofbeingused ascollateral.156 Second, theprivate
equity infusion offunds enhances the credibility ofthe firm,
increasing itsnetworth and overallfinancialstrength.157 This,
in turn, im provestheaccessofthefirm tootherformsoffinanc-
ing, such asdebtfinancing.158
The provision of equity finance may increase a firms chances 
ofsurvival. Private investors can lend significant m anagerial
supportand advice.159 Theprovision offinancingbyaparticular
investormaylead toa preferred relationship with otherinstitu-
tions.160 Although the levelofinvolvementin a venture differs
149 17 §C.F.R. 230.506 (2015).
150 DOUGLAS J. CUMMING & SOFIA A. JOHAN, VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE
EQUITY CONTRACTING:AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 314 (2014). 
151 Id. at10.
152 RogerLeeds& JulieSunderland, Private Equity Investing in Emerging
Markets, 15(4)J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 111, 11112 (2003). 
153 SOPHIE MANIGART & MIGUEL MEULEMAN, FINANCING ENTREPRENEUR-
IAL COMPANIES:HOW TO RAISE PRIVATE EQUITY AS A HIGH GROWTH COMPANY
71 (2004).
154 GREG N. GREGORIOU ET AL., VENTURE CAPITAL IN EUROPE 314(2007).
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at316.
158 Id.
159 See OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 356, 413 (Mark Casson
etal. eds., 2006).
160 See INVESTOR ENGAGEMENT 85 (RoderickMartinetal. eds., 2007).
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between privateinvestors, monitoringcan providetheentrepre-
neurwith an incentivetomaxim izethevalueoftheventure.161
However, only a minority ofSMEs are able to obtain private
equity.162 Privateequityinvestorsareusuallyattracted torapidly
growing SMEs, such asinnovativetechnology firmswith a high
potentialforprofitsandexpansion.163
3. Venture Capital
ThisSection providesan insightintothefinancialbehaviorof
venturecapitalfirm sand investigatesa numberofcomplexfac-
tors, including the relatively slow developm entofthe venture
capitalindustry, theselection criteriaemployedbyventurecapi-
talfirm s, andtheim portanceofdifferentexitchannels. Venture
capitalissom etim esseen asasolution tothefinancingproblems
ofSMEs. However, as the following discussion demonstrates,
venturecapitalisonlyavailableforaminorityofSMEs, particu-
larly in thedeveloping world.164 Further, entrepreneurresistance
can prove to be an im portantbarrier when entrepreneurs are
unwillingtoconfercontrolrightstofinanciers.165
Theeconomicfunctionsofventurecapitalistcompaniesinclude
riskpooling, riskdiversification, specialization, andsyndication.166
Theventurecapitalistcarriesouttwoimportantfunctions:capi-
talacquisition and capitalprovision.167 Priortoinvesting in busi-
nesses, theventurecapitalisthastoaccum ulateenough capital
161 Id. at 11316. 
162 See DEPT FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, FINANCING A PRIVATE SECTOR
RECOVERY 14(2010).
163 Id. See generally PETER THIEL, ZERO TO ONE (2014).
164 See SHANTI DIVAKARAN, PATRICK J. MCGINNIS & MASOOD SHARIFF,
WORLD BANK, PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL IN SMES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 46 (Apr. 2014), http:/ssrn.com/abstract=2419273 [https:/perma.cc 
/5BGD-XFFA].
165 See NinaRosenbusch etal., Does Acquiring Venture Capital Pay Off for
the Funded Firms? A Meta-Analysis of the Relationship Between Venture
Capital Investment and Funded Firm Financial Performance, 28(3)J. BUS.
VENTURING 335, 33940, 348 (2013). 
166 See Xuan Tian, The Role of Venture Capital Syndication in Value
Creation for Entrepreneurial Firms, 16(1)REV. FIN. 245, 24647 (2012).
167 PAUL GOMPERS & JOSHUA LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 3 (2nd
ed. 2004).
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andsecurecommitmentsfrom investors.168 Traditionally, thepar-
ticipantsin venturecapitalfundsareinstitutionalinvestorsand
wealthy individuals.169 Examples ofcorporate venture programs
areGoogleVentures, DellVentures, andOracleVentures.170 Ven-
ture capitalfirms specialize in investing in particular types of
firms, considering the industry, technologies, geographic region,
and stage ofdevelopmentofthe firm . There are differencesbe-
tweenindividualandcorporateventurecapitalists.171
In the pre-investmentperiod, the venture capitalisthasthe
necessaryknowledgetoscreen firms, evaluaterisksandreturns,
conductduediligence, and contractwith young growth firm s.172
Venture capitalists act as institutionalized m eeting points for
entrepreneursand potentialinvestors;173 they havetheskillsto
identify profitable investm ent opportunities. In addition, ven-
turecapitalistsbearsearch and information costs, which results
in areduction in transaction costsincurred bytheoriginalsuppli-
ersoffinance.174 Forexample, theuseofstandardized contracts
168 Id.
169 See Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, 76(6)HARV. BUS. REV. 131
(1998), https://hbr.org/1998/11/how-venture-capital-works [https://perma.cc
/W5LE-X96B];Ram iRahal, Will Corporate Venture Capital Disrupt the Tra-
ditional Investment Ecosystem? (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com
/article/240904[https://perma.cc/VP2N-FM5L];TEREZA TYKVOVA & UWE WALZ,
CTR. FOR EUR. ECON. RESEARCH, ARE IPOS OF DIFFERENT VCS DIFFERENT? 7
10 (Apr. 2004), http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp0432.pdf[https://perma.cc
/48T3-KTXP].
170 Id. at1214. See Sandip Basu, CoreyPhelps& Suresh Kotha, Towards
Understanding Who Makes Corporate Venture Capital Investments and Why,
26(2)J. BUS. VENTURING 153 (2011);see also David Benson & Rosemarie H.
Ziedonis, Corporate Venture Capital as a Window on New Technologies, 20(2)
ORG. SCI. 329 (2009).
171 See LucArmelG. Da Gbadji, BenoitGailly & Armin Schwienbacher,
International Analysis of Venture Capital Programs of Large Corporations
and Financial, 39(5)ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRACTICE 1213 (2014),
foradiscussion on corporateventurecapitalists(detailingthedevelopmentof
thecorporateventurecapitalbusinessmodel).
172 E.g. Annalise Croce, José Martí& Samuele Murtinu, The Impact of
Venture Capital on the Productivity Growth of European Entrepreneurial
Firms: Screening or Value Added Effect?, 28(4)J. BUS. VENTURING 489,
49091 (2013). 
173 See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the
Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47(3) J. FIN.
ECON. 243, 245, 24851 (1998). 
174 GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note167, at157, 160, 241.
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reducesnegotiation costs.175 Consequently, venturecapitalistshave
a levelofexpertise thatjustifiestheirinvolvem entasfinancial
intermediaries. In thepost-investm entperiod, theactivepartic-
ipation ofventurecapitalistsin themonitoringofthefirm leads
tomitigation ofagencycosts.176 Theventurecapitalistm aybein
a betterposition than the originalsuppliers offinance to deal
with market imperfections and reduce agency costs resulting
from theopportunisticbehaviorofentrepreneurialowners.177
Agency theory has been applied to venture capitalinvest-
ments, even though such investments occur in private compa-
nies.178 Itisworth notingthattheventurecapitalfirm itselfacts
as an agenton behalfofthe originalprovidersofcapital.179 In
fact, theventurecapitalfirm fulfillsadualrole:itactsasboth a
principaland an agent.180 The venture capitalistassum es the
role ofthe originalsupplieroffinance in providing finance and
m onitoring thefirm .181 Theobjectiveoftheoriginalprovidersof
capitalis to maxim ize the value oftheir investm ent. High re-
turns, stabilitythrough diversification, and liquidityarekeycon-
cernsfortheinvestors.
175 See KEVIN MCNALLY, CORPORATE VENTURE CAPITAL:BRIDGING THE
EQUITY GAP IN THE SMALL BUSINESS SECTOR 200 (DavidStoryed. 1997).
176 See ViolettaGerasymenko& JonathanD. Arthurs, New Insights into Ven-
ture Capitalists Activity: IPO and Time-to-Exit Forecast as Antecedents of their 
Post-Investment Involvement, 29(3)J. BUS. VENTURING 405, 408, 419 (2014).
177 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 167, at171;see also FREDERIC S.
MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS:
INTERNATIONAL EDITION 194(8th ed. 2008). Cash-efficientstartupsmayneed
less monitoring by venture capitalists. Darian M. Ibrahim, Should Angel-
Backed Startups Reject Venture Capital?, 2 MICH. J. PRIV. EQUITY & VENTURE
CAP. L. 251, 252, 26162 (2013). 
178 John Callahan & Steven Muegge, Venture Capitals Role in Innovation,
in INTL HANDBOOK ON INNOVATION 641, 654 (Larisa V. Shavinina ed. 2003);
see MichaelKlausner& KateLitvak, What Economists Have Taught us About
Venture Capital Contracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING
GAP 54, 5657 (Michael J. Whincop ed., 2001). 
179 See PIERRE-YVES MATHONET & THOMAS MEYER, J-CURVE EXPOSURE:
MANAGING A PORTFOLIO OF VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS
25456 (2007). 
180 Id.
181 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note167, at3.
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There are inter-country differences concerning the size and
effectivenessoftheventurecapitalm arket.182 Theventurecapi-
talm arketisa vibrantsourceofdirectcapitalforSMEsin the
UnitedStates, butthiscannotbesaidofallcountries.183 Thelevels
ofventure capitalfinancing are higher in developed countries
due to the presence ofestablished public capitalm arkets and
institutionalinvestors.184 Lookingatthedifferencesbetween the
European Union and theUnited States, itisclearthattheU.S.
venture capitalindustry is more developed. For instance, the
average European venture capitalfund issmall, containing on
average approxim ately 60 m illion vis-à-vis 130 million in the 
United States, which issmallerthan theoptimalsizenecessary
formaking a substantialcontribution toindividualcompanies.185
Moreover, U.S. venture capital funds invest around 4 m illion 
on average in a company com pared to 2 million invested by 
theirEuropean counterparts.186 Early-stagecapitalinvestm ents
in the United States are, on average, 2.2 m illion per com pany, 
while such investm ents amount to an average of 400,000 per 
companyin theEuropean setting.187
182 See GarryD. Bruton, VanceH. Fried & SophieManigart, Institutional
Influences on the Worldwide Expansion of Venture Capital, 29(6)ENTRE-
PRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRACTICE 737 (2005);see also Yong Li& ShakerA.
Zahra, Formal Institutions, Culture, and Venture Capital Activity: A Cross-
Country Analysis, 27(1)J. BUS. VENTURING 95 (2012).
183 See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons
from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 106869 (2003); Paul 
A. Gompers& JoshuaLerner, The Venture Capital Revolution, 15(2)J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 145, 145, 163 (2001);Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works,
76(6)HARV. BUS. REV. 131, 132 (1998).
184 See generally Pekka Stenholm, Zoltan J. Acs & Robert Wuebker,
Exploring Country Level Institutional Arrangements on the Rate and Type of
Entrepreneurial Activity, 28(1)J. BUS. VENTURING 176 (2013).
185 See PressRelease, European Commission, New EU fundraising rules:
boostingventurecapitalforSMEsand easingaccesstocredit(Dec. 7, 2011),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1513_en.htm?locale=en#footnote-1
[https://perma.cc/ULB8-RL8A];see also JOSH LERNER ET AL., NESTA, ATLANTIC
DRIFT:VENTURE CAPITAL PERFORMANCE IN THE UK AND THE US 14(June2011),
http://www.nesta.org.uk/sites/default/files/atlantic_drift.pdf [https://perma.cc
/6TCN-8A4S].
186 Id.
187 Kristiina Raade& Catarina DantasMachado, Recent Developments in
the European Private Equity Markets, EUR. COMMN 26 (Apr. 2008), http://ec
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Generally, onlyafraction offirmsthatsubm itbusinessplans
toventurecapitalorganizationsaresuccessful.188 Withouta good
risk-return ratio, a com panyisunlikelytobedeem ed an attrac-
tiveinvestm ent. Venturecapitalistsoften prefertomakeasmall
numberoflarge investmentsinstead ofspreading theirinvest-
mentsovera large numberofsmallerbusinesses.189 Itiscostly
fortheventurecapitalfund managertomonitoralargenumber
offirmsintheportfolio. Further, privateinvestorsinventurecapi-
talist funds may favor later-stage deals.190 Early-stage invest-
ments are considered to be higher risk. 191 Such investments
requirea long-term strategy.192 Theselection ofprofitablelater-
stageinvestm entsenablestheventurecapitalisttobuildarepu-
tation withouthavingtowaitfortheinvestm enttomaterialize.
After closing the fund, the venture capitalistcollects infor-
mation aboutpotentialinvestm ents and prom otes the fund.193
Theventurecapitalistthen screenscom paniesandconductsdue
diligence to determ ine the strengths, weaknesses, profitability,
andrisksassociatedwith particularventures.194 Venturecapital
firm suseanumberofselection criteriatodecideon thesuitabil-
ity ofpotentialapplicantfirms.195 The selection processusually
.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication12419_en.pdf[https://perma
.cc/Y7GH-X7XZ].
188 See generally PaulA. Gompers& Joshua Lerner, The Money of Inven-
tion: How Venture Capital Creates New Wealth, 2(43)UBIQUITY 1 (2002);Armin
Schwienbacher, Financing the Business, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 193, 195 (TedBaker& FriederikeWeltereds., 2015).
189 MARK VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBERT J. ROBINSON, ANGEL INVESTING:
MATCHING START-UP FUNDS WITH START-UP COMPANIES 25 (2000).
190 GREG N. GREGORIU ET AL., VENTURE CAPITAL IN EUROPE 29 (1st ed.
2007);see also DouglasCumming, Public Economics Gone Wild: Lessons from
Venture Capital, 36 INTL REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 259 (2014).
191 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note167, at145.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 39798. 
194 See SuzannedeTreville, JeffreyS. Petty& Stefan Wager, Economies of
Extremes: Lessons from Venture Capital Decision Making, 32 J. OPERATIONS
MGMT. 387, 390 (2014).
195 Id. at389. See ThomasHellmann, Entrepreneurship and the Process of
Obtaining Resources, 16(1)J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 81, 8182 (2007); see
also Dan K. Hsu etal., What Matters, Matters Differently: A Cojoint Analysis
of the Decision Policies of Angel and Venture Capital Investors, 16(1)
VENTURE CAPITAL:INTL ENTREPRENEURIAL FIN. 1 (2014).
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consists ofan assessm ent ofthe abilities ofthe m anagem ent
team .196 The talents, experience, and skillsofthe m anagem ent
are considered a key determ ining factorin selection.197 Second,
theventurecapitalfirm willconsiderthepotentialm arketsize
oftheproductorserviceoffered by thefirm, itsoriginality, and
itsm arketability.198 The selected firm needsto fitintothegen-
eralinvestmentstrategy oftheventurecapitalist. Anotherpre-
condition often im posedisthattheapplicanthasobtainedoneor
severalroundsofangelfinancing.199 Theobjectiveistoselectan
enterprise with a good risk-return and provide itwith capital
andm anagem entsupportbeforesellingitatahigherprice.200
Oncesuitableinvestmentopportunitiesareidentified, theven-
ture capitalistseeks to reach an agreementwith the investee
businessaboutthedeal.201 Ifboth partiesagree, theventurecapi-
talfirm willbegin disbursing fundsto the firm.202 In the post-
investmentperiod, the venture capitalistmonitors the firm to
ensuretheproperuseoffunds.203 Attheendofthefundlifecycle,
venture capitalists seek to exitby selling their stake to third
partiesviaatradesale, an IPO, orasecondarytransaction.204
4. Business Angels
Venturecapitalistsand businessangelsplaysimilarrolesand
maysometimesco-invest.205 In essence, angelsareprivateinformal
196 See Hsuetal., supra note 195, at 23. 
197 Id.
198 Id. at8, 14, 20.
199 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note167, at183.
200 See Thomas F. Hellm ann & Veikko Thiele, Friends or Foes? The
Interrelationship between Angel and Venture Capital Markets, NATL BUREAU
OF ECON. RESEARCH 2 (May 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20147.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AB4F-S4S8].
201 Tyzoon T. Tyebjee & AlbertV. Bruno, A Model of Venture Capitalist
Investment Activity, 30(9)MGMT. SCI. 1051, 1053 (1984).
202 See Hsuetal., supra note195.
203 See Umit Ozmel, David T. Robinson & Toby E. Stuart, Strategic
Alliances, Venture Capital, and Exit Decisions in Early Stage High-Tech
Firms, 107(3)J. FIN. ECON. 655, 658 (2013).
204 See DouglasCumming, GrantFleming & Armin Schwienbacher, Legality
and Venture Capital Exits, 12(2)J. CORP. FIN. 214, 216 (2006);GOMPERS &
LERNER, supra note167, at397.
205 ANNAREETTA LUMME ET AL., INFORMAL VENTURE CAPITAL:INVESTORS,
INVESTMENTS AND POLICY ISSUES IN FINLAND 54 (1998);see also Christophe
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venture capitalists. The angelfinance market is a non-inter-
mediated marketwhich consistsofadiversepoolofinvestors.206
Businessangelsareprivateindividualswhousetheirown money
to investin an unlisted company in which they haveno family
connections. 207 Obtaining information about transactions be-
tween entrepreneurs and business angels is often difficultbe-
causesuch transactionsoccurin an informal, unregulatedmarket.
The m arketplace for angel finance is characterized by infor-
mationalopacity208 and operatesin obscurity.209 Finding business
angelscan bedifficult, asthey keep a low profileand preferto
remain anonymous; however, business angel networks have
emerged to allow entrepreneurstoconnectwith angels.210 Such
networksmay becompared tocrowdfunding portalsthatmatch
entrepreneurswith crowdinvestors.
Intheliterature, distinctionsaremadebetweentypesofangels,
includingbusinessandknowledgeangels.211 Ourfocusisonlyon
businessangels. Theprovision offinancetounlisted young and
high-growthfirmsisoneinvestmentoption.212 Businessangelscan
beselectiveand maychoosetoinvestin young growth firmsfor
diversification purposes.213 Given this, SMEs wishing to obtain
angelfinancingneed todemonstratethequalityoftheirventure.
Bonnet& PeterWirtz, Raising Capital for Rapid Growth in Young Technol-
ogy Ventures: When Business Angels and Venture Capitalists Coinvest, 14(23) 
VENTURE CAPITAL:INTL J. ENTREPRENEURIAL FIN. 91, 92 (2012).
206 See Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, The Economics of Small
Business Finance: The Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Finan-
cial Growth Cycle, 22(68) J. BANKING & FIN. 613, 630 (1998).
207 Colin M. Mason & Richard T. Harrison, Business Angel Networks and
the Development of the Informal Venture Capital Market in the U.K., 9(2)
SMALL BUS. ECON. 111, 112 (1997).
208 StuartPaul& GeoffWhittam, Manna from Heaven? The Entrepreneurs 
Experience of Angel Funding, in ADVANCES IN INTERDISCIPLINARY EUROPEAN
ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 321, 321 (MichaelDowlingetal., 2005).
209 Stephen Prowse, Angel Investors and the Market for Angel Investments,
22(68) J. BANKING & FIN. 785, 785 (1998).
210 Mason& Harrison, supra note207, at111.
211 See EmmanuelMulleretal., Knowledge Angels: fostering innovation in
knowledge-intensive business services through creative individualsObser-
vations from Canada, China, France, Germany and Spain 25 (2013), http://
www.jaheraud.eu/docrech/cccc/Knowledge_Angels_EM_AZ_JAH_2013.pdf[https:
/perma.cc/W9G3-WZT3].
212 Id.
213 See, e.g., Andrew L. Maxwelletal., Business angel early stage decision
making, 26(2)J. BUS. VENTURING 212 (2011).
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Businessangelsoften view themselvesasbeing constrained by
thelack ofprom ising entrepreneursand investmentprojects.214
Consequently, theydonotneed toallocateasignificantpercent-
ageoftheircapitaltotheirprivateequityportfolio.215
Businessangelsfrequently basetheirinvestmentdecisionson
idiosyncraticconsiderationsand may investatan earlierstage
than venture capitalists.216 Investing close to hom e may be im -
portant. The investors stage of life may also have an impact on 
thedecision andtheirwillingnesstoprovidefinancetoearly-stage
orlater-stage firms. Investorshave differentdegreesofexperi-
encein theinvestm entcycleand arelikelytoselectastagethat
allowsthem toapplytheirstrengths.217 Higher-risk investm ents
mayrequirealonger-term horizon forrealizingreturns.218 While
certain investorswillacceptlonger, otherswillnotwanttowait
severalyearsforgains.219
The individual considerations of business angels may not
matchtheneedsoftheventureortheobjectivesoftheentrepreneur.
Businessangelsmayrejectinvestmentopportunitiesbecausethey
areunfam iliarwith theunderlying technology. Alternatively, if
they havereason tobelievetheentrepreneurhasoverestimated
thevalueoftheventureanditsgrowth prospects, theymayrefuse
toprovidefinancing. Businessangels, however, maybemotivated
bynoneconomicconsiderationswhen providingfundstounquoted
firms.220 They may bewilling tomakea tradeoffbetween finan-
cialandnonfinancialreturns.221 Examplesofrelevantnoneconomic
motivationsincludetheexcitementofbeinginvolved in thedevel-
opmentofa new business, job creation, assisting minority entre-
preneurs, orfundingparticularhigh-technologyprojects.222
214 See, e.g., Colin M. Mason & RichardT. Harrison, Why Business Angels 
Say No: A Case Study of Opportunities Rejected by an Informal Investor
Syndicate, 14(2)INT. SMALL BUS. J. 35, 37 (1996).
215 Id. at36.
216 See, e.g., id. at36;see also Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling
Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1420 (2008).
217 See, e.g., Mason& Harrison, supra note214, at36.
218 See Ibrahim, supra 216, at1410.
219 See, e.g., id. at1408.
220 See Colin M. Mason & Richard T. Harrison, Is it worth it? The rates of
return from informal venture capital investments, 17(3)J. BUS. VENTURING
211, 220 (2002).
221 Id.
222 See, e.g., id.;see also Mason& Harrison, supra note214, at36.
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An advantage ofangelfinancing isthatitcan fillthe small
equity gap. The absence ofinterestcosts and fixed repaym ent
obligationsisattractiveforyoungstartupfirms. Obtainingangel
financing isimportantform any firm s, asitcan lead to second
round venture capitalfinancing.223 However, despite the value-
adding advantages for SMEs, the angelfinance marketis not
efficient. Thisisduetoitsfragmentednature, itsrelianceoninef-
fectivecom munication channels, andtheanonymityofangels.224
InthepreviousSection, wecomparedseveralfinancingoptions,
including internalfinance, debtcapital, and equity finance.225
The analysis revealed that different groups offinanciers are
likely tohave heterogeneousincentive structures.226 Theextent
towhich financiersengagein monitoring when providing finance
varies between different groups offinanciers.227 For exam ple,
venture capitalfirms prefer to be involved in m anagem ent.228
Althoughbankfinancinghashistoricallybeenpredominant, recent
trends cast doubt on its continued availability.229 Recent eco-
nom icdownturns, theconsolidation ofthebankingindustry, and
theerosion ofrelationship bankinglimitthepoolofcredit.230 In
light ofthe limited availability ofdebt finance, entrepreneurs
needtolook towardexpandingtheirequitybasethrough alterna-
tives. Itisin thisclim ateoflimited accesstocapitalthatcrowd-
funding and P2PL createnew m eansoffund raising forSMEs.
However, therearecrucialdifferencesbetweenventurecapitalists,
businessangels, institutionalinvestors, and crowd investors.231
Thesedifferencesareexploredin thesectionbelow.
5. Differences Between Venture Capitalists, Angels, and
Crowd Investors
In thisSection, wedraw attention tothedifferencesbetween
publicfundraisingviaECF andP2PL platformsandprivateequity
channelssuchasventurecapitalandangelfinancing.
223 See, e.g., Ibrahim, supra note216, at1418.
224 See, e.g., Mason& Harrison, supra note220, at217.
225 See supra PartII.B.
226 See id.
227 See Wilson& Testoni, supra note23, at4.
228 See id. at6.
229 See, e.g., id. at4.
230 See, e.g., id.
231 See infra PartII.B.5.
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Crowdfundingprimarilyrelieson standardizedcontractspro-
vided by thecrowdfundingintermediaries, whereasprivatecon-
tracting tends to be the norm in angelinvesting and venture
capitalinvesting.232 Private contracting allows venture capital-
istsand angelinvestorstoenterintotailor-madecontractswith
entrepreneurs that can include various clauses, such as anti-
dilution provisions, convertible preference shares, monitoring
rights, and board representation toensurecontrol.233 Moreover,
businessangelsrefrain from buying common shareswithoutvot-
ingrights, which tendstobecom mon in crowdfunding.234 Thus,
some fundamentalprotectionsavailable tobusinessangelsand
venture capitalists ex ante through tailor-made contracts may
be m issing in the typical crowdfunding scenario. 235 Instead,
crowdfunding platforms often offer standardized financialcon-
tracts to the issuer.236 These boilerplate contracts contain lim -
ited covenants to protectcrowd investors, butnotto the same
levelofexanteprotectionsthatentrepreneurswould comm itto
witheitherbusinessangelsorventurecapitalists.237
Angelinvestorsand venture capitalistsfunction assophisti-
cated privatepartieswhocan utilizeshareholderagreementsand
othergovernancestructuresthataregenerally unavailabletothe
crowd, and thusaremoreabletoeffectivelyconstrain self-dealing
andotherentrepreneurialactionsdesignedtomaximizetheentre-
preneurs private benefits of control.238 This, in turn, can result
in efficiency gains and a reduction of agency costs as firm s
which would otherwise be unregulated commit to greater mon-
itoring and bettergovernance rulesex ante. In contrast, crowd
investorsdonotparticipateon theboardsofcrowdfunded firm s,
232 Lars Hornuf& Armin Schwienbacher, CrowdinvestingAngel Investing 
for the Masses?, 1, 6, 8 (3 HandbookofRes. on VentureCapital, WorkingPaper,
2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2401515 [https://perma.cc/4SL5-QG8K].
233 Id. at8.
234 Id. at9.
235 See, e.g., id. at9;see also Zachary Griffin, Note, Crowdfunding: Fleecing
the American Masses, 4J.L. Tech. & Internet375, 394(2013).
236 SeeHornuf& Schwienbacher, supra note232, at9.
237 See LarsHornuf& Armin Schwienbacher, ShouldSecuritiesRegulation
PromoteCrowdinvesting?1, 15, 32 (2015)(unpublished manuscript)http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2412124[https://perma.cc/JA3N-8ESS].
238 Lucian A. Bebchuk, A Rent Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership
and Control (Natl Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7203, 1999), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7203 [https://perma.cc/AM39-DKSM].
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and owing to smallequity stakes, they may lack the necessary
incentivestoparticipatein them onitoringoftheinternalgover-
nanceoftheinvesteefirms.239 Moreover, unlikebusinessangels
orventurecapitalists, crowd investorsarenotexpertsin devel-
oping and valuing firm s.240 They do nothave the same levelof
expertise and knowledge aboutfirms, and theirindividualequity
investmentsaregenerallymuch smallerthan thoseofangelinves-
torsorventurecapitalists.241 Thisled Hornufand Schwienbacher
toconcludethatcrowdinvestorsarelikelytoofferlessvalue-add
than businessangelsorventurecapitalists.242
Nevertheless, wherecrowd investorsparticipatein ECF, there
isevidencetosuggestthattheycanbeefficientinchannelingfunds
toappropriate fund seekersand participating in productdevel-
opm ent, thereby creating value for the firm .243 In fact, crowd
investorsoften becom ethefutureusersofa productonceithas
been realized and havean incentivetodisseminateinformation
abouttheproduct.244 Theym ayactasboth patronsoftheproject
andcustomersatthesametime.245 Accordingly, entrepreneurscan
benefitfrom crowdfunding in a numberofways:they notonly
receive fundsforseed financing orearly startup financing, but
they alsobenefitfrom word ofm outh by theirinvestorsand po-
tentialcustomersthroughsocialmedia.246 Furthermore, somefirms,
especially smallerfirms, may notfind iteconomically worthwhile
toseek venturecapitalorangelfinancingduetothecostsasso-
ciatedwithusingthisform ofcapitalandtheexantecommitments
requiredofthem byventurecapitalistsorangelinvestors.247
Theadvantagesofusingcrowdfundingextend beyond provid-
ing access to financing to market validation of the firms products 
239 Wilson& Testoni, supra note23, at8.
240 See id. at6.
241 See, e.g., id. at2.
242 Hornuf& Schwienbacher, supra note65, at25.
243 F. Kleeman etal., Un(der)paid Innovators: The Commercial Utilization
of Consumer Work through Crowdsourcing, 4(1)SCI., TECH., AND INNOVATION
STUD. 5, 1819 (2008). 
244 See, e.g., Rossi, supra note144, at12.
245 See, e.g., id.
246 Rossi, supra note144, at15;see also P. Belleflamme& T. Lambert, Crowd-
funding: Some Empirical Findings and Microeconomic Underpinnings (Lourvain
Sch. ofMgmt. Research Inst., Working PaperNo. 2014/04, 2014), http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2437786 [https://perma.cc/7NGK-FJD6].
247 See Rossi, supra note144, at10.
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orservices, brainstorming, markettestingintheform ofcomments,
feedbackandideasfrom thecrowd, anddevelopingapotentialpool
ofloyalclientsearly in thestartup process.248 Being able to pre-
sell products or services assists the firm in evaluating users 
reactionsand allowsforfurtherfine-tuningorcustomizingofits
products or ideas. The firm can involve the investor and con-
sumercomm unityin problem solvingand ensurethatitobtains
amplefeedbackbeforesinkingitsresourcesintoproduction. More-
over, markettestingoccursatlittleornocosttotheentrepreneur.
Inaddition, asshownintheprevioussection, venturecapitalists
mayfocuson certain investm ents, such ashigh-risk, high-return
investmentsin technology-basedcompaniesonly.249 Bycomparison,
crowdinvestorsmayhaveamuchbroaderinvestmentspectrum.250
Inthelongrun, crowdfundingplatformscan helpentrepreneurs
benefitfrom theso-called big data paradigm.251 Byanalyzingdata
trailsleftonlinebyinvestorsand entrepreneursusingECF and
P2PL, crowdfunding platform sm ay be able to betterm atch in-
vestorsandcompaniesandthusfacilitateinvestmentdeals.252 The
SEC hasstated thatitbelievesthatitisim portantforfunding
portalstobesubjecttoa recordkeeping requirementin orderto
create a m eaningfulaudit trailof crowdfunding transactions
andcom munications.253
Finally, asolution fortheperceivedlack ofex ante investorpro-
tectionsin theECF contextmaybeallowingcrowdinvestorstoco-
invest with business angels an approach that has been adopted by 
someplatformssuchasMyMicroInvestinBelgium.254Thatsolution
allowscrowdinvestorstoinvestalongsideprofessionalinvestors,
and thereby benefit from the financial contracting and post-
investmentmonitoringskillsofsuch investors.255 Theadvantage
ofsuch an approach is thatitfacilitates collaboration between
248 See id. at12.
249 See supra PartII.B.3.
250 Wilson& Testoni, supra note23, at5.
251 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, VOL. 14, 63, 93 (Josh Lerner&
ScottStern eds., 2014).
252 Id.;see also Wilson& Testoni, supra note23, at7.
253 Proposed CrowdfundingRulesunderTitleIII oftheJOBS Act, Securites
ActReleaseNo. 33-9470;ExchangeActReleaseNo. 34-70741, FileNo. S7-09-13,
at261 (Oct. 2013)[hereinafterProposedCrowdfundingRules].
254 See MICROINVEST, https://www.mymicroinvest.com/en/faq [https:/perma
.cc/CN3B-M7TR].
255 Wilson& Testoni, supra note23, at9.
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professionalinvestorsand retailinvestors. Moreover, angelinves-
torscan acttom aintain variousshort-term andlong-term inves-
torprotectionsforthecrowdinvestorandtherebybetteralign the
interestsoftheentrepreneurswith thoseoftheinvestors.256
III. THE GLOBAL MARKET FOR CROWDFUNDING
Crowdfundingisanew fundingmodelinanumberofcountries.
One study reported 240 crowdfunding platforms globally in 2011
and this num ber is growing rapidly.257 According to the 2013
Crowdfunding Industry Report, crowdfundingraised $2.7 million
globallyin 2012, an increaseof81 percentcompared to2011.258
Thisfigureaccountsforalltypesofcrowdfunding, includingdona-
tion-based, lending-based, reward-based, andequity-basedcrowd-
funding.259 North America and European platform saccountfor
approximately95 percentofthetotalmarket, raisingmorecapital
than anywhereelsein theworld.260 In 2011, theNorth Am erican
crowdfundingmarketgrew by86 percent, followedby105 percent
in 2012 reaching an am ount in excess of $1.6 billion.261 Euro-
pean platform s raised $9.45 million an increase of 65 percent 
in 2012 comparedto2011.262 ThefinancinggapislargestinSouth
Am erica and Africa, where$800,000 and $65,000 wasraised re-
spectively.263 Theaggregate2012 fundingvolumeinAsiawas$33
m illion;in Oceania, $76 million.264 TheUnited States, therefore,
256 DanielIsenberg, The Road to Crowdfunding Hell, HARV. BUS. REV., Apr. 23,
2012, https://hbr.org/2012/04/the-road-to-crowdfunding-hell/[https://perma.cc
/524F-CWK6].
257 Hemer, supra note71, at19.
258 MASSOLUTION, THE 2013 CROWDFUNDING INDUSTRY REPORT 7, at8 (2013),
http://www.compromisoempresarial.com/wp-content/uploads/137356857-Massolu
tion-2013CF-Excerpt-Revised-04182.pdf[https://perma.cc/F5ND-4MQ6]. In late
2015, thecrowdfunding industry wasvalued at$16.2 billion worldwide. See
Crowdfunding takes root in Asia in boon to entrepreneurs, GULF TIMES, Nov. 18,
2015, atBusiness2.
259 MASSOLUTION, supra note258, at9.
260 See, e.g., id.
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 Id. at23.
264 Id.
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leadsthefieldin crowdfunding.265 Donation-basedcrowdfunding
represents the highest volume ofcrowdfunding, while equity-
based crowdfundingisused toalesserextentmainlybecauseof
theabsenceofcrowdfundinglegislation.266
Themajority ofcrowdfunding projectapplicationswere sub-
mitted to the established platformssuch asMyMajorCompany,
IndieGoGo, and Kickstarter, with 18,000, 15,000 and 12,000 appli-
cationssubmitted to each ofthese sites respectively.267 The ac-
ceptanceratevarieshighly between platforms, with PledgeMusic
acceptingand processing77 percentofallapplicationsreceived,
whiletheratewaslowerforKickstarter(42 percent)and Uluie
(31 percent).268 Conversely, MyMajorCompany only accepts 0.2
percent ofapplications and Sonicangelaccepts 0.8 percent.269
Thesefiguressuggestthattheplatform sutilizevastly different
selection criteria and m ethods. Sonicangel with a high success 
rate of 92 percent appears to have one of the most successful 
business models, whereas other platform s such as SellaBand,
MyMajorCompany, SliceThePie, IndieGoGo, and Kickstarterhave
lowersuccessrates, between 42 and84percent.270
Themajorityofcrowdfundingprojectsarederivedfrom thecre-
ative industry and the not-for-profitsector.271 Here, crowdfund-
ing hasbeen used primarily to supportcreativeideas, projects,
and ventures, asopposed toinnovations. Thisisbecausecrowd-
fundingisparticularlysuitedtocase-by-casefundingofsingleproj-
ectsthatare com pelling and attractm any individuals, butare
limitedin scope. Fundersareoften peersfrom thesam ecreative
industryandwillingtobackartistsinasimilarposition.272
A leading study estim atesthe likelihood ofobtaining entre-
preneurialfinancingviacrowdfundingin thesameorderofmag-
nitudeasin theinternationalventurecapitalbusiness, which has
265 U.S. Leads World in Burgeoning Crowdfunding Trend, FORBES (Apr. 12,
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2013/04/12/u-s-leads-world-in-bur
geoning-crowdfunding-trend/.
266 Id. at 5859. 
267 Hemer, supra note71, at21.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 2122. 
271 Id. at23.
272 Id. at27.
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successratesofbetween 1 and 5 percent.273 Theauthorconcludes
thatthere are presently few genuine entrepreneurialventures
fundedthrough crowdfundingplatforms.274
Crowdfundingentrepreneursfacevariouschallengesthatof-
ten preventthem from achievingtheirfundinggoals. Forexam -
ple, someentrepreneurshavetroubleestim atingand activating
their network capabilities when seeking funding.275 They often
donotrealizetheimportanceofgrowing theirnetwork priorto
launching an onlinecampaign orunderestimatethetimeittakes
to build such a network.276 Crowdfunding isoften notfully un-
derstoodbyentrepreneurs. Asaresult, few usethisnovelwayof
financing despite the potentialthatitprovides.277 The key ele-
mentsforasuccessfulcrowdfundingcampaignappeartobeaclear
understanding ofthe crowdfunding process, aim s, targets, and
timeframes;theselection ofan appropriatecrowdfundingorP2PL
platform;and successfulinvestorcommunication.278 According to
Mollick, personalnetworks, the attributes ofthe project, and
geographic location also play a crucialrole.279 Itis difficultto
predictwhetherentrepreneurialfundingactivitieswillgravitate
towardsadominantequitycrowdfundingplatform internationally.
Themosteffectivemarketstructureislikelytoemergebasedon a
numberoffactors, includingmarketsize, businessmodel, thecost
ofparticipating on a particular platform , specialfeatures, and
services provided.280 There is a great dealofexperim entation
involved acrossdifferentmodels, and themarketforcrowdfunded
273 Id. at22.
274 Id. at23.
275 See JulieS. Huietal., UnderstandingandLeveragingSocialNetworksfor
Crowdfunding:OpportunitiesandChallenges678 (unpublishedmanuscript, fea-
tured in DesigningInteractiveSys., 2014), http://delivery.acm.org/10.1145/26
00000/2598539/p677-hui.pdf?ip=128.239.114.252&id=2598539&acc=ACTIVE%
20SERVICE&key=B33240AC40EC9E30.491D1E721DB3290B.4D4702B0C3E8
B35.4D4702B0C3E38B35&CFID=561855669&CFTOKEN=79078245&__acm__
=1447833649_0263b3ae38ae62c260134826c13913a7 [https://perma.cc/MG6X
-YJFB].
276 Id. at 680.
277 See Hemer, supra note 71, at 38. 
278 See generally P. Belleflammeetal., Individual Crowdfunding Practices,
15 VENTURE CAPITAL:INT. J. ENTREPRENEURIAL FIN. 313, 31516 (2013). 
279 Id. at316. Mollick, supra note31, at14.
280 Belleflammeetal., supra note 278, at 31516; Ajay Agrawal et al., The Geo-
graphy of Crowdfunding 20 (Natl Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
w16820, 2011), http:/www.nber.org/papers/w19133 [https:/perma.cc/82PY-4UDV].
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equity capitalrem ains atan evolutionary stage. The nextsec-
tionconsidersthevariousregulatoryregimescurrentlyavailable.
This is prefaced by an overview ofthe legalissues associated
withcrowdfunding.
IV. COMMON LEGAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH CROWDFUNDING
A. Prudential Supervision
CrowdfundingandP2PL sitesperform acomplexfunction. They
bringpotentialinvestorsandentrepreneurstogether, andfacilitate
thetransmissionoffundsanddisclosuretoandfrom entrepreneurs
toinvestors.281 However, crowdfundingand peer-to-peerplatforms
are notbanks or deposittakers. They use escrow accounts in
which fundsareheld anddonotreinvestthesefundsforfurther
purposes. Forexample, theBritishcrowdplatform Buzzbnkstates:
Buzzbnk is not a bank in a legal or financial sense we do not 
holdsavingdepositsandactonlyasan agenttointroducethe
BackerstotheVentures. Fundsareheld on behalfoftheVen-
turesuntilthefundraisingperiod iseithersuccessfuland the
fundsaretransferredorifunsuccessful, returnedtotheBacker.282
Such clausesensurethatcrowdfundingplatformsarenotsubject
to prudentialsupervision. While crowdfunding platforms coop-
erate with otherpaymentproviders such as PayPalorspecific
banks, they prefertobeseen asfacilitatorsofpaymentsrather
than deposit-takinginstitutions.
B. Taxation
Crowdfunding is typically subjectto taxation, since itis a
m eanstoreceiveincom eon goodsand services. Applicabletaxes
aresalestax, incometax, andcapitalgainstax.283 Itislessclear
281 MoneyTalkNews, Investing In People: How Crowdfunding Works, MINT
LIFE BLOG (June 26, 2013), https://blog.mint.com/trends/investing-in-peo
ple-how-crowdfunding-works-0613/[https://perma.cc/GUY6-WDKS].
282 See BUZZBNK, http://buzzbnk.melontech.com/StaticPages/FAQ.aspx[https:
/perma.cc/UZ6S-7BL9].
283 See KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/taxes [https://perma
.cc/Z6SY-57N7];Kevin Frisch, The Tax Implications of Equity Crowdfunding
in the U.S., LAW FOR CHANGE, http://www.lawforchange.org/NewsBot.asp
?MODE=VIEW&ID=6362 [https://perma.cc/U46N-TS2T].
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how crowdfunding projectswith nonfinancialrewardsare to be
taxed if at all and such projects may be in a gray area in re-
gardsto taxation. Perhapssome crowdfunding platformsought
to be classified as non-profit platforms, while other platform s
thatprovide crowdfunding with financialrewards oughtto be
classifiedasfor-profitplatforms.
C. Money Laundering
Moneylaunderingisanotherrisk associatedwith crowdfund-
ing. However, the World Bank does notdeem this risk to be
greater in ECF than in other investing system s.284 Platform s
such as Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and RocketHub comply with
internationalandU.S. anti-moneylaunderinglaws.285
D. Credit Regulation and Peer-to-Peer Platforms
Undera crowd lendingm odel, lending takesplacein theab-
senceofatraditionalbank. Accordingly, thediscretionarypower
overthegrantingofaloan istransferred from thebank orbank
manager to the crowd consisting of individual loan providers
which makesan assessmentoftheworthinessoftheborrower.286
Providing a loan via a peer-to-peerplatform istherefore associ-
atedwith variousrisks, theprincipalrisk beingthedefaultofthe
borrowerandinabilitytorepaytheloan.
British P2PL platform s have launched a P2PF association:
P2PFA.287 Theassociation isaself-regulatorybodythatseeksto
prom ote certain standards ofconductand consumerprotection
amongstBritish P2PL platforms such as Zopa, FundingCircle,
andRateSetter.288 Theoperatingprinciplesoftheassociation set
outkeyrequirem entsfortheoperation ofP2PF platforms. They
coverthefollowing:
seniorm anagem ent;
m inim um operatingcapitalrequirements;
284 WORLD BANK, CROWDFUNDINGS POTENTIAL FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD
45 (2013).
285 Id.
286 See Moenninghoff& Wieandt, supra note 51, at 45. 
287 See PEER-TO-PEER FIN. ASSN, http://p2pfa.info/about-p2p-finance [https://
perma.cc/76FH-LMDQ].
288 Id.
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segregation of participants funds and auditing of 
thesegregatedbankaccount;
appropriatecreditandaffordabilityassessment;
appropriate anti-money laundering and anti-fraud
measures;
clearrulesgoverninguseoftheplatform, consistent
withtheseOperatingPrinciples;
marketing and customercomm unications thatare
clear, fairandnotmisleading;
secureandreliableIT system s;
faircom plaintshandling;and
theorderlyadm inistration ofcontractsin theevent
aplatform ceasestooperate.289
E. Investor Protection and Cross-Border Access to Investments
Oneparticularissueistheproblem ofcross-borderaccessto
investm entsvia crowdfundingplatform s. Towhatextentshould
crowdfunding platformsbeavailabletonon-domesticinvestors?
The solution m ay be to make investments via platforms only
availabletodom esticinvestorsbyway ofa meaningfuljurisdic-
tionaldisclaim er. Forexample, theSwisscrowdfundingplatform
Investiere.ch only addresses domestic investors and accredited
investorsfrom certain countries, such asGerm any.290 Sim ilarly,
portalssuch asAngelList.com andShekra.com areonlyaccessible
toscreened high-networth investors.291 TheBritish crowdfunding
platform Crowdcubeincludesthefollowingprovisoon itssite:
Viewingpitchesand investingmaynotbelawfulin somecoun-
tries. In othercountries, onlycertain categoriesofperson may
beallowed toview pitcheson Crowdcube. Any person resident
outsidetheUnited Kingdom whowishestoview pitchesmust
289 See Operating Principles, PEER-TO-PEER FIN. ASSN, http://p2pfa.info/wp
-content/uploads/2015/09/Operating-Principals-vfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/U28S
-S8XG].
290 See INVESTIERE, https://www.investiere.ch/content/our-selection-criteria
[https://perma.cc/MRU3-L9EV].
291 See ANGELLIST, https://angel.co/help/startups/how-do-i-get-featured-to-in
vestors [https://perma.cc/TL46-EV2B]; Shekra Investors Network, SHEKRA,
http://www.shekra.com/en/howitworks.php[https://perma.cc/A67A-NNJ8].
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firstsatisfythemselvesthattheyarenotsubjecttoanylocalre-
quirementsthatprohibitorrestrictthem from doingso.292
In addition, using the sitetoinitializecrowdfunding projectsis
restrictedtocitizensoftheUnitedKingdom.293 Conversely, som e
platformswillacceptnon-domesticventures. Forexample, Buzzbnk
states that Buzzbnk is developed for prim arily UK based ven-
turesalthough we willacceptorganisationsregistered in other
countries under certain criteria.294
Platformswithoutfinancialrewards, on theotherhand, tend
toattractprojectsfrom othercountries. Forinstance, Indiegogo
is a globalplatform with campaigns running in 200 countries
andregions.295
F. Designing an Appropriate Disclosure Regime for the Crowd
The primary audience for disclosure is the crowd the actual 
and potentialinvestorsofthe securitiesoffered forsale.296 The
crowd is likely to be heterogeneous including representatives of 
varioussocialgroups, aswellasdifferenteconomicand political
circles and geographically dispersed. Furtherm ore, crowds can 
be mad irrational and foolish, subject to hype but they can 
also be wise rational, sensible and intelligent.297
Behavioralpsychology offers two distinct narratives ofthe
crowd, focusingon thephenomenon ofcrowdsin economicbubbles
(crowdsengagingin concertedirrationalorsuboptim aleconom ic
behavior)and crowds as a source ofcollective intelligence.298
292 See FAQs, CROWDCUBE, https://www.crowdcube.com/faqs/investing-in-eq
uity/i-am-not-based-in-the-uk-can-i-still-register-and-invest [https://perma.cc
/AZT3-FR5Y].
293 See FAQS, CROWDCUBE, https:/www.crowdcube.com/faqs/raising-through
-equity/who-can-start-a-pitch[https://perma.cc/2YU9-5SWM].
294 See Buzzbnk FAQs, BUZZBNK BLOG (Feb. 16, 2011), http://blog.buzzbnk
.org/2011/02/16/buzzbnk-faqs/[https://perma.cc/265G-9R5K].
295 See About Us, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/about/our-story
[https://perma.cc/Y84C-VFJB].
296 See JoanMacLeodHeminway, Investor and Market Protection in the Crowd-
funding Era: Disclosing to and for the Crowd, 38 VT. L. REV. 827, 829 (2014).
297 Id. at830.
298 See generally TIM PHILIPS, CHARLES MACKAYS EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR
DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS (InfiniteIdeasLtd. 2009);Gordon
R. Walker, Securities Regulation, Efficient Markets and Behavioural Finance:
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Surowiecki, forexample, suggeststhatcrowdshavethecapacityto
bewise, owingtosuch factorsascognitiveandconceptualdiversity,
collectiveknowledge, independence(relativefreedom from thein-
fluence ofothers), and decentralization.299 The wisdom ofthe
crowd consists of developing solutions using others propositions 
anddevelopingcollectivesolutions, which leadtobetteroutcomes
overall. Surowieckistates:
The idea of the wisdom  of crowds   takes decentralization as 
a given and a good, sinceitimpliesthatifyou seta crowd of
self-interested, independentpeopletowork in adecentralized
way on the same problem, instead oftrying to directtheir
effortsfrom thetop down, theircollectivesolution islikelyto
bebetterthananyothersolutionyoucouldcomeupwith.300
From aregulatoryperspective, itisdifficulttopredictwhattype
ofcrowd willbeparticipatingin an offering, whetherthatcrowd
will have the attributes of a wise crowd or have a tendency to 
actirrationally, and whattypeofregulatoryapproach oughttobe
adopted. Theactualand potentialcrowd audienceisdifficultto
define. Moreover, investorprofilesmaychangeasthecrowdfunding
marketmatures, and differentinvestorsmay haveconflicting ob-
jectives. Indeed, itisdifficulttoempiricallyassessthenatureofthe
investorcrowd. Accordingly, itisimportanttoadopta regulatory
approachtobestaddresstheneedsofacrowdofdiverseinvestors.
From thesecuritiesregulation perspective, however, thecrowd
can beconflated with thepublic, and prima faciefulldisclosure
onanyofferisrequired.301 Thisrequirem entisthen tem peredby
thesmallmonetary valueoftheinvestment. Thesmallmonetary
valueoftheinvestmentistheflipsideofthesophisticated inves-
torexclusion, leadingtotheconclusion thatan exemption forsuch
investmentsiswarranted. Thelaw doesnotprohibittheracegoer
from bettingsmall(orlarge)amountson ahorse. Itshouldnotpro-
hibitan investormaking a sm allinvestmentvia a licensed ECF
platform wherearguably the form guide ismorereliable. One
Reclaiming the Legal Genealogy, 36 H.K. L.J. 481 (2006)(discussingbehavioral
psychologygenerally).
299 JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS xviii(AnchorBooks, 1st
ed. 2005).
300 Id. at70.
301 See Heminway, supra note 296, at 82930. 
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logicalextension ofthisargum entistoproposeaslidingscaleor
spectrum ofdisclosuretiedtothequantum offundstobeinvested.
G. Pre- and Post-Investment Problems: Soft Facts and 
Peer Drivers 
Potentialcrowdinvestorsoftenmakeinvestmentdecisionsbased
on limited inform ation and imperfectknowledgeoftheproducts
orservicesoffered. Thisgivesrisetotheinform ation asymm etry
problem described by Akerlof.302 Receivers offunds have more
knowledgeabouttheviabilityoftheprojectthan investors.303 In
addition, moralhazardproblemsarisebecauseentrepreneursmay
utilizefundsforpersonalgain.304
Supposethataprojectisnotadequatelydevelopedorprovenat
the time the cam paign islaunched on a crowdfunding orP2PL
platform andthatconsumersmaybeunabletotryouttheprojector
servicepriortoinvestinginit.305 Often, theonlyavailablesource
ofinformation may bethecampaign description published by the
creatorsoftheproject. Thelattermaybebiased, incomplete, orlim-
itedinscope. Thismakesitdifficultforpotentialbackerstoevaluate
thequalityorutilityofaproject. Backerscan relyon third-party
endorsementsand thenumberofbackers(prominently displayed
on thecrowdfundingplatform siteforeach project)togaugethe
likelysuccessofaproject. Forexample, ZhangandLiufindthatin-
vestorsaremorelikelytocontributetoprojectsintheECF orP2PL
settingwheretheprojectshavealreadygarneredsupportfrom the
community.306 Conversely, priorcontributionsmayhavetheoppo-
siteeffectin donation-basedcrowdfundingmodels, whereapoten-
tialbackerhaslessneed tosupportaprojectasaresultofprior
302 GeorgeAkerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84QUARTERLY J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970).
303 Gmeleen FayeB. Tom boc, The Lemons Problem in Crowdfunding, 30 J.
MARSHALL J. INFO TECH. & PRIVACY L. 253, 266 (2013).
304 Id.
305 See Ferdinand Thies& MichaelWessel, The Circular Effects of Popularity
Information and Electronic Word-of-Mouth on Consumer Decision-Making:
Evidence from a Crowdfunding Platform 1 (22ndEuropean ConferenceonInfor-
mation Systems, TelAviv, 2014), http://ecis2014.eu/E-poster/files/0810-file1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UVA8-U3NQ].
306 J.J. Zhang& P. Liu, Rational Herding in Microloan Markets, 58 MGMT.
SCI. 892, 893 (2012).
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donations.307 A studypublishedbyAhlersetal. findsthatfirmsthat
havebeeninbusinesslongerpriortoseekingECF aremorelikelyto
raisecapital, aswellasfirmswithagreaternumberofboardmem-
bers, higherlevelsofeducation (asmeasured by thepercentageof
boardmembersholdingMBAs), andfirmswithbetternetworks.308
Moritzetal. published a studyexam ininginvestorcommuni-
cation in thecontextofcrowdfunding.309 The authors adopt an ex-
ploratory qualitativeresearch approach based on semi-structured
interviews with seventeen crowdfunding participants: six crowd 
investors, sixnew ventures, and fivethird parties.310 Theauthors
develop a theoretical framework and present it in a set of six 
propositions.311 The results indicate that the ventures overall 
impression especially perceived sympathy, openness, and trust-
worthiness is important to reduce the perceived information 
asymmetries of [crowd] investors.312 Thus, itis im portantfor
entrepreneurs to com municate soft facts. This is typically done 
viapseudo-personalcommunicationchannels, such asvideos.313
Inadditiontosoftfacts, Moritzetal. foundthatcrowdinvestors
arealsoinfluenced by othermarketparticipants.314 Thisiscon-
sistentwith thefindingsofZhang and Liu. Peereffectsareim-
portantdriversofcrowdfunding. Hence, third-partyendorsements
areregarded asquality signalsand servetoreduceinform ation
asymm etry.315 This may lead to inform ation cascades and herd 
behavior in the sense that individual investors choose to m ake 
decisionsbased on the actionsofothersratherthan on private
information available to them.316 The upshotis thatinvestors
endupsupportingalreadysuccessfulprojects, i.e., projectsthatare
alreadysuccessfulin termsofthenumberofbackers. Asaresult,
307 See Thies& Wessel, supra note305, at2.
308 GerritK.C. Ahlersetal., Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding, 39 ENTRE-
PRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 955, 95663 (2015). 
309 AlexandraMoritzetal., InvestorCommunication in Equity-BasedCrowd-
funding:A Qualitative-EmpiricalStudy 1 (2014)(unpublished manuscript),
http:/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2462282 [https://perma.cc/N3
F3-WD2M].
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 See Thies& Wessel, supra note305, at4.
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already successfulcampaignsreceive furtherpopularity boosts,
leading to positive upward inform ation cascades.317 Conversely,
projects thatlack a high number ofbackers may experience a
negativedownward information cascade.318 Huietal. find thatthe
majority of failed project creatorscited theinabilitytosuccess-
fully leverage an online audience as a main reason for failing.319
Theaboveanalysissuggeststhatcrowdinvestorsareoften hype
driven and subject to social contagion processes a fact that m ay 
beexploitedbycrowdfundingplatforms.320 Crowdfundingplatforms
oftenadoptbusinessmodelsthatseektoestablishpositivefunding
momentumsbyimposingshortinvestmentspans, creatingfunding
limits, and makingthefunding processtransparent. Thisprocess
isdesigned to generate a feeling ofurgency amongstinvestors.
Entrepreneurs can also exploitinformation cascades by artifi-
ciallytryingtokick-startacampaign usingpreappointedguinea
pigswhoactasbuyers.321
AccordingtoBurtch, herdingbehaviorisanegativeexternality
ofcrowdfunding.322 However, from an entrepreneurialperspective,
thereverseisalsotrue. Herding can beregarded asa positiveex-
ternalitybecauseitresultsin a snowballeffectand helpsentre-
preneursm eettheirfinancingobjectives. Otherpotentialpitfalls
ofcrowd wisdom may be summarized as pluralistic ignorance
and groupthink (m em bersofthegroup com ingtoincorrectdeci-
sionsorassumptionsbasedon adesiretofindconformitywithin
a group);323 bandwagoning (assum ption offalsehoodsto be true
byanyonememberofagroupandothermembersbuyingintothe
same falsehood);and the Dunning-Krueger effect (a cognitive
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 JulieHuietal., UnderstandingtheRoleofCommunityin Crowdfunding
Work(2014)(unpublishedmanuscript), http://egerber.mech.northwestern.edu
/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Gerber_UnderstandingtheRoleofCommunityinCrowd
fundingWork.pdf[https://perma.cc/E9TC-CGAR].
320 Id.
321 DanielSgroi, Optimizing Information in the Herd: Guinea Pigs, Profits
and Welfare, 39 GAMES & ECON. BEHAVIOR 137, 137 (2002).
322 See generally Gordon Burtch, Herding Behavior as a Network Externality,
32 ICIS CONF. (2011), http://www.researchgate.net/publication/221599843
_Herding_Behavior_as_a_Network_Externality[https://perma.cc/3UJC-RPJG].
323 Isenberg, supra note256.
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bias, with unskilled individualsratingtheirown abilitieshigher
than average).324
V. CROWDFUNDING REGULATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT
The aim ofthisPartisto examine crowdfunding regulation
in aglobalcontext. Itisstructuredasfollows:first, weexaminethe
variouscapitalmarketinnovationsintroduced toclosetheSME
financinggappriortotheintroduction ofcrowdfundingregulation.
Here, weuseAustraliaandNew Zealandascasestudies. Second,
weturn tospecificcrowdfundingmodelsin selectjurisdictionsand
examine the nature ofthese models and the rationales forthe
introduction ofcrowdfunding regulation. Thisanalysisisintended
toprovidean overview ofthevariouscapitalmarketlaw reform
optionsavailabletoregulatorsin orderto enhance SME access
tocapital. Particularattention ispaid totheNew Zealand model,
whichweregardastheleadingmodelintheSouthernHemisphere.
A. Australia
In thepast, Australiahasattem ptedtosolvetheSME financ-
ingproblem via variousmeans. Forexample, theAustralian Cor-
porations Act2001 (Cth.)contains various provisions thatare
designed to facilitate small scale offerings, or low-value capital 
raisings.325 The relevantrules are contained in Chapter 6D of
the Act.326 Thelatterchapterrequiresa disclosure documentto
belodgedwiththeAustralian SecuritiesandInvestmentComm is-
sion Australias corporate regulator prior to the making of an 
offerofsecuritiesto an investor.327 Exem ptionsto thisrule are
contained in Section 708 oftheAct, which providesthatnodis-
closureisrequiredwhen apersonalofferismade, i.e., an offerof
lessthan AU$2 million and involving no m ore than twenty in-
vestors in a twelve-m onth period;or alternatively, the offer is
madetosophisticated orprofessionalinvestors.328 A sophisticated
investor is defined as someone with net assets greater than
324 DRESNER, supra note 92, at 6465. 
325 Corporations Act 2011 (Cth)ch. 6D, s708 (Austl.).
326 Id. atch. 6D.
327 Id. at s 70407. 
328 Id. atss708(1), (8), (11).
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AU$2.5 million or gross incom e ofatleastAU$250,000 in the
lasttwo years.329 Professionalinvestors, on the otherhand, in-
clude listed entities with assets ofat least AU$10 million.330
Unlessoneoftheseexem ptionsapplies, acompanycannotraise
fundsfrom investorsgenerallyand musttargetsophisticated or
professionalinvestors. Because non-exem ptoffers m ustbe ac-
companiedbyaprospectus, thecostsofcomplianceandcomplexity
in obtainingfinancingfrom thepublicareincreased.331
The law also provides for the use of offer information state-
ments abbreviated information statements rather than a pro-
spectusifthetotalamountraisedbyacorporatebodyorspecific
related entitiesisAU$10 million orless.332 Moreover, thereare
specific sophisticated investor exemptions that allow companies 
toraisefundsfrom sophisticated investorswithouta disclosure
document.333 In addition, theVentureCapitalAct2002 provides
forso-calledVentureCapitalLimitedPartnerships(VCLPs)and
Early Stage Venture CapitalLimited Partnerships (ESVCLPs)
thatenjoytaxconcessions.334 For example, the ESVCLP program 
wasestablished in 2007 and isaimed atfurtherencouraging in-
vestment in early-stage companies.335 Allpartnersin ESVCLPs
areexem ptfrom tax on any shareoftheincom ederived by the
partnership.336 Lastly, Australia has introduced certain public-
privateequity co-investmentschemeswhereby governm entand
privatesectorcapitalarepooled toinvestin new Australian com-
panies commercializing innovative ideas. 337 Such coinvestment
329 Id. ats708(8).
330 Id. ats708(11).
331 Pekmezovic& Walker, supra note10, at68.
332 Corporations Act 2011 (Cth)ch. 6D, s709(4)(Austl.).
333 Id. at s 708(8)(10). 
334 Factsheet: Early Stage Venture Capital Limited Partnerships, AUSTL.
GOVT DEPT OF INDUS. & SCI (2015), http://www.business.gov.au/grants-and-as
sistance/venture-capital/esvclp/Documents/ESVCLP-FactSheet.pdf[https:/perma
.cc/SCN8-E5JR][hereinafterFactsheet].
335AUSTL. GOVT:INNOVATION INV. FUND, VENTURE CAPITAL IN AUSTRALIA 4
(2013).
336 Factsheet, supra note334.
337AUSTL. GOVT:THE TREASURY AND THE DEPT OF INDUS., INNOVATION, SCI.,
RESEARCH AND TERTIARY EDUC., REVIEW OF VENTURE CAPITAL AND ENTREPRE-
NEURIAL SKILLS:FINAL REPORT 1720 (2012), http://www.avcal.com .au/docu 
ments/item/516 [https://perma.cc/W3QQ-3Z6X].
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programsarecoupledwith taxincentives, andtogethertheyhelp
toattractcapitaltothehigh-risk venturecapitalsector. Table1
below providesan overview ofthesereform s.
TABLE 1:SME CAPITAL MARKET REFORMS IN AUSTRALIAN LAW
RELEVANT
LEGISLATION KEY PROVISIONS
LOW-VALUE
CAPITAL
RAISINGS
Sections 708(1)
(7) of the Corpo-
rations Act 2001
(Cth)
Australian provisions contain bright-
linerulesthatsaydisclosure(viaapro-
spectus)is required unless exceptions
apply. Keyexceptionsincludesmallscale
offeringsandsophisticatedinvestors.338
The exem ption from the prospectus
requirementforsmallscaleofferingsal-
lowsup totwenty personalofferingsin
any period of twelve months (the 20/12 
rule).339
Under the 20/12 rule, the num ber of
investors, rather than the num ber of
offerees, iscounted, subjectto a finan-
cialceiling.340
Theexem ption isavailablewhen three
conditionsaresatisfied:
(1) theoffersarepersonaloffersforis-
sue or sale of a bodys securities; 
(2) noneoftheoffersresultsin abreach
ofthetwentyinvestorsceiling;and
(3) noneoftheoffersresultsin a
breach ofthe$2 million ceiling.341
Infuturereform proposals, thresholdsare
likely to be relaxed in the future, for
exam ple, through higherlimitsforthe
am ountoffunding that can be raised
under the 20/12 prospectus exemp-
tion, orfora largernumberofinvestors
investingunderthatsameexemption.342
338 Corporations Act 2011 (Cth)ch. 6D, s708 (Austl.)
339 Id. ats708(1).
340 Id. at s 708(3)(4). 
341 Id. ats708(1).
342 AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMMN, PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION:REVIEW OF BAR-
RIERS TO BUSINESS ENTRIES AND EXITS IN THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY 22 (2015).
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RELEVANT
LEGISLATION KEY PROVISIONS
OFFER
INFORMATION
STATEMENTS
Section 709(4) of
the Corporations
Act 2001 (Cth)
A body, arelatedbodycorporate, oracon-
trolled entity offering to issuesecurities
m ay usean offerinform ation statem ent
instead ofa prospectusifthetotalofall
am ountsraised by thebodyorspecified
relatedentitiesisAU$10 millionorless.343
The offer information statem entis pri-
marilyintendedtobeafundraisingmech-
anism forSMEs, though itisnotlim ited
to those enterprises. 344 The m ain re-
quirementisthatthecom pany includes
an audited financialreport covering a
twelve-m onth period and hasa balance
datenolaterthan sixm onthsbeforethe
securitiesarefirstoffered.345
SOPHISTICATED
INVESTORS
Sections 708(8)
(10)ofthe Corpo-
rations Act 2001
(Cth)
The Corporations Act 2011 perm its of-
ferstosophisticated investorswithouta
disclosure document.346 A potentialin-
vestorm ightderive sophistication from
oneormoreofthesethreefactors:
(1) theamountoftheinvestm ent;or
(2) the financial status or incom e of
theinvestor;or
(3) the investment experience of the
investor.347
Two types of sophisticated investors 
are encom passed. One is the large in-
vestor. Iftheinvestorispaying atleast
AU$500,000 or has a gross incom e or
net assets that exceed the prescribed
m inim um , theofferisexem pt.348
A sophisticatedinvestorisaperson with
netassetsofatleastAU$2.5 m illion ora
grossincom eforeach ofthepasttwofi-
nancialyearsofatleastAU$250,000.349
Another is the professional or experienced 
investortowhom theofferism ade.350
343 Corporations Act 2011, s709(4)(Austl.).
344 Id.
345 Id. ats715(2).
346 Id. at ss 708(8)(10). 
347 Id. at ss 708(8)(a)(c). 
348 Id. at ss 708(8)(a)(b). 
349 Id. at ss 708(8)(c), (9A)(9C). 
350 Id. ats708(11).
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RELEVANT
LEGISLATION KEY PROVISIONS
VENTURE
CAPITAL
SECTOR
Venture Capital
Act 2002
Venture Capital Limited Partnerships
(VCLP)wereestablishedin 2002. 351
Early Stage Venture Capital Limited
Partnerships(ESVCLP)program s.352
The ESVCLP program was established
in 2007 and isaim ed atfurtherencour-
aging investm entin early stage com pa-
nies. 353 All partners in ESVCLPs are
exem ptfrom taxon anyshareofthein-
com ederivedbythepartnership.354
The ESVCLP program replaced the
Pooled Developm ent Funds (PDF)pro-
gram . Over AU$961 m illion has been
invested in 707 Australian com panies
underthePDF program .355
Since the ESVCLP program wasestab-
lished in 2007, registered ESVCLPs
have invested AU$64 m illion into fifty
businesses.356
TAX
CONCESSIONS
The Australian governm enthasseveral
taxconcession programsfortheventure
capitalsector, includingtheVentureCapi-
talLimitedPartnerships(VCLP)andthe
Early Stage Venture Capital Limited
Partnerships(ESVCLP)program s.357
Other tax concessions include the Re-
search and Developm ent(R&D)Tax In-
centiveandEnterpriseConnect.358
351 Venture Capital Act 2002 (Cth)(Austl.);Factsheet, supra note334.
352 Venture Capital Act 2002 (Cth)(Austl.);Factsheet, supra note334.
353 AUSTL. GOVT:DEPT OF IND. AND SCI.,EARLY STAGE VENTURE CAPITAL
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS (ESVCLPS):CUSTOMER INFORMATION GUIDE 6 (2015).
354 Id. at23.
355 AUSTL. GOVT:DEPT OF IND. AND SCI., INNOVATION AUSTRALIA ANNUAL
REPORT 201213 70 (2013).
356 Id. at68.
357 AUSTL. GOVT:BD. OF TAXATION, REVIEW OF TAXATION ARRANGEMENTS
UNDER THE VENTURE CAPITAL LIMITED PARTNERSHIP REGIME:A REPORT TO
THE ASSISTANT TREASURER 89, 11 (2011). 
358 AUSTL. GOVT:DEPT OF IND., R&D TAX INCENTIVE:CUSTOMER INFOR-
MATION GUIDE (AUSINDUSTRY SECTIONS)(2012);AUSTL. GOVT:DEPT OF IND.,
SINGLE BUSINESS SERVICE, http://www.business.gov.au/about-businessgovau
/Pages/One-Website.aspx [https://perma.cc/EG7E-2BTR](noting that Single
BusinessServicereplacedEnterpriseConnect).
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RELEVANT
LEGISLATION KEY PROVISIONS
PUBLIC-
PRIVATE
EQUITY CO-
INVESTMENT
SCHEMES
Governm ent and private sector capital
is pooled to invest in new Australian
com panies com mercializing innovative
ideas.359
Co-investm ent program s are coupled
with tax incentives, and together they
help to attractcapitalto the high-risk
venturecapitalsector.360
The current Australian Governm ent 
equity-based venture capital programs
com prise:
the Innovation Investm ent Fund
(IIF) last funding tranche sched-
uled for2013 [and cutfrom federal
budget in 20142015]; 
the Innovation Investm ent Follow-
on Fund (IIFF) investm ent period 
ceasedin late2012;
the Pre-Seed Fund (PSF) invest-
m entperiodceasedinlate2012;[]
the Renewable Energy Venture
Capital (REVC) Fund investm ent 
period underway;361 and
the Entrepreneurs Infrastructure 
Program m e 20142015; intended to 
supply AU$484.2 m illion over five
years.
AsofNovember2015, however, Australiahasnolegislation in
placetofacilitatecrowdfunding.362 Companiesmay, however, raise
financing via the exem ptions in Section 708 or the Australian
Sm allScale Offerings Board (ASSOB).363 ASSOB was created
underASIC Class Order02/273, which provides an exem ption
359 REVIEW OF VENTURE CAPITAL AND ENTREPRENEURIAL SKILLS, supra
note337, at17.
360 Id. at47.
361 Id. at17;see also AUSTL. GOVT DEPARTMENT OF INDUS., ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE ENTREPRENEURS INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMME DISCUSSION PAPER
(2014), http:/www.industry.gov.au/industry/Documents/EntrepreneursInfrastruc
tureProgrammeDiscussionPaper.pdf[https://perma.cc/9BQP-J22F].
362 See Terence W. Wong, Crowd funding: Regulating the new phenom-
enon, 31 CO. & SEC. L. J. 89, 107 (2013).
363 Corporations Act 2011 (Cth) ch. 6D, ss 708(1)(11) (Austl.); AUSTL. SMALL
SCALE OFFERING BD., ASSOB PLATFORM:RULES OF ADMISSION FOR LIMITED
COMPANIES 2 (2015).
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from the fundraising provisionsofthe CorporationsAct.364 The
boardallowssmallcom paniestolisttheircompanyon theboard
for registered investors.365 To date, more than AU$130 million
hasbeenraisedusingtheplatform.366 Itcostsacompany$4,500 to
liston the platform.367 Furthermore, companies incurfees by re-
maining on the list.368 Otherthan ASSOB, there are few equity
crowdfunding platforms to which Australian com panies m ay
have recourse.369 This not only substantially reduces com peti-
tion in the crowdfunding market, but also reduces SMEs access 
tocapital.
B. New Zealand
Capitalmarketlaw reformsaimedatSMEshavebeen enacted
invariousjurisdictions, includingNew Zealand. Forexample, New
Zealandrecentlysimplifiedthefinancialreportingrequirem ents
applicabletoSMEsundertheFinancialReportingAct2013 inorder
toenhancethedevelopmentoftheSME sector.370 New Zealand
law also follows the cognate Australian small scale offerings 
exem ptions, enabling issuers ofdebt and equity securities to
fund up to $2,000,000 in any twelve-month period from twenty
investors.371 Other exemptions include the offers to wholesale
investors exemption underthe FinancialMarkets ConductAct
364 See generally ASIC, Business Introduction or Matching Services, Class
OrderCO 02/273 (Mar. 2002)(Austl.).
365 About ASSOB, AUSTL. SMALL SCALE OFFERING BD., https://www.assob
.com.au/about.asp?page=1 [https://perma.cc/B8XJ-2VYZ].
366 ChrisGay, Equity Crowdfunding: Good for Capitalism or for Fraudsters?,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Nov. 21, 2012, 9:25 AM), http://money.usnews
.com/money/personal-finance/mutual-funds/articles/2012/11/21/will-crowdfund
ing-unleash-innovation-encourage-securities-fraud-or-both [https://perma.cc/Q2
WR-W7NA];see also ASIC, supra note364.
367 Our Fees, AUSTL. SMALL SCALE OFFERING BD., https://www.assob.com
.au/about.asp?page=3 [https://perma.cc/PYW2-T88D].
368 Id.
369 See Rose Powell, VentureCrowd Fund-raising Adds $1.2m to Start-Up
Ingogos $9.1m Raising, AUSTL. FIN. REV. (Sept. 30, 2014)(discussing the
VentureCrowd platform, which enables sophisticated investorsin Australia
toinvestuptoAU$2,500.).
370 ERNST & YOUNG, NEW ZEALAND FINANCIAL REPORTING GUIDE 2014/15
17 (2015).
371 FinancialMarketsConductAct2013, s12 (N.Z.).
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2013.372 Thelattercoversinvestmentbusinesses, personsengaged
in investm entactivities, eligible investors, and personsmaking
an investm entof$750,000 orm ore.373 Issuersissuing securities
towholesaleinvestorsarenotrequired tocomply with prospec-
tusrequirements.374 New Zealand law alsomakesprovisionsfor
venture capitalschemes, which allow com paniesto raise funds
withsubstantialexemptionsfrom theusualsecuritieslaw require-
ments(such asprospectusrequirem ents), butunderthesupervi-
sionofanindependentventurecapitalschem eadm inistrator.375
TheNew ZealandStock Exchangehasintroducedanew high
growth marketsegment(NXT)aimed atSMEs.376 The key ele-
mentsoftheNXT disclosureregim earethesetting by thefirm
of key operating m ilestones (KOMs), by which investors can 
measureand monitorbusinessperformanceand receivequarterly
business updates.377 The KOMs willreplace prospective finan-
cial inform ation (PFI) currently required in listing docum ents, 
anditisexpectedthatthiswillreducetheinitiallistingcostsfor
SMEs.378 Table2 providesan overview ofkeycapitalmarketlaw
reform saimedatSMEs. Asdiscussedbelow, theseincludeanew
regimeforECF andP2PL vialicensedintermediaries.
TABLE 2:NEW ZEALAND SME CAPITAL MARKET LAW REFORMS
LEGISLATION SUMMARY
FINANCIAL REPORTING
Financial Reporting Act
2013
Requirem entsaresim plified
for SMEs under FRA 2013.
SMEs have the option of
preparing special purpose fi-
nancial reports for tax pur-
poses.379
372 Id. ats3.
373 Id.
374 Id.
375 See FinancialMarketsAuthority, SecuritiesAct(VentureCapitalSchemes)
Exemption Amendment Notice 2012 (N.Z.);Financial Markets Authority,
SecuritiesAct(VentureCapitalSchemes)ExemptionNotice2008 (N.Z.).
376 NXT, GUIDANCE NOTE:KEY OPERATING MILESTONES (Feb. 2015).
377 Id. at3.
378 See NXT, GUIDANCE NOTE:LISTING AS A NXT COMPANY 7 (Feb. 2015).
379 FinancialReportingAct2013, ss15, 19 (N.Z.).
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LEGISLATION SUMMARY
EXEMPTIONS FROM
PROSPECTUS
REQUIREMENTS
FinancialMarketConduct
Act2013
Key exem ptions include the
following:
Sm allscaleoffers:This
exclusion follows the
cognate Australian 20/
12 rule. Itenablesissu-
ers ofdebt and equity
securitiestoraisefunds
up to AU$2 m illion in
any twelve-month pe-
riodfrom 20 investors;
Offers to wholesale
investors: this covers
investm entbusinesses,
persons engaged in in-
vestm entactivities, el-
igible investors, and
persons making an in-
vestm ent of $750,000
orm ore;
Offers for persons in
closerelationships:this
categorycomprisesclose
businessassociatesand
relatives;
Offersthrough licensed
intermediaries:ECF and
P2PL.
NEW ZEALAND STOCK
EXCHANGE:NEW HIGH
GROWTH MARKET
SEGMENT (NXT)
NXT is aimed at SMEs. 380
The key elements of the
NXT disclosureregim eare:
the setting by the firm
of key operating m ile-
stones by which inves-
tors can m easure and
m onitor business per-
form ance;
a quarterlybusinessup-
date;and
asetlistofeventsrequir-
ingimmediatedisclosure
to the m arket between
businessupdates.381
KOMs willreplace prospec-
tive financial information
currently required in listing
380 See NXT, supra note378, at4.
381 NXT, supra note 376, at 3, 710. 
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LEGISLATION SUMMARY
documents, and it is hoped
thatthiswillreducetheini-
tiallistingcostsforSMEs.382
Note that the London
Stock Exchange has de-
veloped a market seg-
ment for high-growth
companies, such asinter-
netand technology com -
paniesthatareexpected
to, in time, seek alisting
on them ain board.383
This new high-growth
segm ent was developed
jointly by the U.K. Gov-
ernm ent and London
Stock Exchange. Itisin
addition to the second
board called AIM, High
Growth Segm ent.384
VENTURE CAPITAL
SCHEMES
Securities Act
(Venture Capital
Schemes) Exemption
Amendment Notice
2012 and
Securities Act
(Venture Capital
Schemes) Exemption
Notice 2008
Companies can raise
funds with substantial
exem ptions from the
usualsecurities law re-
quirements(such aspro-
spectus requirem ents),
but under the supervi-
sion of an independent
venture capital scheme
adm inistrator.385
TheNew Zealand Finan-
cial Markets Authority
(FMA)hasdesignated 10
organizations, including
Powerhouse Ventures
Limited, toadministerthe
venturecapitalschem e.
382 See NXT, supra note378, at7.
383 LONDON STOCK EXCH., HIGH GROWTH SEGMENT, http:/www.lseg.com/sites
/default/files/content/documents/HGS_flyer.pdf[https://perma.cc/FY8Z-A2FK].
384 LONDON STOCK EXCH., AIM, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/com
panies-and-advisors/main-market/companies/hgs/hgs.htm [https://perma.cc/425V
-CGFK].
385 See SecuritiesAct(Venture CapitalSchemes)Exemption Amendment
Notice2012, 34(N.Z.);SecuritiesAct(VentureCapitalSchemes)Exemption
Notice2008 (N.Z.).
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LEGISLATION SUMMARY
The scheme administra-
tors operate under a
Code of Practice and are
exemptfrom various se-
curities law require-
m ents.386
A businessthatwantsto
raisefundsfrom thepub-
lic for a project or ven-
turemayapplytobecome
a Registered Business
underanyscheme.387
A Registered Business
that m akes an offer of
equity securitiesorpar-
ticipatory securities in
compliancewiththeCode
m ay rely on the exemp-
tions stated in the Ex-
emptionNotice, including
exem ption from the re-
quirementtohaveareg-
istered prospectus and
exem ption from certain
advertising requirements
ofthelaw.388
A com pany can raise no
m ore than NZD $5 m il-
lion.389
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT
PROGRAMS
Callaghan Innovations 
Incubator Support Pro-
gram m e390
R&D Grants391
386 Securities Act (Venture Capital Schemes) Exemption Amendment
Notice2012, at4(N.Z.).
387 Id. at2.
388 Id.;see also SecuritiesAct(Venture CapitalSchemes)Exemption Notice
2008, 7 (N.Z.).
389 Securities Act (Venture Capital Schemes) Exemption Amendment
Notice2012, at5 (N.Z.).
390 CALLAHAN INNOVATION, INCUBATORS, https://www.callaghaninnovation
.govt.nz/incubators[https://perma.cc/UK5C-EC4B].
391 CALLAHAN INNOVATION, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT GRANTS, https://
www.callaghaninnovation.govt.nz/sites/all/files/rd-grants-brochure-07-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HYL8-XZPE].
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Underthenow-repealedNew ZealandSecuritiesAct1978, is-
suerswererequiredtomakefull, timely, andaccuratedisclosureof
relevantinform ation to potentialinvestors.392 UnderSection 33
ofthe Act, no securities could be offered to the publicforsub-
scription byoron behalfofan issuerunlesstheofferwasmadein
an investmentstatement, aspartofan authorizedadvertisement,
ormadein oraccom panied by a registered prospectus.393 Thus,
theActim posed variousrestrictionson offerstothepublic. Ex-
cluded from theserestrictionswerecertain offereeswhowerenot
consideredmembersofthepublic, such asrelativesandclosebusi-
nessassociatesoftheissuer.394 Inaddition, theActexcludedoffers
toprofessionalorhabituallargeinvestors, aswellaseligibleper-
sons, i.e., wealthy and experienced investors, from itsambit.395
There was no crowdfunding regim e per se. Crowdfunding was
technicallypossibleunderthe1978 regime, butonlytothelimited
extentprovided by theexclusionstotheprospectusrequirements
contained in Section 3 ofthe Securities Act1978.396 The sam e
position holdstruein Australia asofJuly2015;ECF ispossible
butonly via the exclusions or carveouts to the prospectus re-
quirem entsin theCorporationsAct2001.397
1. Crowdfunding Under the Financial Markets Conduct
Act 2013
TheFinancialMarketsConductAct2013 (FMC Act)and the
FinancialMarketsConductRegulations2014 (FMC Regulations)
provide fortwonew form sofcapitalraising:crowdfunding and
392 TheNew ZealandmodelwasfollowedbyPapuaNew GuineaandSamoa.
SecuritiesAct1978, s54(N.Z.).
393 See Securities Act 1978, s 33 (N.Z.). The offer to the public requirement 
alsoappearsin therelevantHongKonglegislation:see Companies(WindingUp
andMiscellaneousProvisions)Ordinance(2012)Cap. 32, §1 (H.K.). Thereareno
specificcrowdfundingprovisionsin theHongKonglegislation.
394 SecuritiesAct1978, s3 (N.Z.).
395 Id. ats2c.
396 Id. ats3.
397 See Wong, supra note362, fora discussion ofECF in Australia in the
absenceofspecificlegislativeprovisions. Foran exampleofhow ECF works
inAustraliain suchacontext, see Powell, supra note369.
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P2PL.398 UndertheFMC Act, financialproductsoffered through
licensed intermediaries are notsubjectto the standard disclo-
sure obligations forfinancialproducts thatapply underthe fi-
nancialmarketconductlegislation.399 Forthispurpose, licensed
intermediariesare personslicensed to provide crowdfunding or
P2PL servicesunderPart6 oftheFMC Act.400
Priorto the enactm entofthe FMC Act, providersofcrowd-
fundingand peer-to-peerservicesran therisk ofcontraveningthe
SecuritiesAct1978.401 TheFMC removed thisrisk bycreatinga
licensingregimethatenablesprovidersofcrowdfundingandpeer-
to-peerservicestoprovidelicensed servicesunderthesupervision
of the regulator, the Financial Markets Authority (FMA).402 Li-
censed crowdfunding and peer-to-peerservice providersare not
subjectto the disclosure obligationsforoffersoffinancialprod-
uctsunderPart3 oftheFMC Act.403 Thisisadirectresultofan
exclusion contained in Clause 6 ofSchedule 1 ofthe FMC Act,
which statesthata person providing a prescribed intermediary 
service is excluded from the disclosure obligations under Part 3.404
Crowdfunding and peer-to-peer services are designated as pre-
scribedintermediaryservices.405
Accordingly, theprotection ofinvestorsisderivedfrom theli-
censing regimein Part6 oftheFMC Actratherthan Part3 of
theAct.406 Licensed providersrem ain subjecttovariousrequire-
m ents, including disclosing toclientsthenature oftheservices
provided. 407 They are also subject to FMA supervision.408 As
398 This section draws on Alm a Pekmezovic & Gordon Walker, Equity
Crowdfunding in New Zealand, 33(1)CO. & SEC. L.J. 63, 6369 (2015). 
399 FinancialMarketsConductAct2013, s6 (N.Z.).
400 Id. ats390.
401 Pekmezovic& Walker, supra note398, at63.
402 See FinancialMarketsConductAct2013;Who needs a license?, FIN. MKTS.
AUTH., https://fma.govt.nz/compliance/licensing-and-registration/who-needs-a-li
cence/[https://perma.cc/9EDR-CPEJ].
403 FinancialMarketsConductAct2013, pt3 (N.Z.).
404 Id. atss 3940, schedule1, cl6. Notethattheexclusionscontained in
Schedule1, Part1 oftheActaresimilartothecarveoutsin Section708 ofthe
Australian CorporationsAct2001.
405 FinancialMarketsConductRegulations2014, reg184(N.Z.).
406 FinancialMarketsConductAct2013, pts3, 6 (N.Z.)
407 Id. at ss 42228. 
408 Id. at ss 41415, 41821. 
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indicated, the benefitofobtaining a marketservice license for
crowdfunding underPart6 oftheFMC Actisthatthedisclosure
obligations underPart3 are inapplicable, and m odified disclo-
surerequirem entsapplyinstead.409
Generally, thedisclosureobligationsim posedon ECF provid-
ersarefewerthan thosethatapplyon a registered exchange.410
A com pany issuing securitiesthrough crowdfunding servicesis
subjectto lessdisclosure than a com pany listed on the NZX.411
Thus, com paniescan raisefundsthrough licensed crowdfunding
and peer-to-peer intermediaries facilities without having to com-
ply with public offer disclosure documents under securities or
financialm arketslegislation.412 Such exclusionsfrom disclosure
areintendedtomakeiteasierforSMEstoraisecapital.413
Regulation 185 oftheFMC Regulations2014definestheterms
crowd funding service and peer-to-peer lending services.414 A
person provides a crowd funding service if the following two 
elem entsarem et:
the person provides a facility by m eans of which 
offersofsharesin acom panyarem ade;and
theprincipalpurpose... istofacilitatethematching
ofcom panies who wish to raise funds with many
investorswhoareseekingtoinvestrelativelysmall
am ounts.415
A person providesaP2P if:
the person provides a facility by m eans of which 
offersofdebtsecuritiesarem ade;and
theprincipalpurpose... istofacilitatethematching
oflenderswith borrowerswhoareseekingloansfor
personal, charitable, or sm all business purposes.416
409 Id. at ss 5052, 42228. 
410 See generally id.
411 Id.
412 Id.;see also Pekmezovic& Walker, supra note398, at63.
413 Financial Markets Conduct Act, ss 34 (N.Z.). 
414 FinancialMarketsConductRegulations2014, reg185 (N.Z.).
415 Id.
416 Id.
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2. Part 6 of the FMC Regulations 2014
Part6 oftheFMC Regulations2014containsprovisionsthat
allow crowdfunding services and P2PL services
providerstobelicensed(Reg. 184);417
provide additionaleligibility criteria, such as ade-
quatesystemsand procedurestoensurethatissuers
donotraisemorethan$2 millioninanytwelve-month
period(Reg. 186);418 and
setoutadequate disclosure arrangem ents applica-
bletocrowdfundingproviders, disclosurestatements
for retailinvestors, conditions (including warning
statem ents for investors), and client agreements
(Reg. 186).419
Theserequirementsarediscussedbelow.
3. Licensing Requirements
Equity-based crowdfundingfacilitiesand P2PL servicefacili-
tiesmustapplytobelicensedbytheFMA.420 TheFMA issuedthe
firstequitycrowdfundinglicenseson July31, 2014, toPledgeMe
and SnowballEffect.421 Thecriteria forobtaininga licensetopro-
vide a crowdfunding service are setoutin Section 396 ofthe
FMC Act422 and additionaleligibility criteria apply underRegu-
lation 186 oftheFMC Regulations2014.423 Theeligibilitycriteria
fora crowdfundingserviceunderSection 396(a)oftheFMC Act
areasfollows:
theproviderhasfair, orderly, and transparentsys-
tem sandproceduresforprovidingtheservice;
417 FinancialMarketsConductRegulations2014, reg184(N.Z.).
418 Id. atreg186.
419 Id.
420 FIN. MKTS. AUTH., supra note402.
421 See FMA Issues First Equity Crowd Funding Licences, FMA, MR No.
2014-25 (July31, 2014)(N.Z.).
422 FinancialMarketsConductAct2013, s396 (N.Z.).
423 FinancialMarketsConductRegulations2014, reg186 (N.Z.).
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theserviceisdesignedprimarilyforoffersbypersons
otherthan theprovideranditsassociatedpersons;
theproviderhasan adequatepolicy foridentifying
andm anagingtheriskoffraudbyissuersusingthe
service(ananti-fraudpolicy);
theproviderhasadequatedisclosurearrangements
to give investors, orto enable investors to readily
obtain, timely and understandable information to
assist investors to decide whether to acquire the
shares (for example, through initialdisclosure, or
question and answerforums, orotherinformation
thatismadeavailable);
theproviderhasan adequatepolicy (a fairdealing
policy)forexcludingan issuerfrom usingtheservice
ifthe providerhasinform ation (forexample, from
checks or assessments itcarries out(ifany))that
givesitreason tobelievethattheissuer, in relation
toany dealing in sharesusing theservice, hasen-
gaged in conductthatism isleadingordeceptiveor
islikely to mislead ordeceive orhasm ade an un-
substantiatedrepresentation.424
Upon registration, licensed crowdfunding service providers
have to meetand maintain certain minimum standards, asset
outbytheFMC Actandanyapplicableregulations.425
4. Required Disclosure Statements
Regulation215 providesthatadisclosurestatementforacrowd-
funding serviceorpeer-to-peerservicemustcontain a description
ofthefollowingm atters:
thenatureoftheserviceprovided;
how investors apply for, and obtain, access to the
facilityandtheeligibilitycriteriathatapply;
how issuers apply for, and obtain, access to the
facilityandtheeligibilitycriteriathatapply;
424 Id. atreg186.
425 FIN. MKTS. AUTH., CROWDFUNDING PLATFORMS, https:/fma.govt.nz/compli
ance/role/crowdfunding-platforms/[https://perma.cc/CS4G-MD9P].
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how investm ents are made and financialproducts
areissuedundertheservice;and
how investorm oneyisreceivedanddealtwith.426
In addition, theproviderm ustdiscloseinform ation aboutthe
nature and extentofthe checksand assessmentsmade by the
providerofeach issuerthatoffersfinancialproductsunderthe
service;427 thedirectorsand seniormanagersofthoseissuers;428
therisksinvolved in thosefinancialproducts;429 thenatureand
extentofthe disclosure arrangem entsthatapply in relation to
the financialproducts offered underthe service;430 the charges
thatmay be payable to the provider by an investor (or by an
issuer);431 therightsoftheprovider;432 thenatureofanyrestric-
tionsorprohibitions;433 andthenatureandextentofanyinterest
held byorin theproviderthatm aym ateriallyadverselyimpact
on the providers ability to have fair, orderly and transparent 
system s and procedures for providing the service.434 Further,
investors must receive inform ation about the contact details of 
theproviderand how theinvestorsmaycom plain abouttheser-
vicetotheproviderandtoanydisputeresolution schem ethatis
available.435 Regulation 196 im poses an obligation to make a
warning statem ent available.436 The required statement is as
follows:
Equitycrowdfundingisrisky. Issuersusingthisfacilityinclude
new orrapidlygrowingventures. Investmentin thesetypesof
businessesisveryspeculativeandcarrieshighrisks. Youm ay
loseyourentireinvestment, andmustbein aposition tobear
thisrisk withoutunduehardship. New Zealand law normally
requirespeople who offerfinancialproductsto give informa-
tion toinvestorsbeforetheyinvest. Thisrequiresthoseoffering
426 FinancialMarketsConductRegulations2014, reg215(1)(N.Z.).
427 Id. atreg215(1)(f)(i).
428 Id. atreg215(1)(f)(ii).
429 Id.
430 Id. atreg215(1)(g).
431 Id. atreg215(1)(h).
432 Id. atreg215(1)(i).
433 Id. atreg215(1)(k).
434 Id. atreg215(1)(l).
435 Id. at reg 215(1)(m )(n). 
436 Id. atreg196(1).
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financialproductsto have disclosed information thatisimpor-
tantforinvestorstomakean informeddecision. Theusualrules
donotapply tooffersby issuersusing thisfacility. Asa result,
youm aynotbegivenalltheinformationusuallyrequired. You
willalsohavefewerotherlegalprotectionsforthisinvestment.
Ask questions, read allinformation given carefully, and seek
independentfinancialadvicebeforecommittingyourself.437
5. Requirement to Obtain Investor Confirmation
Regulation 197(1)requirescrowdfundingserviceprovidersto
obtain a confirmation from an investortotheeffectthatthein-
vestorhasseen thewarningstatementaboutcrowdfundingand
understands the risks involved.438 This confirmation must be
obtainedin writinginaseparatedocument.439
6. Issuers Must Not Breach $2 Million Aggregate Limit
The regulations limitcom panies using crowdfunding, P2PL
services, orthe smalloffers exclusion underSchedule 1 ofthe
FMC Act to a NZ$2 million aggregate limit.440 Thismeansthat
issuers may notraise more than $2 m illion from the publicin
any twelve-m onth period.441 Atfirstglance, thisappearstobea
variation of the so-called 20/12 exclusion to the prospectus
requirements ofthe cognate Australian legislation.442 The key
differenceisthatwhilethemonetarylimitisthesame, theNew
Zealand provisionshavenolimiton thenum berofinvestors.443
Further, thoseinvestorsneed notbesophisticated orhavea high
networth.444
New Zealand wasthe firstoftheform erBritish enclavesin
the Southern Hemisphere (Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore,
Australia, and New Zealand)to introduce a discrete regimefor
437 Id. atreg196(2).
438 Id. atreg197(1).
439 Id. atreg197(2).
440 Id. atreg186(1)(g).
441 Id.
442 See supra notes 33839 and accom panying text. 
443 FinancialMarketsConductRegulations2014, reg186(1)(g)(N.Z.).
444 Compare FinancialMarketsConductRegulations2014, reg186 (N.Z.),
with Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth.) ss 708(1)(7) (Austl.). 
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crowdfunding.445 The regime introduces relaxed disclosure re-
quirem ents, while also introducing a form ofm eritregulation
via the ability ofthe licensed interm ediariesto choose and vet
thefirm stheyplaceon theirplatform s.446
C. Crowdfunding in the United States: The New Registration
Exemption
Thesecuritiesframework in theUnitedStatesisbasedon the
Securities Actof1933 (Securities Act).447 This Actoperates in
conjunction with theSecuritiesExchangeActof1934(Exchange
Act), which created the U.S. Securitiesand Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC).448 TheActswereenactedin responsetothe1929 stock
marketcrash.449 TheSEC isresponsibleforenforcingthesecuri-
tieslawsand prom otingpublicconfidencein capitalmarkets.450
In addition, theSarbanes-Oxley Actof2002 (SOX Act)im poses
variouscorporategovernance, accounting, and financialreporting
requirementsoncom panies.451
UndertheExchangeAct, com paniesarerequired toregister
thedistribution ofsecuritieswith theSEC priortoengaging in
the interstate sale of securities.452 This requirem ent pertains
unless one ofthree exemptions applies under Regulation D.453
Theseexem ptionscorrespond toRules504, 505, and506 respec-
tively, with Rule506 havingthemostim pact.454
445 New Zealand Equity Crowdfunding 1st Year in Review, CROWDREADY,
http://www.crowdready.com.au/updates/[https://perma.cc/9W98-KMBA].
446 Id.
447 SecuritiesAct1933, Pub L. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as15 U.S.C.A.
§77a(West2015)).
448 SEC, SMALL BUSINESS AND THE SEC:A GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESSES
ON RAISING CAPITAL AND COMPLYING WITH THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
(Oct. 2013), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm#regd [https://perma
.cc/4ZGV-R8LK].
449 Id.
450 SEC, HOW THE SEC PROTECTS INVESTORS, MAINTAINS MARKET INTEG-
RITY, AND FACILITATES CAPITAL FORMATION, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwe
do.shtml[https://perma.cc/R65L-8SP4].
451 Sarbanes-OxleyActof2002, PubL. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
452 SEC, supra note448.
453 Id.
454 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.504506 (2015). 
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TheSEC adoptedRegulation D in 1982 with theaim ofestab-
lishing certain exemptions for companies thatissue securities.455
The main purpose ofthe exemptions is to allow companies to
issuesecuritieswithouthavingtoregisterthem with theSEC.456
Regulation D extends to accredited investors and uses incom e
criteria fordeterm iningwhen theregistration requirementdoes
notapply.457 Forexample, anaccreditedinvestorisdefinedassome-
onewho, atthetimeofthepurchaseofthesecurities, hasa net
worth of$1 million orm ore, notincludingthevalueofhisorher
primaryresidence.458 Thisistheso-called networth testapplied
under Regulation D. 459 Alternatively, using an incom e-based
definition, an accredited investormay alsobedefined asan indi-
vidualwithincomeexceeding$200,000 duringthetwomostrecent
yearsorwith jointincome(with aspouse)above$300,000 in each
ofthe twomostrecentyears.460 Accredited investorstypically in-
cludebanks, financialinstitutions, variousinvestmentfunds, direc-
tors, and executiveofficersofan issuer;and individualssatisfying
thenetworthorincome-baseddefinitionsappliedundertheAct.461
Section 4(a)(5)oftheSecuritiesActexemptsacompanyfrom
registeringoffersandsalesofsecuritieswith theSEC wherethe
totalofferingpriceislessthan $5 m illion and theoffersorsales
aremadetoaccredited investors.462 Thecompany m ay m akean
offeringtoan unlim itednumberofaccreditedinvestors, butonly
up tothirty-fiveunaccreditedinvestors.463 Therequirementunder
Rule 506, however, isthatan unaccredited investormusthave
such knowledge and experience in financialand businessmat-
tersthatheiscapableofevaluating themeritsand risksofthe
prospective investmentorthe issuerreasonably believesimme-
diatelypriortomakinganysalethatsuch purchasercomeswithin
455 Manning GilbertWarren III, A Review of Regulation D: The Present
Exemption Regimen for Limited Offerings under the Securities Act of 1933, 33
AM. U. L. REV. 355, 358 (1984).
456 Id.
457 Id. at 36869. 
458 Id. at369;15 U.S.C.A. §77b(a)(15)(ii)(West2015).
459 Warren, supra note455, at382.
460 SEC, INVESTOR BULLETIN:ACCREDITED INVESTORS, http://www.sec.gov
/investor/alerts/ib_accreditedinvestors.pdf[https://perma.cc/5WL9-FEF9].
461 Id.
462 15 U.S.C.A §77d(a)(5)(West2015).
463 SEC, supra note448.
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this description.464 This usually limits offerings to accredited
investorsonly.465 Furthermore, theissued securitiesareregarded
as restricted securities generally offered to friends and family
and purchasersm ay notresellthem withoutregistration oran
applicableexemption.466 Accordingly, an issuerisobliged to de-
term inethattheinvestorispurchasingtherestricted securities
forinvestm entpurposesonly, ratherthanresale.467
Asa resultofthisregulatorystructure, sm allinvestorswere
generally unable to participate in investing in startups, while
startups were unable to attractfunds from sm allinvestors.468
Regulation D, therefore, effectively precluded the em ergence of
crowdfundingprojectsonline, asthisinvolvestheraisingofcapi-
talwithpublicsolicitation from unaccreditedinvestors.469
Todate, websitessuchasKickstarterintheUnitedStateshave
notbeen used to sellsecurities.470 Thiswasintended tochange
with thepassageoftheJumpstartOurBusinessStartups(JOBS)
Act.471 TheJOBS ActwaspassedonApril5, 2012, anditwasorigi-
nallyexpectedthattheActwouldbeimplementedbytheSEC by
January1, 2013.472 PresidentObama described theJOBS Actfor
startups and small businesses as a potential gam e changer.473
Theprim aryaim ofthelegislation istoprom otetheformation of
new com paniesandspurjobgrowth.474 TheActintroducesanew
term an emerging growth company (EGC) and deals with 
464 17 C.F.R. §230.506 (2015).
465 Id.
466 Warren, supra note455, at366 n.63.
467 DRESNER, supra note92, at151.
468 Claudia Buck, Personal Finance: Crowdfunding Helps Creative People
Raise Money for Their Projects, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 7, 2013), http://www
.sacbee.com/news/local/article2577111.html[https://perma.cc/A9YC-HAXK].
469 DRESNER, supra note92, at10.
470 Brad Hamilton, The Colorado Crowdfunding ActThe Online Inter-
mediary (Part 2 of 2), BUS. FIN. & SEC. L. BLOG (May 16, 2015), https://bradh
hamilton.wordpress.com/2015/05/16/[https:/perma.cc/X9CC-2LX9].
471 Id.
472 Id.
473 Jean Eaglesham, Crowdfunding Efforts Draw Suspicion, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 18, 2013, C1.
474 ThomasA. Martin, TheJobsActof2012:BalancingFundamentalSecuri-
tiesLaw Principleswith theDemandsoftheCrowd 2 (Apr. 12, 2012)(unpub-
lished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2040953
[https://perma.cc/ET32-VWFP].
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crowdfundingaswellassmallissues.475 Thereissignificantover-
laphere, asan EGC mayissuesecuritiestoacrowdviaacrowd-
funding platform referred to as a funding portal in the legislation 
whilealsorelying on thesmallissuesexemption.476 TitleI ofthe
Actisdevoted toEGCs, whileTitlesII and III dealwith crowd-
fundingandsmallissues.477 TitleII permitsstartupstogenerally
solicitaccreditedinvestors, whileTitleIII oftheJOBS Actallows
startupsand smallbusinessestouseSEC-registered websitesto
raisedebtorequitycapital, effectivelylegalizingcrowdfunding.478
TheSEC hasstated:
Totheextentthatcrowdfundingrulesaresuccessfullyutilized,
the crowdfunding provisionsofthe JOBS Actshould provide
startupsandsmallbusinesseswiththemeanstoraiserelatively
modestamountsofcapital, from a broad crosssection ofpoten-
tialinvestors, through securities offerings that are exempt
from registration under the Securities Act. They also should
permitsmallinvestorstoparticipatein awiderrangeofsecuri-
tiesofferingsthanm aybeavailablecurrently.479
EarlyeuphoriasurroundingtheJOBS Actdiminishedduring
the rulem aking phase. Title II wasim plem ented in September
2013;proposed rulesunderTitle III cam e outin October2013
butthen stalled, andrulesunderTitleIV (Sm allCompanyCapi-
talFormation)werepromulgated in March 2015. Itwasnotuntil
October30, 2015 thattheSEC issuedrevisedrulesforTitleIII.480
ThespecificprovisionsoftheJOBS Actareexploredbelow.
475 Id. at 8, 1314. 
476 JumpstartOurBusinessStartupsAct, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
304(h)(2012).
477 Id.
478 TitleII removestheprohibition on generalsolicitation in Rule506 (17
C.F.R. §230.506 (2015))offerings. Startupsmaysolicitaccreditedinvestorspro-
vided they undertake reasonable steps to verify the accredited status of the 
investors. SomenotableexamplesofTitleII sitesareAngelList, FundersClub,
andCircleUp. Fordiscussion, seeIbrahim, supra note 5, at 11416. 
479 ProposedCrowdfundingRules, supra note253, at344.
480 See PressRelease, SEC, SEC AdoptsRulestoFacilitateSmallerCom-
paniesAccesstoCapital(Mar. 25, 2015);PressRelease, SEC, SEC AdoptsRules
toPermitCrowdfunding(Oct. 30, 2015). Thelatterruleswillnotcomeintoforce
until2016. Forcomment, seeJ.D. Harrison, SEC finalizes key JOBS Act rules
for small businesses, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/on-small-business/wp/2015/03/25/sec-finalizes-key-jobs-act-rules-for
-small-businesses/[https://perma.cc/BH78-Y95N](discussingtheTitleIV rules)
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1. The Crowdfunding Exemption Under Title III of the
JOBS Act
TitleIII oftheActintroducesanew exemption from thereg-
istration requirementsunderSection5 oftheSecuritiesActof1933
in ordertofacilitatecertain crowdfundingtransactions.481 Thisex-
emption isaddedasacrowdfundingtransactionalexemption under
Section 4(a)(6)oftheSecuritiesAct.482 In responsetotheseamend-
ments, theSEC published proposed RuleS7-09-13 in ordertoes-
tablish a framework for the implementation ofthe exem ption.
Undertheproposedrule, acrowdfundingofferingwillfallwithin
theexem ption undertheJOBS Actifthecriteriaoutlined below
arem et.483
a. Limits on Maximum Funds that an Issuer Can Raise
First, thetotalamountraisedm ustnotexceed$1 m illionin a
twelve-monthperiod.484 Forexample, astartupmayraise$500,000
in a firstcrowdfunding and raiseanother$500,000 in a second
crowdfundingwithinayear. However, whenthestartuphasraised
$1 million in thepasttwelvem onths, itwillbeunabletoutilize
crowdfunding.485 This restriction, therefore, places the focus of
the JOBS Acton new, very early-stage companies, ratherthan
companiesthathavealreadyreceivedcrowdfunding. TheSEC has
notedin thiscontextthat
[t]helimitation on theamountthatmayberaised couldbenefit
investorsbyreducingthepotentialfordilution orfraud. How-
ever, werecognizethatthecapon themaximum amountthat
m ay be sold   also could prevent certain issuers from  raising 
allthecapitaltheyneedtomaketheirbusinessesviable.486
and Stacey Cowley, SEC puts Wall St. Spin on crowdfunding model, INTL
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2015, at15.
481 JumpstartOurBusinessStartups(JOBS)Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, §302,
126 Stat. 306 (2012)(amending15 U.S.C.A. §77d(6)(West2015)).
482 Id. §302(a). ForadiscussionofTitleIII crowdfunding, seeIbrahim, supra
note5, at136. Ibrahim arguesthatTitleIII providesfortrueequitycrowdfunding
intheUnitedStatesandrepresentsaparadigm shiftinentrepreneurialfinance.
483 ProposedCrowdfundingRules, supra note253, at14.
484 JumpstartOurBusinessStartups(JOBS)Act§302.
485 DRESNER, supra note92, at83.
486 ProposedCrowdfundingRules, supra note253, at353.
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b. Investment Caps
Second, individualinvestmentsin atwelve-month period are
limited tothegreaterof$2,000 or 5 percent of an investors an-
nualincom e ornetworth ifannualincome ornetworth ofthe
investorislessthan $100,000, or10 percentofannualincom eor
networth (nottoexceed an am ountsold of$100,000)ifannual
incomeornetworth oftheinvestoris$100,000 ormore.487 Under
theproposedSEC rules, itisenvisagedthatanissuerwillbeableto
relyontheeffortsofanintermediarytodeterminethataninvestor
has notexceeded the investmentlimits.488 To rely on an inter-
mediary, however, theissuerm ustnothaveknowledgethatthe
investorhasexceededorwouldexceedtheinvestm entlimits.489
c. Registration Requirement: Channeling ECF Through
Registered Brokers or Funding Portals 
Third, transactionsmustbe conducted through a registered
brokerdealeroranew typeofregistered entity called a funding 
portal.490 In thiscontext, theSEC Comm issionerhasnoted:
Undertheproposed rules, thecrowdfundingintermediaryisre-
quiredtokeepaneyeoutforfraudandtohaveareasonablebasis
forbelievingthattheissuerhascompliedwith therequirements
oftheexemption. Thecrowdfundingintermediarywillalsopro-
videaforum forinformationsharing, withcommunicationsbyan
issuerorpaidpromoterclearlyidentifiedassuch.491
d. Disclosure Requirements
Companieswishingtoconductacrowdfundingofferingwould
berequiredtodisclose, in an offeringdocument, certaininform a-
tion, including:
487 JumpstartOurBusinessStartups(JOBS)Act§302.
488 ProposedCrowdfundingRules, supra note253, at28.
489 Id.
490 JumpstartOurBusinessStartups(JOBS)Act§302.
491 Luis A. Aguilar, Comm r, SEC, Remarks at SEC Open Meeting: Harness-
ingtheInternettoPromoteAccesstoCapitalforSmallBusinesses, WhilePro-
tectingtheInterestsofInvestors(Oct. 23, 2013)(transcriptavailableathttp://
clsbluesky.law.colum bia.edu/2013/11/19/sec-commissioner-aguilar-discusses-the
-secs-crowdfunding-proposal/[https://perma.cc/Z6CA-MEB9]). Foradiscussion,
seeIbrahim, supra note5, at156. Ibrahim arguesthatfundingportalsought
to be redefined to function as reputationalintermediaries to prevent the
lemonsproblemsin theequitycrowdfundingmarket.
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basicinform ation abouttheissuer;492
information aboutofficers and directors and each
person owning 20 percentorm ore ofthesharesof
theissuer;493
a description of the business of the issuer and the 
anticipatedbusinessplan;494
adescriptionofthefinancialconditionoftheissuer...
and [the] intended use of the proceeds of the
offering;495
thetargetoffering amount... and updatesregarding
progressinm eetingthetargetofferingamount;496
thepricetothepublicofthesecurities... ;497
certain related-party transactions;498 and
financialstatem ents ofthe issuerthat, depending
on the amount offered and sold during a twelve-
month period, would have to be accompanied by a
copy of the issuers tax returns or reviewed or 
auditedbyanindependentpublicaccountant.499
Theobjectiveofdisclosureinthiscontextistoallow investors
to better evaluate the quality ofthe offerings and the issuing
firm.500 Disclosure is intended to reduce information asymmetry 
between investors and entrepreneurs and enhance both the 
transparency and efficiency of the [crowdfunding] market.501
Issuerswhoseekagreatertargetofferingamountarerequired
to disclose m ore information than those issuers who seek less
capital.502 Thelaw takesaslidingscaleapproach tothequestion
492 ProposedCrowdfundingRules, supra note253, at41.
493 Id.
494 Id.
495 Id.
496 Id.
497 Id.
498 Id. at59.
499 Id. at65.
500 Id. at391.
501 Id. at 39192. The disclosure rules are based on an assum ption that 
crowd investorswillread thedisclosurestatements. Fora discussion on the
limits ofdisclosure and the efficientmarkets hypothesis in the contextof
crowdfunding, see Ibrahim, supra note5, at146.
502 JumpstartOur Business Startups (JOBS)Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105,
§302(b), 126 Stat. 306 (2012)(amending15 U.S.C.A. §77d(6)(West2015)).
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of the issuers financial condition.503 Forexample, an issuerseek-
ing$100,000 orlessmustonlydiscloseitsincom etaxreturnsfor
themostrecentlycompletedyear, ifany, andfinancialstatements
certified by theprincipalexecutiveofficer.504 Conversely, where
theissuerisseekingatargetofferingamountbetween $100,000
and $500,000, there isan obligation to disclose financialstate-
ments reviewed by an independentpublicaccountantin accor-
dancewith anyapplicablestandardsandregulationspublishedby
theSEC.505 Audited financialstatementsm ustonlybedisclosed
iftheissuerisseekingan amountabove$500,000.506
Asfarasdescribingthefinancialcondition oftheissuer, the
rulesdonotprovidespecificrequirementsasofyet.507 However,
this would likely include a discussion ofliquidity and capital
resources, aswellasrevenuesand expenses, ifapplicable.508 This
requirementis particularly im portantfordrawing attention to
thecash needsoftheenterpriseandthelikelysourcesofcapital.
TheJOBS Actalso requires a description of the stated pur-
pose and intended use of the proceeds of the offering, as well as 
thetargetofferingam ount.509 Thekeyrestriction here, asstated
above, isthatstartupscannotraisemorethan $1 million a year
usingcrowdfunding.510 Furthermore, startupsmaychoosetoraise
below $500,000 in order to avoid having to prepare financial
statementsthatareaudited byan independentaccountingfirm .
The Actdoes notcontain specificrequirem entswith respectto
how the use of the proceeds section is to be described, with 
firm slikely todelineatesuch itemsasmarketing, research and
developm ent, andothercorporatepurposes.511
2. Regulation of Funding Portals or Intermediaries 
A funding portal is defined as any person acting as an inter-
mediary in a transaction involvingtheofferorsaleofsecurities
503 Id.
504 Id.; see also DRESNER, supra note92, at88.
505 JumpstartOurBusinessStartups(JOBS)Act§302(b).
506 Id.
507 DRESNER, supra note92, at88.
508 Id.
509 JumpstartOurBusinessStartups(JOBS)Act§302(b).
510 Id. §302(a)(6)(A).
511 Id. §302(b)(1)(E)-(F).
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forthe accountofothers, solely pursuantto Section 4(6)ofthe
Securities Act of 1933.512  The funding portal or registered 
brokerisresponsiblefor, am ongotherthings, facilitatingcrowd-
funding transactions and providing educationalinform ation to
potentialinvestors.513 TheSEC describesthefunction offunding
portals as follows: [t]he use of a registered intermediary to match 
issuersandinvestorswouldrequirethattheyincurcertain trans-
actions costs necessary to supportthe intermediation activity,
butalso would provide centralized venuesforcrowdfunding ac-
tivities that should lower investor and issuer search costs.514
Further, the SEC has stated the requirement [to conduct 
crowdfundingcam paignsthrough onlineportals]should help is-
suersgain exposuretoa widerangeofpotentialinvestors, who
alsomaybenefitfrom havingnumerousinvestmentopportunities
aggregated in oneplace, resulting in lowersearch costsorbur-
dens related to identifying suitable investment opportunities.515
A portalcannotengage in soliciting purchases, sales, orof-
ferstobuysecuritiesofferedordisplayedon itswebsiteorportal,
and itmusttake variousm easuresto reduce fraud risk.516 For
example, an interm ediary m ust register with applicable self-
regulatoryorganizationsand conductduediligencem easures.517
The portalis prohibited from holding, managing, or otherwise
handlinginvestorfundsorsecurities, andcannotofferinvestment
adviceorrecomm endations.518 Theserestrictionsaredesignedto
protectinvestors.519 Com menting on thelatterrequirem ent, the
SEC notes the requirement that the [bank] account in which 
funds are deposited be exclusively for the benefitofinvestors
512 15 U.S.C.A. §78c(a)(West2015).
513 ProposedCrowdfundingRules, supra note253, at378.
514 Id. Fordiscussion, see Ibrahim, supra note 5, at 15455. The author 
arguesthatfundingportalsshould notbeenvisioned aspassiveentities, but
as active reputational intermediaries whose role is not simply to match
buyersand sellersbuttoserveassignalsofstartup quality. Fundingportals
shouldbeprimarilytiedtostartups, notinvestors. See Joan MacleodHeminway,
The New Intermediary on the Block: Funding Portals Under the Crowdfund
Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 177, 178 (2013).
515 ProposedCrowdfundingRules, supra note253, at388.
516 JumpstartOurBusinessStartups(JOBS)Act§302.
517 Id.
518 15 U.S.C.A. §78c(h)(2015).
519 ProposedCrowdfundingRules, supra note253, at401.
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and theissuerwouldhelppreventtheintermediaryorotherpar-
tiesfrom claimingorotherwiseunlawfullytakingfundsfrom that
account.520 The restriction on offering investmentadvice corre-
spondstosim ilarprohibitionson broker-dealers.521
Congressplaced specialemphasison theeducationalrole of
the funding portal, requiring portals to ensure that investors
havereviewed anyrelevantinform ation.522 Interm ediariesm ust
therefore among other things provide general disclosure to
investorsabouttheinherentrisksinvolvedin equitycrowdfund-
ing.523 Further, investorsmustpositivelyaffirm thattheyunder-
standtheyrisk losingtheentireinvestmentandm ustbeableto
bearsuch loss.524 Investorsmustanswerquestionswith theaim
of dem onstrating an understanding ofthelevelofriskgenerally
applicabletoinvestmentsin startups, emergingbusinesses, and
smallissuers;an understandingoftherisk ofilliquidity;andan
understanding ofsuch otherm attersasthe Commission deter-
mines appropriate.525 It is unclear how these requirements,
particularly the latter, are to be im plemented and whetherthe
insertion of such m atters into a websites terms and conditions 
would suffice forthe intermediary to ensure thatinvestorsare
awareoftherisksinvolved.
a. Electronic Bulletin Boards
Crowdfunding interm ediariesmay includean electronicbul-
letin boardthatallowspotentialinvestorstocomm unicateabout
an offering.526 Thisisnota legalrequirementunderthe JOBS
Act, although itwasincluded in an earlierversion oftheHouse
crowdfunding bill.527 The SEC m ay adoptsuch a bulletin board
requirementforfundingportalsaspartofitsadditionalrules.528
The bulletin board would function as an open forum, allowing
520 Id.
521 JumpstartOurBusinessStartups(JOBS)Act§302.
522 Id.
523 Id. With this view, funding portals prim ary relationship is that with 
investors. See Ibrahim, supra note 5, at 15658. 
524 JumpstartOurBusinessStartups(JOBS)Act§302.
525 Id.
526 DRESNER, supra note92, at119.
527 EntrepreneurAccesstoCapitalActof2011, 112 H.R. 2930 §2(b)(2011).
528 See ProposedCrowdfundingRules, supra note253, at34.
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thepublictoshareknowledgeaboutinvestmentrisks, businesses,
and particular entrepreneurs.529  The SEC has stated that a 
premiseofcrowdfundingisthatinvestorswould rely, atleastin
part, on the collective wisdom ofthe crowd to make betterin-
formed investm ent decisions.530
b. Material Misstatements and Omissions
TitleIII oftheJOBS Actintroducesacauseofaction underthe
newlycreatedsection 4a(c)oftheSecuritiesAct.531 Thiscauseof
action isspecifically targeted atcrowdfunding offerings.532 Pur-
suanttoSection 4(a)(c), issuersaresubjecttoliabilityform ate-
rialmisstatementsorfailing tocom ply with relevantdisclosure
obligations.533 Liability will attach regardless of the issuers knowl-
edge orintent.534 Section 4(a)(c)operates alongside the general
anti-fraudprovisionsofSection10(b)oftheSecuritiesExchangeAct
andRule10b-5. Theserulesalsoapplytocrowdfundingofferings.535
c. EGCs
An EGC is defined as an issuer that had total annual gross 
revenues of less than $1,000,000 ... during its most recently
completed financial year.536 Thisdefinition isintended tocover
startup com panies. 537 EGC status confers special benefits on
529 DRESNER, supra note92, at120.
530 Proposed CrowdfundingRules, supra note253, at376. However, asthe
rulespresently stand, itisunclearwhethera funding portalcould hostan
online discussion among investors aboutthe quality ofthe startups. For a
critique, see Ibrahim, supra note 5, at 15657. Ibrahim argues that Title III 
should beamended toallow fundingportalstofunction astruereputationalin-
termediariesforthestartupstheylist. Thiswouldentailgreaterduediligence
on part of the interm ediaries and allow interm ediaries to signal a com panys 
quality, andthus, reduceinformation asymmetriestosuch an extentastopre-
venttheemergenceofamarketforlemons.
531 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS)Act of2012, 15 U.S.C.A.
§77d-1(c)(West2012).
532 Id. §77d-1.
533 Id. §77d-1(c)(2)(A).
534 Id. §77d-1(c)(2).
535 See generally id. §77d-1.
536 Id. §77b(a)(19).
537 Id.
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companies, including an exemption from certain executive pay
disclosurerequirementsand accountdisclosurerequirements.538
Thereisa wholesaleexem ption from Section 404(b)oftheSOX
Act, which im posesinternalcontrolsandauditingrequirements,
and EGCsare also exemptfrom m andatory auditfirm rotation
rules.539 Asfarasinvestorcomm unicationsareconcerned, EGCs
arefreetocom m unicateopenlywith qualified institutionalbuy-
ersand accredited institutionalinvestors.540 Forexample, EGCs
can engagein generalsolicitation and generaladvertisingwhen
making offeringstoaccredited investors. TheJOBS Actspecifi-
callyinstructstheSEC tomodifyitsrulesin thiscontextandlift
anysuchbanswith respecttoEGCs.541
d. Intrastate Crowdfunding Exemptions
Dissatisfactionwiththeslow implementationofrulesoncrowd-
fundingundertheJOBsActhasresultedin statesenactingtheir
own intrastatecrowdfundingexemptions.542 Onereportmaintains
thatthirteen stateshaveintrastatecrowdfundingexem ptionsin
place, while fourteen otherstates are considering such exemp-
tions.543 Compliancecostsaresaidtobemuch lowerunderintra-
stateexemptionsascomparedwiththefederalrules.544 Examples
ofintrastateexemptionsaretheKansasExemption(effectivesince
August 2011),545 the InvestGeorgia Exemption (effective since
Decem ber2012),546 aswellasthe Michigan547 and Wisconsin548
exemptions. However, accordingtostatesecuritiesregulators, few
firmshavetakenadvantageofthenew fundraisingexemptions.549
538 Id. §7262(b).
539 Id.
540 Id. §77e(d).
541 Id.
542 See State of the StatesList of Current Active and Proposed Intrastate
Crowdfunding Exemptions (Updated), CROWDFUNDINGLEGALHUB, http://crowd
fundinglegalhub.com/[https://perma.cc/D62A-UQP4].
543 Id.
544 See Crowdfunding exemption movement, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/Crowdfunding_exemption_movement[https://perma.cc/T8DU-MGQA].
545 KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §81-5-21 (2011).
546 GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-4-2-08 (2012).
547 2013 Mich. Pub. Acts167.
548 WIS. STAT. ANN. §551.202 (West2014).
549 Loten& Simon, supra note1, atB5.
2016] SIGNIFICANCE OF CROWDFUNDING 427
D. Crowdfunding in the European Union
Crowdfunding plays an im portant role as an alternative
source offinancing in the European Union.550 It is estimated
that in 2012, about 735 milllion was raised for all form s of 
crowdfunding in Europe.551 The figure israthermarginalwhen
com pared to traditionalretailbank-lending and non-financial
institutions (6 trillion in 2011), but relatively significant when 
compared to the financing provided by businessangels(visible
m arket segment estim ated at 660 m illion in 2010) or venture 
capitalists in seed, startup, later, and growth stages (7 billion 
in 2012).552
A survey conducted by the European Com mission in 2014
found thatmore than 75 percentofprojectownerssaw crowd-
funding asa viable m eansto reduce dependence on banksand
othertraditionalm eansoffinance.553 Moreover, theprojectown-
erssaw crowdfundingasausefulwaytotestm arketdemandfor
theirproductsandservices.554 Therespondentssaw theprim ary
benefits ofcrowdfunding as being com munity involvement, en-
gagementin innovation, thedem ocratization offinance, and the
empowerm entofentrepreneurs.555 Thus, crowdfundinghasbeen
likenedtoangelinvestingforthem asses.556
In June 2014, the European Com mission setup an Expert
Group the European Crowdfunding Stakeholders Forum to 
examinethepotentialand risksofcrowdfunding.557 Thetask of
550 See EUR. COMMN, CROWDFUNDING IN THE EU EXPLORING THE ADDED
VALUE OF POTENTIAL EU ACTION (Oct. 2013), http://clientebancario.bportugal
.pt/pt-PT/Publicacoes/OrganismosInternacionais/Documents/CE_Consultation
_Crowdfunding.pdf[https://perma.cc/N7B8-WU5B].
551 EUR. COMMN, UNLEASHING THE POTENTIAL OF CROWDFUNDING IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION (Mar. 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances
/docs/crowdfunding/140327-communication_en.pdf[https:/perma.cc/Q4YC-YF65].
552 Id.
553 EUR. COMMN, SUMMARY RESPONSES TO THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON
CROWDFUNDING IN THE EU (Mar. 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market
/consultations/2013/crowdfunding/docs/summary-of-responses_en.pdf[https://
perma.cc/5F9F-DA32].
554 Id.
555 Id.
556 See Hornuf& Schwienbacher, supra note232, at11.
557 EUR. COMMN, CROWDFUNDING, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/fi
nances/crowdfunding/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/J52A-GE57].
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theGroup istoassisttheComm ission in developingpoliciesfor
crowdfundingand, moregenerally, toraiseawarenesswithrespect
tocrowdfundingin thewiderfinancialecosystem.558 Furthermore,
theGroupwillassesswhetherregulatoryinterventionisnecessary
attheE.U. level, asthereiscurrentlynocoherentframework in
place.559 Earlier, in March of2014, the European Commission
adopted a com munication on crowdfunding.560 The comm unica-
tion expresslyidentifiessomeofthechallengestocrowdfunding,
including lack ofawarenessand understanding am ongstentre-
preneurs, challengesrelated totheprotection ofintellectualprop-
erty, fraud, legaluncertainty, andconsumerprotectionconcerns.561
However, theCommission alsorecognizesthehigh potential
benefits that crowdfunding m ay yield, including innovation,
research and development, economicgrowth, community develop-
ment, and jobcreation.562 Supportingcrowdfunding, therefore, is
seen asan importantaspectofdrivingeconomicdevelopment.563 In
its Entrepreneurship 2020 Action PlanReigniting the Entrepre-
neurial Spirit in Europe, theUnion notedthatitseekstoincrease
the levelofem ploymentby reinforcing entrepreneurship.564 Ac-
cordingly, the European Union invites member states to [a]ssess 
theneed ofamendingcurrentnationalfinanciallegislation with
the aim offacilitating new, alternative forms offinancing for
startupsand SMEs[sm alltomedium enterprises]in general, in
particular as regards platforms for crowd funding ....565 In its
Consultation Paper onCrowdfunding, theCom mission observed:
In the context of SMEs finance ecosystem , it appears that 
crowdfunding may respond totheneedsofm any smallstart-
upsthatdonotmanagetoaccessbank finance, venturecapital
558 EUR. COMMN, CROWDFUNDING FOR THE CULTURAL AND CREATIVE SECTORS:
KICK-STARTING THE CULTURAL ECONOMY (Mar. 2015), http://ec.europa.eu
/culture/calls/general/0315/reference_en.pdf[https://perma.cc/J9LB-S3C4].
559 EUR. COMMN, UNLEASHING THE POTENTIAL OF CROWDFUNDING IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION (Mar. 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs
/crowdfunding/140327-communication_en.pdf[https://perma.cc/Q4YC-YF65].
560 Id.
561 Id.
562 Id.
563 See id.
564 EUR. COMMN, ENTREPRENEURSHIP 2020 ACTION PLAN REIGNITING THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IN EUROPE (Oct. 2013), http://eur-lex.europa.eu
[https://perma.cc/C4M7-556G].
565 Id.
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or reach the stage of initialpublic offering (IPO). Crowd-
funding could thuscontributetobridging thefinancegap for
small firms and innovative projects. It could complement
other sources offinance. Better access to finance for small
businesses would promote entrepreneurship and ultimately
contribute to growth and job creation. Crowdfunding creates
opportunitiesto turn largergroupsofpeople, who otherwise
would nothave accessto traditionalchannelsoffinance, into
small-scaleentrepreneurs.566
1. The Development of Crowdfunding in the European Union
Crowdfundinghasbeen abletodevelopin theEuropean Union
asa resultofa numberoffactors, including prospectusrules.567
The relevantE.U. regulatory framework presently applying to
financialreturncrowdfunding(i.e., crowdinvestingandcrowdlend-
ing)includestheDirectiveson Prospectus,568 PaymentServices,569
Markets in FinancialInstruments,570 CapitalRequirem ents,571
Alternative Investm entFund Managers,572 Consum erCredit,573
DistanceMarketingofFinancialServices;574 andtheRegulations
on Capital Requirements, 575 European Venture Capital, 576 and
European SocialEntrepreneurship Funds.577 No specific crowd-
fundingrules, however, applyattheE.U. level.578 Thus, thereisno
comprehensiveE.U. crowdfunding legislation, and memberstates
arefreetodevisetheirowncrowdfunding-specificlawsandrules.579
566 EUR. COMMN, CONSULTATION PAPER:CROWDFUNDING IN THE EU EX-
PLORING THE ADDED VALUE OF POTENTIAL EU ACTION 7 (Oct. 2013), http://
ec.europa.eu/internal_m arket/consultations/2013/crowdfunding/docs/consulta
tion-document_en.pdf[https://perma.cc/93E9-MUYA].
567 DRESNER, supra note 92, at 20405. 
568 See CouncilDirective2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L 345)64(E.U.).
569 See CouncilDirective2007/64, art. 1, 2007 O.J. (L 319)1, 12 (E.U.).
570 See CouncilDirective2004/39, art. 1, 2004O.J. (L 145)(E.U.). ThePay-
mentServicesDirectivemightapplyalsotocrowd sponsoring, wherethebusi-
nessmodeladoptedissuchthatitfallsunderthescopeofthisinstrument.
571 Id.
572 See CouncilDirective2011/61, art. 2, 2011 O.J. (L 174)1, 14(E.U.).
573 See CouncilDirective2008/48, art. 2, 2008 O.J. (L 133)66, 71 (E.U.).
574 CouncilDirective2002/65, 2002 O.J. (L 271)16 (E.U.).
575 CommissionRegulation575/2013, art. 1, 2013 O.J. (L 176)1 (E.U.).
576 CommissionRegulation345/2013, art. 1, 2013 O.J. (L 115)1, 8 (E.U.).
577 CommissionRegulation346/2013, art. 1, 2013 O.J. (L 115)18, 26 (E.U.).
578 DRESNER, supra note92, at203, 206.
579 Id. at 20405. 
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Turningtoprospectusrequirements, however, itisclearthat
theE.U. ProspectusDirectivehasdirectly facilitated thedevel-
opm entofcrowdfunding.580 The Directive was amended by Di-
rective 2010/73/EU of November 24, 2010, which establishes
exem ptions from the obligation to publish a prospectus.581 For
example, ifan offer is solely addressed to qualified investors,
there is no need to publish a prospectus.582 The Directive also
mandates that offerings of 5 million or more must be m ade in 
accordance with an approved prospectus.583 Where an offering,
however, falls below 5 m illion, it is subject to prospectus re-
quirem entsmadebyindividualE.U. memberstates.584 Thus, the
E.U. framework allowsmemberstatestosettheirown prospec-
tus requirem ents with respectto offerings below 5 m illion.585
Mem berstatescannotrequire publication ofa prospectuswith
respect to offerings below 100,000.586 Accordingly, offerings of
less than 100,000 are exem pt from the obligation to publish a 
prospectus and crowdfunders are able to raise capitalwithout
beingsubjecttosucharequirem ent.587
Itrem ainstobe seen whetherspecificcrowdfunding legisla-
tionwillbeadoptedattheE.U. level. Obviously, oneofthedangers
ofhavingdivergentregulatoryapproachesin placeineach m em -
berstateisthatthismayresultinafragmentedinternalm arket
and, ultimately, a lack ofgrowth ofEuropean crowdfunding in
the long term. Some statistics indicate thatthe lack ofinfor-
mation aboutapplicable rulespreventssome equity crowdfund-
ing platforms from operating in more than one E.U. country.588
Moreover, thecostofobtainingauthorization tooperatein another
580 CouncilDirective2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L 345)64, 71 (E.U.)(regarding the
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the publicorad-
mittedtotradingandamendingDirective2001/34/EC).
581 CouncilDirective2010/73, 2010 O.J. (L 327)1, 6 (E.U.).
582 Id. at6.
583 Id. at5;see also CouncilDirective2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L 345)(E.U.).
584 CouncilDirective2003/71, 2003 O.J. (345)(E.U.); see CouncilDirective
2010/73, 2010 O.J. (L 327)5 (E.U.).
585 CouncilDirective2003/71, supra note584;see CouncilDirective2010/73,
supra note584, at5.
586 CouncilDirective2010/73, supra note584, at2, 7.
587 Id.
588 EUR. COMMN, CROWDFUNDING INNOVATIVE VENTURES IN EUROPE:THE
FINANCIAL ECOSYSTEM AND REGULATORY LANDSCAPE (2014).
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memberstate may be prohibitive, and crowdfunding platform s
mayforegothebenefitsofoperatingbeyond thebordersoftheir
m em berstate.589
Ifim plem ented properly, E.U.-levelcrowdfunding rulesmay
prom otetheem ergenceofcross-bordercrowdfunding platforms.
ThedelaysaroundtheimplementationoftheJOBS Act, however,
would seem tosuggestthatthisprocessin theEuropean Union
may, asintheUnitedStates, belongandprotected.590 Accordingly,
an alternative to adopting crowdfunding-specific rules at the
E.U. levelisim plem entingamutualrecognition regim ewhereby
each m emberstatewould berequired topermita crowdfunding
platform tooperatewithin itsborderssolongastheplatform is
properly regulated in itshom ejurisdiction.591 Theadvantage of
adopting thisapproach isthatitwould allow m em berstatesto
adopttheirown ruleswith respectto crowdfunding.592 Alterna-
tively, theEuropean Union m ayoptforaclear, unifiedapproach
tocrowdfundingbyadoptingasetofcomprehensiverulesthatset
m inim um requirementsand applytocrowdfundingplatformsin
allm emberstates.
2. The United Kingdom as a European Example
TheUnitedKingdom possessesoneofthemostdevelopedcrowd-
fundingm arketsin theEuropean Union.593 A reportpublishedin
2013 indicatedthatloan-basedcrowdfundingplatformsraised480
m illion poundssterlingin 2013, ofwhich 287 m illion wasloaned
to individuals an increase of 126 percent com pared to 2012.594
589 See YongLi& ShakerA. Zahra, Formal institutions, culture, and venture
capital activity: A cross-country analysis, 27 J. OF BUS. VENTURING 95 (2012).
590 KendallAlmerico, SEC Delays Equity Crowdfunding Piece of JOBS Act
for Another Year, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur
.com/article/240558 [https://perma.cc/G9Y9-HXSB].
591 DRESNER, supra note92, at210.
592 DRESNER, supra note92, at211.
593 See generally AndyDavis, Beyond the Banks: Innovative Ways to Finance
Britains Small Businesses, NATL ENDOWMENT FOR SCI. TECH. AND THE ARTS
(Sept. 2011), https://www.nesta.org.uk/sites/default/files/beyond_the_banks
_innovative_ways_to_finance_britains_small_businesses.pdf [https://perma.cc
/57AQ-DV9X].
594 NATL ENDOWMENT FOR SCI. TECH. AND THE ARTS, THE RISE OF FUTURE
FINANCE, THE UK ALTERNATIVE FINANCING BENCHMARKING REPORT 44(Dec.
2013), cited in FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., POLICY STATEMENT 2014(2014), http://www
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A totalof193 m illion poundssterlingwasloaned tobusinesses,
an increaseof211 percentcom pared to2012;investment-based
crowdfundingplatformsraised28 million poundssterlingin 2013,
an increaseof618 percentcom paredto2012.595
a. The First U.K. Platforms
Investment-based crowdfunding in theUnited Kingdom tends
to be dom inated by two platforms:Crowdcube and Seedrs.596
Launched in February of2011, CrowdcubewasthefirstBritish
equity platform and, atthe time ofits commencement, lacked
authorization by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) which 
has since been splitinto the PrudentialRegulation Authority
andtheFinancialConductAuthority(FCA).597
Crowdcube relied on the so-called intragroup offering ex-
emption when launching itsplatform.598 Thisexemption allows
agroup companytoissuesharessolelytoshareholdersofanother
mem berofthesamecorporategroup and, thereby, bypasssecu-
ritiesregulations.599 Utilizingthisexem ption, Crowdcubeallowed
investorstobecom enominalshareholdersofaCrowdcubegroup
com panyandinvestin startupcom paniesseekingcapital, which
werealsoCrowdcubegroup companies, with Crowdcubetypically
takingmorethan 50 percentofthesharecapitalin astartupand
handing back the shares to the originalowners after attracting
capitalfrom investors.600 In February of2013, Crowdcube ob-
tainedFSA authorization andnow sim plyintermediatesadirect
shareissuancefrom thestartuptoinvestors.601
Crowdcubeoperatesasapureintermediaryonly. Thism odel
may becom pared to thatofSeedrs, which launched in 2012.602
UnlikeCrowdcube, Seedrstakesanumberofstepsineachcrowd-
fundingtransaction, includingapprovingeachlistingasafinancial
.fca.org.uk/static/documents/policy-statements/ps14-04.pdf[https:/perma.cc/ZU
9S-87A9].
595 Id.
596 DRESNER, supra note92, at52.
597 Id. at206.
598 Id.
599 Id.
600 Id. at 20607. 
601 Id. at207.
602 Id.
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promotion and conducting duediligenceon each startup. Other
platform sthathave em erged are CrowdBnk, FundtheGap, and
BanktotheFuture.603 These platform s are now subjectto regula-
tion bytheFCA, assuccessortotheFSA, andthecodeofpractice
published by the U.K. Crowdfunding Association.604 The FCA
regulationsare considered first, followed by a discussion ofthe
codeofpractice.
b. FCA Regulation
In theUnitedKingdom, crowdfundingfallswithin theregula-
toryscopeoftheFCA.605 Broadlyspeaking, them ain aimsofthe
FCA includeconsum erprotection and thepromotion ofeffective
com petition in consum er markets. 606 In October of 2013, the
FCA published aconsultation paperoutliningitsproposaltoreg-
ulate both the loan-based and investment-based crowdfunding
industries.607 Followingconsultation, in March of2014, theFCA
publishedasetofrulestoregulatethecrowdfundingindustry.608
Theserulescam eintoforcein April2014 butaresubjecttocer-
tain transitionalprovisions.609 The FCA hasstated thatitsaims
in regulatingthecrowdfundingindustryare, on theonehand, to
make crowdfunding m ore accessible to a wider, butrestricted,
audience of investors and, on the other hand, to ensure that only 
thoseretailinvestorswhocan understand and bearthevarious
risks involved are invited to investin unlisted shares or debt
securities.610 Further, the FCA observes: If [intermediaries] 
targetthiswiderbutstillrestricted audienceofretailinvestors
appropriately, thismayresultingreateraccesstoalternative(non-
bank) finance options for businesses seeking finance.611 Hence,
thekeypremiseunderpinningtheU.K. approachtoequitycrowd-
fundingistomakecrowdfundingavailabletoarestrictedaudience
603 Id.
604 See UK CROWDFUNDING ASSN, CODE OF PRACTICE, http://www.ukcfa
.org.uk/code-of-practice-2 [https://perma.cc/DB8U-ULQQ].
605 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 2, at 1015. 
606 Id. §1.22.
607 Id. at10.
608 Id. at9.
609 Id. at12.
610 Id. at36.
611 Id.
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ofinvestors, therebylimitingthoseinvestorswhocan participate
in ECF campaigns.612
Thenew FCA rulesapplytotwocategoriesoffinancing:loan-
based crowdfunding thatextendstopeer-to-peerplatforms(these
coverloansfrom individualinvestorstootherindividuals), peer-
to-businesslendingplatform s(coveringloansfrom individualsto
businesses), ora combination ofthese m odels, and investment-
basedcrowdfundingplatformsbywhichconsumerspurchaseshares
or debtsecurities in new or em erging companies.613 The m ain
policy rationales underpinning the rules are the protection of
retailinvestorswho, owingtoalackofknowledge, experience, or
resources, mayincursignificantfinanciallosses;and theeffective
promotion ofcompetitionwithin thecrowdfundingmarkets.614 The
rulesdo notextend to donation-based orrewards-based crowd-
funding. 615 Accordingly, some crowdfunding activities remain
unregulatedin theUnitedKingdom.616
Interestingly, the FCA regards loan-based crowdfunding as
involving fewer risks than investment-based crowdfunding.617
Themain thrustoftherulesistorequireloan-based crowdfund-
ingplatformstofollow certain capitalrequirementsrules, describe
risksaccurately, andhaveresolution plansin placetoadminister
loansincasetheplatform fails.618 Forexample, therulesexpressly
statethat
[a]n operator ofan electronic system in relation to lending
musttakereasonablestepstoensurethatarrangementsare
in place to ensure thatP2P agreementsfacilitated by itwill
continue to be m anaged and adm inistered, in accordance
with the contractterm s, ifatany tim e itceasesto carry on
the activity ofoperating an electronicsystem in relation to
lending.619
612 Id.
613 Id. at4.
614 Id. at5.
615 Id. at11.
616 Id.
617 Id. at6.
618 See generally FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FCA HANDBOOK:SYSC AVAILABLE,
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/SYSC/4/1.pdf[https://perma.cc/HA
2D-WLC4].
619 Id. atRule4.1.8A (emphasisremoved).
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Such arrangementsmayincludeenteringintoan agreementwith
anotherfirm totakeoverthemanagementandadministration of
theP2P agreement;holdingsufficientcollateralin a segregated
accounttocoverthecostsofm anagementand administration in
the eventofplatform failure;and managing theloan book in a
manner thatensures thatincome from P2P agreem ents facili-
tated bythefirm issufficienttocoverthecostsofm anagingand
administering loans during the winding down process.620 The
FCA referstoloanagreem entsasP2P agreements.621
Them inim um financialresourcestobeheld by a loan-based
crowdfunding platform are the higherofthe following:£20,000
(increasingto£50,000 from 1 April2017);orthesum of:
(1)0.3% ofthevolumeofloanedfundsupto£50 million;
(2)0.2% ofthevolumeofloanedfundsabove£50 million
upto£500 m illion;and
(3)0.1% thevolumeofloanedfundsabove£500 million.622
Thetotalvalueofloaned fundsoutstandingisdefined asthe
totalamountoffundsthatare currently being provided to bor-
rowersunderP2P agreementsthroughanoperatorofanelectronic
system in relation tolending.623
Asfarasdisclosureisconcerned, examplesofthetypesofin-
formation firms are expected to disclose to explain the specific
natureandrisksofaP2P agreementincludethefollowing:
expectedandactualdefaultrates;
asummaryoftheassumptionsusedin determining
expectedfuturedefaultrates;
adescription ofhow loan riskisassessed, including
adescription ofthecriteriathatm ustbemetbythe
borrowerbeforethefirm considerstheborrowereli-
gibleforaP2P agreement;
the creditworthiness assessment of the borrower
carriedout;whethertheP2P agreementbenefitsfrom
any security and, ifso, what;a fairdescription of
620 Id. atRule4.1.8C.
621 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note594, at5.
622 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note2, at21.
623 Id. app. 1 at9.
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thelikelyactualreturn, takingintoaccountdefault
ratesandtaxation;
an explanation ofhow any tax liability forlenders
arising from investm ents into P2P agreem ents
wouldbecalculated;
an explanation of the firms procedure for dealing 
with lateloan paym entsandloansindefault;
theprocedureforalendertoaccesstheirmoneybe-
foretheP2P agreementhasexpired;and,
lastly, an explanation ofwhatwould happen ifthe
firm fails.624
c. Authorization Requirements for P2PL Platforms
The rules require firms running loan-based crowdfunding
platform sasofApril1, 2014, toapplyforfullauthorization from
theFCA.625 Transitionalarrangem entsapply tofirmsthathold
a consum er credit license from the Office of Fair Trading
(OFT).626 The FCA assumed responsibility forthe regulation of
consum ercreditmarketsfrom the OFT on April1, 2014.627 All
firms are required to become fully authorized by March 31,
2017.628 However, OFT-regulatedloan-basedcrowdfundingfirm s
are notsubjectto the new prudentialstandardsuntilthey be-
com efullyFCA-authorized.629 Firm swith avalidOFT licenseon
March 31, 2014 are granted interim perm ission and will be 
abletocontinuecarrying on theconsumercreditactivitiesthey
arelicensed foruntiltheybecom eauthorized.630 Upon becom ing
fully FCA-authorized, firmsm ustsubm itfinancialand pruden-
tialreporting returns.631 The FCA requires loan-based crowd-
fundingfirmstocom plywith regularreportingrequirements.632
In addition, therulesprovideinvestorswith arighttocomplain,
624 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note2, app. 1 at32.
625 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note2, at12.
626 Id.
627 Id. at4.
628 Id. at21.
629 Id.
630 Id. at12.
631 Id. at12, 34.
632 Id. at 3435. 
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in thefirstinstance, tothefirm runningtheplatform, andin the
secondinstance, totheFinancialOmbudsm an Service.633
d. Restricting the Category of Investors Participating in
ECF Campaigns
Asstated, thenew rulesalsoextend tofirm sthatoperatein-
vestment-based crowdfundingplatformson which consumerscan
investintoequityordebtsecuritiesthatarenotlisted ortraded
on recognized stock exchanges.634 In thiscontext, the FCA isof
the view that, given the significantrisks investors face when
investingin unlistedsecuritiesthatarehardtopriceorsellon a
secondary market, firms offering investments on crowdfunding
platforms (or other m edia) may only make a direct offer finan-
cial promotion to a restricted category of investors.635 Theseare
professionalclients, retailclientswhoareadvised, retailclients
classified ascorporate finance contractsorventure capitalcon-
tracts, sophisticated or high networth retailclients, or retail
clientswhoconfirm thattheywillnotinvestmorethan 10 percent
oftheir net investible assets into these products.636 A direct 
offer financial prom otion is definedas(a)an offerbythefirm or
anotherperson toenterinto a controlled agreement with any 
person whorespondstothecomm unication, or(b)an invitation
to any person who responds to the com munication to make an
offer to the firm or another person to enter into a controlled
agreem ent, and which specifies the m anner ofresponse or in-
cludesaform bywhich aresponsemaybem ade.637 Accordingly,
theFCA seekstorestrictdirectofferfinancialpromotionsbutnot
allprom otions. Forexam ple, ifa comm unication onlygivesgen-
eralm arketinginform ation aboutthefirm, itdoesnotfallwithin
thisdefinition. Conversely, therestriction willapplyifinformation
isprovidedaboutaspecifiedinvestmentopportunity.638
Therestriction described aboveisintended toprotectretailin-
vestorswhoaresubjecttospecialrisks. Such risksin thecontext
633 Id. at33.
634 Id. at36.
635 Id. at7.
636 Id. at 67. 
637 Id. at31.
638 Id. at37.
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ofinvestm ent-basedcrowdfundingincludetheriskofcapitalloss,
which isexacerbatedifthepriceofthesecurityisover-valuedor
where the security is a long-term debtsecurity which willnot
returncapitalforuptotwentytotwenty-fiveyears.639 Additionally,
investorsfacetherisk ofdilution ofshareholdervalue, illiquidity
risks, andtheriskthatdividendsmaynotbedeclared.640 Illiquid-
ity risks arise because there m ay not be a secondary m arket
through which sharesordebtsecuritiesacquired through ECF
orP2PL platform smaybesold.641 Asaresult, theprofitableexit
routeislikelytobethesaleoftheventuretoathirdparty.
TheFCA considerslonger-term illiquid unlisted debtsecuri-
ties offered by com panies to carry more risk ofcapitalloss for
investorsvis-à-visshort-term P2P agreements.642 Consequently,
theFCA maintainsacleardistinction in itsregulatoryapproach
between P2P agreementsand non-readily realizablesecurities.643
Thus, ifan individualsignsaRestrictedInvestorStatement, firms
can communicatedirectofferfinancialpromotionsfornon-readily
realizable securities to thatindividualfortwelve months after
thedateofthestatement.644Firmshaveanobligationtosatisfythat
therearevalidstatementsin placeatthetimetheycommunicate
apromotion, butfirm sarenotrequiredtoensurethatindividuals
qualify as restricted investors on an ongoing basis.645
e. The U.K. Crowdfunding Association Code of Practice
Crowdfunding platforms wishing to obtain m em bership in
theU.K. CrowdfundingAssociation mustadheretotheprinciples
setoutin the United Kingdom Crowdfunding Association Code
ofPractice.646 Theprinciplesapply toboth FCA authorized and
non-authorized platforms.647 The key principlescan be sum ma-
rizedasfollows:
639 See id.
640 Id. at15.
641 Id.
642 Id. at37.
643 Id. at66.
644 Id. app. 1 at17.
645 Id. app. 1 at 1617. 
646 UK CROWDFUNDING ASSN, CODE OF PRACTICE (2014), http://www
.ukcfa.org.uk/code-of-practice-2 [https://perma.cc/U932-47H3].
647 Id.
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Investmentsand donationsaretobekeptseparate
from thebusiness, inclientaccountsorsimilarsegre-
gatedm oney-handlingstructures.
Transparency isregarded asparamount. Investors
and donors m ust be able to see information on
where their money is keptas wellas the amount
andanytransactions.
Firm s m ustputprocesses in place to ensure that
investmentholdingsareaccessiblein theeventthat
thefirm ceasestooperate.
Firmsagree to provide a cooling-offperiod in case
investorsordonorschangetheirm indaftermaking
an investmentordonation.
Termsandconditionsmustbeclearlywrittenandset
outandexplain exactlyhow theinvestm entprocess
works, whatthedutiesandresponsibilitiesoftheplat-
formsare, whatduediligencehasbeen undertaken,
andwhatfeesandchargeswillapplyandwhen.
Executive Directors details willbe published on
theU.K. CrowdfundingAssociation website.
Firm sm ustensure theirIT systemsand business
processesaresecure, reliable, and proportionateto
thenature, scale, andcomplexityofthebusinessand
aresufficiently robusttofacilitatecom pliancewith
applicablelaw, regulations, andtheCodeofConduct.
Firmsm ustcomply with the lawsand regulations
applicable to their sales and marketing activity,
and ensurethatallU.K. CrowdfundingAssociation
mem bers comm unications are fair, clear, and not
misleading;thatrisksandpotentialreturnsarepre-
sented in a balanced way;and thatinvestors and
donorsaretreatedfairly.
Ifinvestorsordonorsareunhappyaboutanyaspect
of a m em bers service, they are able to com plain,
and firms willpublish their perform ance on com-
plaintsontheU.K. CrowdfundingAssociationwebsite
everyyear.648
648 Id.
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3. The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and France
TheNetherlandsisgenerallyrankedhighlyin termsofnum -
berofcrowdfundingplatforms.649 Theleadingequityplatform in
the Netherlands is Sym bid.650 Symbid operates in a m anner
wherebyso-calledcooperativesholdsharesoftheunderlyingstart-
ups, andinvestorscan acquirem em bershipunitsin thecoopera-
tives. 651 Cooperatives allow an interm ediary to manage the
sharesofthe underlying com pany.652 Adopting thiscooperative
structurehasallowedSymbidtobypasstherequirem entofseek-
ingauthorizationfrom aregulatoryauthority.653
InGermany, thereareanumberofcrowdfundingplatforms, in-
cludingBankless24, Bergfürst, BerlinCrowd, BestBC, Companisto,
Crowdrange, DeutscheMikroinvest, Devexo, Fundsters, Gründer-
plus, Innovestment, MyBusinessBacker, Power4Projects, Seed-
m atch, StartkapitalOnline, and United Equity.654 One portal
Companisto has set up a special purpose vehicle Companisto 
Venture Capital GmbH to pool investments from  the crowd.655
Crowd investorsbuysecuritiesfrom thisspecialpurposevehicle,
which then investson theirbehalfin the startup.656 Com panisto
operatesin a similarm annertotheDutch Sym bid, allowing for
investmentstobepooled.657 Thetotalamountraisedbetween2011
and July 1, 2014 was 27.7 million.658 In thisperiod, 140 success-
fulECF campaignswerecarriedout.659
A com mon structure adopted in Germ any by equity crowd-
fundingplatform sisthesilentpartnership(StilleBeteiligung).660
Thisstructureallowsinvestorstoacquiresilentpartnershipunits
649 WORLD BANK, supra note63, at18.
650 DRESNER, supra note92, at207.
651 Id. at 20708. 
652 Id. at208.
653 Id.
654 LarsHornuf& Armin Schwienbacher, The Emergence of Crowdinvest-
ing in Europe 16 (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2481994 [https://perma.cc
/KH43-6Z43].
655 Id. at14.
656 Id. at10.
657 Id. at14.
658 LMU FORSCHUNGSDATENBANK, CROWDINVESTING (July1, 2014).
659 Id.
660 DRESNER, supra note92, at208.
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from aninvesteecompany.661 Suchunitsarecomparabletoequity-
likesharesin acompany. Theygiveinvestorsapre-definedshare
ofprofits, butno voting rights.662 Hence, voting rightscannotbe
sold via ECF platformsin Germany, butthesaleofsilentpart-
nership units is perm issible.663 The advantage ofutilizing this
structureisthatsilentpartnershipshavebeneficialtaxtreatment
in Germany.664 Germanyhasnotpassed specificlawsregulating
crowdfunding. 665 Crowdfunding, therefore, takes place within
theexistingparadigm ofsecuritieslaws.666 However, in Novem -
ber 2014, Germany passed a draftlaw on crowdfunding titled
Gesetzentwurf für ein Kleinanlegerschutzgesetz.667 Underthe
proposed law, com panies will be able to raise up to 1 million 
withouthaving toregistera prospectus.668 Moreover, individual
investors will be able to invest up to 10,000 per project.669
Italy has opted for crowdfunding-specific legislation by
amendingitsexistingsecuritieslaw, theTUF (TestoUnicodella
Finanza).670 The aim ofthelegislation istolegalize crowdfund-
ing, and CONSOB (Comm issione Nazionale perle Società e la
Borsa), Italys regulator and the equivalentoftheSEC, istasked
with implementing the legislation.671 The legislation wentinto
forceon Decem ber17, 2012, andisavailabletoinnovativestart-
ups so-called startup innovativa.672 TheActm akesitpossible
for innovative startups to offer securities up to 5 million without 
661 Id.
662 Id.
663 Id.
664 Id. at 20809. 
665 RossS. Weinstein, Crowdfunding in the U.S. and Abroad: What to Expect
When Youre Expecting, 46 CORNELL INTL L.J. 427, 447 (2013).
666 Id.
667 BUNDESFINANZMINISTERIUM, GESETZENTWURF FÜR EIN KLEINANLEGER
SCHUTZGESETZ (Nov. 10, 2014), http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/039/1803
994.pdf[https://perma.cc/82PD-V7RE](Ger.).
668 Id.
669 Id.
670 DecretoLegge18 ottobre2012, n. 179 artt. 30, http://www.altalex.com
/documents/leggi/2014/04/02/decreto-crescita-2-0-ricerca-assicurazioni-start-up
-innovative#sezione9 [https://perma.cc/S94Z-2P67](It.).
671 CONSOB, DELIBERA N. 18592 (26 giugno 2013), http://www.consob.it
/main/documenti/bollettino2013/d18592.htm [https://perma.cc/8QNY-K9GS](It.).
672 Id.
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having to register a prospectus.673 The definition ofinnovative
startupsfocuseson firm swhose sole ormain purpose isto de-
velop, produce, and sellinnovativeproductsand serviceswith a
high technologicalvalue.674 Non-innovative startups, however,
cannottakeadvantageofthisexemptionandcontinuetobebound
byEuropean Directive2010/73, andareonlyabletoraisecapital
up to 100,000 without the obligation toregisteraprospectus.675
This, in ourview, representsa significantlim itation. Moreover,
startupsmustbelessthanfouryearsoldinordertotakeadvantage
ofthe ECF exem ption.676 The crowdfunding exemption imple-
mented in Italy, therefore, resultsin a very narrow exem ption
from generallyapplicableprospectusrequirements.
In France, thecurrentlegislativefram ework permitscompa-
nies to offer securities up to 1 m illion without having to regis-
teraprospectus.677 Moreover, thereisalicensingrequirementin
place. Crowdfundingplatformsmustbelicensed by thesupervi-
soryauthority.678
E. Crowdfunding in the Developing World
CrowdfundingisawayofextendingaccesstocapitalforSMEs
bymergingthesocialwebwith entrepreneurialfinance.679 Accord-
ingly, crowdfundingmaybeseen asasubstitutefortraditionalfi-
nancingchannels(banks, businessangels, andventurecapitalists).
Thefunction ofcrowdfundingportalsistofacilitatetheinforma-
tion flow from early-stageenterprisestopotentialinvestors. The
673 Id.
674 AntonioColetti, Isabella Porchia, FilippoBenintendi& Simona Bormida,
Boosting Innovative Start-Ups in Italy: The New Framework (Dec. 20, 2012)
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/boosting-innovative-start-ups-italy[https://
perma.cc/2NRK-9AR7].
675 2010 O.J. (L 327)7 (E.U.).
676 Colettietal., supra note674.
677 Ordonnance2014-559 du 30 mai2014 relativeau financementpartici-
pative[Ordinance2014-559 ofMay 30, 2014 on crowdfunding], LEGIFRANCE,
May 30, 2008 (Fr.), http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte
=JORFTEXT000029008408&categorieLien=id[https://perma.cc/JQH9-C529].
678 Andrew Conway, Crowd Funding: A Policy Response 1820, INST. OF
PUB. ACCOUNTANTS (2015).
679 PeterLee, Social Innovation, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 5758 (2014). 
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extensiverelianceon crowdfunding in thedeveloped world sug-
geststhatcrowdfundingcouldbecomeausefultoolin developing
countries. Although crowdfundingisstillin itsinfancyin devel-
opingcountries, thepotentialofthemarketissignificant.
1. Economic Growth, Democratization of Finance, and
Women Entrepreneurs
Oneofthem ain advantagesofutilizing crowdfunding in the
developing world isthatitallows developing countriesto spur
entrepreneurship, economic growth, and innovation. A related
advantageofcrowdfundingisthatitdemocratizesaccesstocapi-
tal. Entrepreneurscanraisefundswithoutbeingpartofabusiness
angelorventure capitalnetwork and can targetinvestors dis-
persedacrossthecountry.680
A key finding in a study published by Mollick isthatcrowd-
fundingin developedcountriesislessconcentratedthan venture
capitalfunding, which often leadstotheriseofstartup clusters
in a particular geographic location or region. 681 By contrast,
crowdfunding has the potentialto prom ote startups in rural
areasorsmalltowns, wherelocalinvestorscan engagein invest-
ingand supporttheirlocalcommunities.682 Forexample, Agrawal
etal. show thatgeographicproxim ity isnotan overriding crite-
rion forcrowdfundinginvestorsand thatcrowdfundingeliminates
distance-related economic frictions. 683 These characteristics of
crowdfundinghaveanenormouspotentialfordevelopingcountries.
In addition, crowdfundingisassociated with lessgenderbias
than venture capital.684 Venture capitalists prim arily investin
technology-intensive types offirms, which are less likely to be
funded by women.685 Moreover, wom en raisesignificantly lower
680 Mollick, supra note31, at9.
681 Id.
682 Id.
683 Id. See Jisun An et al., Recommending Investors for Crowdfunding
Projects 2 (2014), http://researchswinger.org/publications/an14recommending
.pdf[https://perma.cc/MT2A-QU4P].
684 See generally Dan Marom etal., Gender Dynamics in Crowdfunding: Evi-
dence on Entrepreneurs, Investors, and Deals from Kickstarter (2015), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2442954[https://perma.cc/XE3L-8TH4].
685 Id. at41.
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amountsofequity than men during the startup stage and less
equity and debt at later stages of a firms development cycle.686 In
fact, severalstudiespointtowomen entrepreneursbeingableto
raiselesscapitalthan men, regardlessofthesourceofcapital.687
Asaresult, womenlaunchfirmswithsignificantlysmalleramounts
ofcapitalthan men.688 Theadvantagesofcrowdfundingarethatit
hasthepotentialtodemocratizetheprivateequitymarket, reduce
genderbias, andempowertheeconomicdevelopm entofwom en.
In thenextsection, wehighlightsomekeyplatformsthathave
em erged in developing countriesand discussthemain enabling
factors that allow crowdfunding to develop. These factors are
technologicalinfrastructure, entrepreneurialculture, institutional
andregulatoryinfrastructure, andcommunityengagement.
2. Emerging Platforms
In sub-Saharan Africa, one example ofa crowdfunding plat-
form isHomestrings.689 Thiswebsitewaslaunched between 2011
and2013 andhasthusfarm obilizedabout$25 m illion in funds,
covering thirteen countriesin Africa.690 The platform allowsin-
vestors, particularly diaspora investors, to invest in projects,
funds, bonds, and public-private partnership opportunitiessup-
portedbythegovernmentsofKenya, Ghana, andNigeria, aswell
asFirstQuantum MineralsandAfren plc.691 Anotherexam pleof
a platform is Startme, which focuses on traditionalentrepre-
neurialcam paigns.692
The MENA (Middle Eastand North Africa)region hasseen
the rise of online platforms such as the Lebanon-based Zoo-
m aal.693 Thissite offersboth cause-related and entrepreneurial
686 See S. Coleman& A. Robb, New Firm Financing for Women-Owned Firms:
Evidence from the Kauffmann Firm Survey Data at 23, 6 (2008), http://sbaer
.uca.edu/research/usasbe/2009/PaperID82.pdf[https://perma.cc/V6Q4-SFK4].
687 Id. at8.
688 Id. at9.
689 See HOMESTRINGS, https://www.homestrings.com/[https://perma.cc/EY
8V-PWA6].
690 WORLD BANK, supra note63, at32.
691 Id.
692 See STARTME, http://www.startme.co.za/[https://perma.cc/2922-SG6B].
693 See ZOOMAAL, http://www.zoomaal.com [https://perma.cc/WB5B-9KQF].
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campaigns.694 Anothersuccessfulequitycrowdfundingplatform is
Eureeca, which, during itsfirstcampaign, raised $100,000 from
twenty-threeinvestors.695
TheLatin American and theCaribbean regionshavealsoseen
a substantialgrowth in crowdfunding platform ssince 2010. In
Brazil, Catarsehasraised over$4.1 million in overonethousand
cam paigns. 696 Another popular platform is Ideame, which has
cam paigns in six countries in the region:Argentina, Mexico,
Chile, Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay. 697 In Southeast Asia,
notable platform sinclude Ignite Intent,698 the HotStart,699 and
Ideasplatform.700
3. Key Enabling Factors
A keyenablingfactorindevelopingcountriesistheimplementa-
tion ofthenecessarytechnologicalinfrastructuretosupportcrowd-
funding. Whetheradevelopingcountrycan movetocrowdfunding
structures depends on its ability to embrace new technologies
and methodologiesforcapitalform ation. Crowdfundingcan only
work ifindividuals have access to reliable broadband Internet
and mobiledatanetworks. Thepresenceofonlinesocialnetworks
thatallow investorstocommunicatewith entrepreneursand vice
versaisalsoa crucialprerequisiteforcrowdfunding.701 Hence, a
reportby theWorld Bank notesthatthesinglemostpredictive
factorfortherateofcrowdfundingemergenceistherateofsocial
media penetration.702 Thelatterisstronglypositivelycorrelated
withtheriseofcrowdfundingplatforms.703
694 Id.
695 See EUREECA, http://www.eureeca.com [https://perm a.cc/UE87-56BP].
696 WORLD BANK, supra note 63, at33. See CATARSE, http://www.catarse
.me[https://perma.cc/V69F-9ZRM].
697 See IDEAME, http://idea.m e[https://perma.cc/GPD2-SPE8].
698 See IGNITEINTENT, http://www.igniteintent.com [https://perma.cc/9S
RE-PVQL].
699 See HOTSTART, http:/www.thehotstart.com [https://perma.cc/RC2B-LLNY].
700 See Ideasplatform Company Page, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com
/ideasplatform [https://perma.cc/QL95-XWYM](notethattheoriginalideasplat
form.inisnolongeranoperatingwebsite).
701 John S. Wroldsen, The Crowdfund Acts Strange Bedfellows: Democracy 
and Start-Up Company Investing, 72 U. KAN. L. REV. 357, 361 (2013).
702 WORLD BANK, supra note63, at40.
703 Id.
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Theinstitutionalframeworksin developingcountriesmustbe
designed in a waytofacilitateaccesstocapitaland thedevelop-
mentofcrowdfundingplatforms.704 Crowdfundingreliesontheex-
istenceofanentrepreneurialcultureinacountry. Entrepreneurial
culturecan beconstrained, however, byfactorssuch asredtape,
bureaucracy, andlackofeconomicincentives.705 Accordingly, coun-
trieswishingtoprom otecrowdfundingandP2P lendingmustad-
dress policies and regulations thatraise transaction costs and
maketheentryandconductofbusinessoperationsburdensome.706
Inaddition, education campaigns, incubators, accelerators, startup
weekends, andmentorshipprogramssponsoredbythegovernment
orNGOscanplayakeyroleinfosteringentrepreneurialculture.707
VI. REGULATORY COMPETITION AND GLOBAL CROWDFUNDING
Thevariousregulatorymodelsconsideredaboveareincompeti-
tion with oneanother. Based on thesemodels, wecan extrapolate
thefollowingregulatoryoptionsavailabletonationalregulators:
noregulatorychange;
creating a specific regulatory framework for ECF
andP2PL;708
enactingcarveoutsorsecuritiesexemptionsfrom the
preexistingsecuritieslawstoexemptfundraisingvia
704 Id.
705 C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws,
2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 5859 (2012). 
706 A recentempiricalstudyofmobilemoneyschemesfoundthatheavyregu-
lation isfataltothesuccessofsuchschemes. Thestudyusesmulti-sidedplatform
economicsandtheroleofignitionandcriticalmasstoexplorethesuccessorfailure
ofmobilemoney. See DavidEvans& AlexisPirchio, An Empirical Examination of
Why Mobile Money Schemes Ignite in Some Developing Countries but Flounder in
Most (U. Chic. L. Sch., Coase-SandorInst. forL. andEcon., WorkingPaperNo.
723, Mar. 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=257 8312 [https:/perma.cc/8X4C-V86P].
707 Id. at 89. 
708 See, e.g., Bradford, supra note705, at8;Joan MacLeod Heminway, How
Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding: A Tale of Political Pressure, Hasty
Decisions, and Inexpert Judgments that Begs for a Happy Ending, 102 KY. L.J.
865, 887 (2014);Marco Figliomeni, Note, Grassroots Capitalism or: How I
Learned to Stop Worrying About Financial Risks in the Exempt Market and Love
Equity Crowdfunding, 23 DAHOUSIE J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 106 (2014).
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ECF platformsfrom generalprospectus, registration
andotherrequirem ents;709
limiting such exemptions, ifany, to accredited, or
sophisticated, high networth investors(theapproach
taken in the United Statespriorto the enactment
oftheJOBS Act);710
makingECF availabletoallinvestors, includingretail
investorssubjectto caps on the am ountofcapital
that retailinvestors can contribute to ECF cam -
paigns(theapproach in theUnited Statesafterthe
im plem entation oftheJOBS Act);711
im posing variousinvestment-related caps, such as
limiting thenumberofissuersinvestorscan invest
in orlimitingtheamountofm oneyan investorm ay
investperyear(thelim itm aybedeterm inedbyref-
erence to a persons income or net worth; or arbi-
trary limits may be set regardless of a persons income 
ornetworth);712
m aking ECF available to retailinvestors without
anyrestrictionsorinvestm entcaps;713
limiting ECF to certain types ofissuers, such as
innovativecompanies(theapproachtakeninItaly).714
Theoptionsforinvestorprotectionsafeguardsinclude:
establishinga licensingframework forcrowdfunding
intermediaries(theapproach taken in New Zealand;
otherexamples include the FCA authorizations in
the United Kingdom for CrowdCube and Seedrs)
andenablingaform ofmeritregulation;715
imposingvariousdisclosurerequirementsonissuers;
709 See StuartR. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption:
Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 143637 (2012); Filgiomeni, 
supra note 708, at 11516. 
710 See Cohn, supra note709, at1436.
711 See Bradford, supra note 705, at 12326. 
712 Id. at124.
713 Id. at 12426. 
714 GarryA. Gabison, Equity Crowdfunding: All Regulated But Not Equal,
13 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 359, 39091 (2014). 
715 Bradford, supra note705, at136;Figliomeni, supra note708, at116.
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requiring offeringsto be conducted online and not
through other means (the approach in the United
States);
requiring issuerstoconductofferingsthrough only
oneintermediary;716
imposingcapsonthemaximum amountofcapitalthat
an issuer can raise in a given year (the approach
takenin New ZealandandtheUnitedStates);717
prohibitingintermediariesfrom directlyholdingfunds
and requiringthem todepositfundsintoan escrow
account(theapproachtakenintheUnitedStates);718
risk acknowledgm entby theinvestorand thepro-
vision ofeducationalm aterialstoinvestorspriorto
investing;719
providingcancellation rightsandcooling-offperiods
(wherebyan investormaywithdraw theinvestment
upuntilacertainpointintimeoruntilthecrowdfund-
ingcampaignisclosed);720
addressingtheholdingofclientmoneyandconflicts
ofinterest;721
providing m echanism s to handle com plaints and
alternativedisputeresolution;722
providing guidelines on socialmedia commentary
(see, forexample, U.S. electronicbulletinrecommen-
dations);723 and
716 Wroldsen, supra note701, at367.
717 Bradford, supra note705, at95;Van S. Wiltz, Will the JOBS Act Jump-
Start the Video Game Industry? Crowdfunding Start-Up Captial, 16 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 141, 160 (2013).
718 Cohn, supra note709, at1442;JoanMacLeodHeminway& SheldonRyan
Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933,
78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 92324 (2010). 
719 Figliomeni, supra note 708, at 11516. 
720 Cohn, supra note709, at1440, 42;Wiltz, supra note 717, at 16869. 
721 Bradford, supra note 705, at 13637; Wiltz, supra note 717, at 16667. 
722 GeorgeH. Friedman, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Emerging Online
Technologies: Challenges and Opportunities, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
695, 71115 (1997); Anjanette H. Raymond & Abby Stemler, Trusting Strangers:
Dispute Resolution in the Crowd, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 357,
37374 (2014). 
723 ThomasG. James, Far From the Maddening Crowd: Does the JOBS Act
2016] SIGNIFICANCE OF CROWDFUNDING 449
establishingrulesorm echanismstodealwith plat-
form failureorclosure(thegreatestrisk hereisthat
a platform may close withoutany data leftbehind
on existingcontracts).724
BecausetheECF industryisstillrelativelyyoung, itremains
to be seen which modelwillbecome dom inantinternationally.
There is no doubt that any future regulation willneed to be
adapted tocrowdfundingplatform swith differentpurposes. Ob-
viously, a cleardistinction can be made between crowdfunding
platforms with non-financialrewards and those with financial
rewards.725 Regulation forcrowdfunding should differbased on
the goalsofthe fundersand the purposes ofthe crowdfunding
projects. Burdensome regulation may havethe effectofstymie-
ing thedevelopm entofcrowdfunding. Theprincipalreason why
entrepreneursutilize ECF isprecisely because itislessexpen-
sivethan raisingcapitalthrough apublicoffering, which involves
costly prospectusobligations, orrelying on banksorprivateeq-
uity channels.726 On the otherhand, a lax regulatory approach
m ayresultin lossestoinvestorsandlackofconfidencein capital
marketsandcrowdfundingin particular. Topreventfraud, some
jurisdictions, such astheUnitedKingdom, haverequired crowd-
fundingplatformstoregisterwith an oversightbodyandregularly
reporttothatbody.727 In othercountries, such asGermany, there
isnorequirementforplatformstoberegistered, andcrowdfunding
platforms operate withoutany specific license.728 The require-
mentthatcrowdfundingplatform sberegistered with anational
oversightbody leadstohighercom pliancecosts, butalsoan in-
creaseininvestorprotection.
Provide Meaningful Redress to Small Investors for Securities Fraud in Con-
nection with Crowdfunding Offerings, 54B.C. L. REV. 1767, 1782 (2013).
724 Bradford, supra note 705, at 14445, 145 n.700; Gabison, supra note
714, at369.
725 Joan MacLeod Heminway, What is a Security in the Era of Crowd-
funding?, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 335, 359 (2012);Heminway &
Hoffman, supra note 718, at 899900. 
726 See supra notes 2122, 247, and accom panying text. 
727 See supra PartV.D.2.c.
728 Lars Hornuf& Armin Schwienbacher, Should Securities Regulation
PromoteCrowdinvesting?16, 37 (June11, 2015)(unpublished manuscript)(on
filewiththeLudwig-Maximilians-UniversitätMünchenLibrary).
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Itis up to each individualjurisdiction to determine the ex-
tenttowhich securitiesregulation oughttoapplytoandoverlap
with crowdfunding regulation. The basicstarting pointis that
securitiesregulation appliestocrowdfunding totheextentthat
crowdfundinginvolvestheofferandsaleofequityordebtsecuri-
ties, which areregulated activitiesin m ostjurisdictions.729 This
m ay triggera rangeofrequirements, including m andatory dis-
closure and reporting requirements. The objective ofimposing
such requirementshashistoricallybeen theprevention offraud
and investorprotection, aswellasthereduction ofagencycosts
and inform ation asym metries.730 A failure to com ply with such
requirementscan resultin misstatements, omissionstostatema-
terialfacts, andclaim sofsecuritiesfraud.731
Thekeyproblem with applyingexistingsecuritiesregulation
lawstocrowdfunding, however, isthatsuch lawswerenotcrafted
foronlinefundraising. Com pliancewith existingsecuritiesregu-
lations i.e., disclosure and prospectus requirements results in 
fixed compliancecoststhatincreasethecostsofobtaining capi-
talforfirms.732 An advantageofsuch requirementsisthatthey
reduceagencycosts. Owingtogreatertransparencyandlessinfor-
mation asym metry, entrepreneurs have fewer opportunities to
engageinself-dealingorextractprivatebenefits.733
Optim alregulation involves a tradeoffbetween the costs of
ensuring an appropriate levelofinvestorprotection and broad-
eningaccesstocapitalforsmalland medium-sized firmsthatare
disproportionatelyaffected bycompliancecosts.734 Theupshotof
aregulatoryapproach thatistoofocusedon investorprotection is
limitedaccesstocapitalforsmallfirm s, whereasregulation that
permitsextensiveaccesstocapitalmayresultin weakerinvestor
protection.735 Furtherm ore, ifthe costsassociated with investor
729 DRESNER, supra note92, at165, 169.
730 JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION
CASES AND MATERIALS 96 (12thed. 2012).
731 Id. at96
732 Id. at97.
733 See Mark Milian, Kickstarters Funded Projects See Some Stumbles,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 21, 2012), http:/www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-08-21
/kickstarter-s-funded-projects-see-some-stumbles[https:/perma.cc/HF7D-3PFD].
734 See DRESNER, supra note92, at171.
735 ONTARIO SEC. COMMN, OCS STAFF CONSULTATION PAPER 45-710, CON-
SIDERATIONS FOR NEW CAPITAL RAISING PROSPECTUS EXEMPTIONS 23 (2012),
2016] SIGNIFICANCE OF CROWDFUNDING 451
protection areexcessive, crowdfunding m ay ceasetobea viable
cost-effectivemeanstoraisecapitalforSMEs.736 Regulatorsmust,
therefore, ensurethatsmallfirmscanutilizeECF andP2PL inthe
firstplace, whilesettingtheinvestorprotection baratan appro-
priatelevel. Indeed, Cum mingand Johan pointtoempiricalevi-
dencethatsuggeststhatcrowd investorsdoseek a certain level
ofinvestorprotection.737
Investorprotection isa particularly importantconsideration
if the creation of a m arket for lemons where only low-quality 
ventures would eventually choose ECF while high-quality ven-
tureswouldcontinuetorelyon venturecapitalorangelinvestor
financing is to be avoided.738 The upshot would be a crowd-
funding m arketfullofunrealistic, and likely fraudulent, sales
pitches.739 A high levelofinvestordissatisfaction and adverse
publicityaboutECF asaform ofcorporatefundraisingcouldeven-
tuallyresultin thecollapseofthecrowdfundingm arketitself.740
ThisistheworstcasescenarioasenvisagedbyAkerlof.741
Forcrowdfunding to havea positive econom icim pactin the
longrun, theregulatoryframework m ustbedesigned in a man-
nerthatworksforboth investorsand entrepreneursalike.742 As
observed by the U.S. Investor Advisory Comm ittee: [a]lthough 
these goalsare sometimesseen asoperating atcrosspurposes,
https:/www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category4/sn_20121214_45-710
_exempt-market-review.pdf[https://perma.cc/6Q75-UP72].
736 Id. at 5152. 
737 DouglasCumming& SofiaJohan, Demand Driven Securities Regulation:
Evidence from Crowdfunding, 15 VENTURE CAPITAL:INT. J. ENTREPREN. FIN.
361, 376 (2013).
738 See Ibrahim, supra note 5, at 108, 13738; see also Wilson& Testoni, supra
note23, at12.
739 EdanBurkett, A Crowdfunding Exception? Online Investment Crowdfund-
ing and U.S. Securities Regulation, 13 TENN. J. BUS. L. 63, 9798 (2011). 
740 CORP. AND MKTS. ADVISORY COMM., CROWD SOURCED EQUITY FUNDING
REPORT 1820, 64, 119 (May 2014) http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/cam ac.nsf
/0/3dd84175efbad69cca256b6c007fd4e8.html[https://perma.cc/WG5V-H9X5].
741 Id.;Akerlof, supra note 302, at 49697. 
742 Louis A. Aguilar, Commr, SEC, Remarks at Open Meeting on Proposal on 
Crowdfunding:HarnessingtheInternettoPromoteAccesstoCapitalforSmall
Businesses, WhileProtectingtheInterestsofInvestors(Oct. 23, 2013)(tran-
scriptavailable athttp://clsbluesky.law.colum bia.edu/2013/11/19/sec-commis
sioner-aguilar-discusses-the-secs-crowdfunding-proposal/[https://perma.cc/W3
4W-ARKP]).
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crowdfunding ultimately cannot succeed unless investors per-
ceivethem arketplaceasfairandbelievetheyhaveareasonable
chance of profiting on their investm ents.743 Theregulatorychal-
lenge, therefore, istodesign a fairand cost-effectivemarketplace
thatfacilitatessmallcapitalformation, whileproviding reason-
ableinvestorprotection.744
Thefocusofregulatorsin somejurisdictionshasbeen thepro-
tection ofthe retailinvestor involved in crowdfunding.745 The
approach taken undertheJOBS Actin theUnited States, forex-
ample, isregulatingnotonlythecrowdfundingplatforms, butalso
theinvestmentopportunitiesofthecrowd. Thisisdonebyimpos-
ing lim its on the extentto which investorscan assume risk.746
Nonaccreditedinvestorscanonlyinvestviacrowdfundingplatforms
up toa certain am ountoftheirannualnetincomeorwealth.747
This represents a significant limitation on investors investment 
opportunities. In the U.S. setting, this is consistent with the
historicalfocus ofthe SEC on the protection ofnonaccredited
investors.748 The definition of accredited investor will therefore 
continuetobesignificantinthefuture, andcrowdfundinginterm e-
diaries m ustclosely m onitorany relevantam endments in this
regard. The Dodd-Frank Actof2010 imposes an obligation on
theSEC toreview thedefinition in itsentiretyandtoamendthe
definition as deem ed necessary every four years, beginning in
2014.749 Accordingly, questionsasto the distinctionsbetween re-
tailinvestorsand accredited orsophisticated investorswillarise
inthefuture.
An alternative regulatory approach istofocuson the corpo-
rategovernanceframeworksofthecrowdfundedenterprisesand
743 SEC INVR ADVISORY COMM., RECOMMENDATION OF THE INVESTOR ADVI-
SORY COMMITTEE:CROWDFUNDING REGULATIONS 1 (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www
.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/investment-adviser-crowd
funding-recommendation.pdf[https://perma.cc/99WM-5JPZ].
744 Id.
745 See supra PartsV.B, V.C.1, V.D.2.b.
746 See supra PartV.C.1.
747 See Amendments forSm alland AdditionalIssues Exemptions Under
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the intermediaries.750 The key pillars ofa good corporate gov-
ernancecrowdfunding framework may besummarized asfollows:
transparency, information disclosure, investorand consumerpro-
tection, and appropriate regulation ofthe crowdfunding inter-
mediaries i.e., the operators of the websites through which
crowdfundingactivitiesareconducted.751 Regulation mustensure,
among otherthings, securityofpaymentand platform function-
ality. In addition, interm ediariesmay havetocomply with cer-
tain capitalrequirements, asisthecasein theUnitedKingdom .
Regulatory authoritiesm ustbe abletocontroland monitorthe
activities ofcrowdfunding intermediaries.752 This is im portant
becausecrowd investorstypically lack thecontrolrightsand ex
antecontractualprotectionsavailabletobusinessangelsandven-
ture capitalists as part oftheir shareholder agreements with
investeecom panies.753
Within the ECF context, regulatory authoritiesm ustfind a
balance between facilitating accessto capitalforSMEsand re-
ducingtherisksofsecuritiesfraud. Thekeyregulatoryobjectives
herearecapitalformation, investorprotection, andthemaintenance
offairand orderly capitalmarkets.754 Investorsmustbeableto
assessinvestmentopportunitieswhilehavingrecoursetoadequate
disclosure. While ECF will never be risk-free in the sense that 
investorsm ay alwaysmake perfectly bad investmentdecisions
notwithstanding having access to adequate disclosure investors 
mustbeprotected from fraud, m isleadingstatements, and other
misleadingand deceptivepractices. A crucialdifferencebetween
tradingsharesin publiclylisted companiesandinvestingin small
businessesisthelackofresearchanalystcoverage.755 Privatecom-
panies, bydefinition, operateinamoreopaqueinformationsetting.
Inaddition, thepublicofferingrulesmustbedesignedinaway
astoallow offeringstobeconductedwithoutaprospectus. Thelack
ofonerousprospectusrequirements, aswesaw in theEuropean
setting, isfundamentaltotheemergenceofcrowdfunding. Public
750 See supra PartV.C.2.
751 See discussion supra PartIV.
752 See supra PartV.D.2.b.
753 See supra textaccompanyingnote235.
754 See supra textaccompanyingnote745.
755 DRESNER, supra note92, at115.
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offeringrules, therefore, maybeviewed asan im portantregula-
torydriverofcrowdfunding. Simplifieddisclosurerequirementsare
neededforSMEsseekingtoutilizeequitycrowdfunding.
Therearevariouscapsthatmaybeimposed on themaximum
amountofcapitalthatcan beraised viaECF byissuersand the
m aximum am ountofcapitalthatinvestors may invest.756 The
rationalebehind investm entcapsistolimitthepotentiallosses
thatretailinvestorsmayincurasaresultofparticipatingin ECF
cam paigns. Asstated, in theUnited States, theapproach under
theJOBS Acthasbeen tolimitthetotalmonetary am ountthat
an investorm ayinvestin allissuersin agiven yearaccordingto
the persons income or net worth.757 Thisrequirementisintended
todeterretailinvestorsfrom concentratingtheirinvestmentsin
theECF m arket(aform ofm andatoryportfoliodiversification).
In ourview, however, ECF and P2PL differsubstantiallyfrom
otherfundraisingm echanisms, whetherpublicorprivate(angel
investing and venturecapital), and requirea speciallegislative
response. Adopting a specificregulatory framework tocoverECF
and P2PL appearsto be the appropriate solution to regulating
ECF andP2PL becausepreexistingsecuritieslaw frameworksare
inadequate. Indeed, a lack oflegislative action in thisfield may
disadvantagefirmsin somejurisdictionsvis-à-visfirmsthatoper-
ateinjurisdictionswheretherehasalreadybeen someregulatory
accommodationforequitycrowdfunding. Anoptionhereistomake
ECF available, butonlytotheextentthatitappliestoarestricted
group ofinvestors(seetheapproach in theUnited Kingdom , for
example). The focus in the United Kingdom , as we saw, is on
sophisticated, experienced, andprofessionalinvestors, aswellas
investorswho certify they fallinto the restricted investorcate-
gory. Anotherapproach m aybetolimitECF tocertain classesof
issuer. ECF in Italyisconfinedtoinnovativestartupsonly.758
Questionsalsoarisein relation topooled investmentarrange-
mentsthatareused bysomeplatformsasan investm entmodel.
Should regulatory distinctionsbemadebetween investorshold-
ing legal, asopposed tobeneficial, interestsin theequity ofan
756 See supra Parts V.C.1.ab. 
757 See supra PartV.C.1.b.
758 See supra PartV.D.3.
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issuer?In particular, towhatextentdosuch arrangementsalter
the disclosure obligations ofissuers to investors? In principle,
investorsinvesting indirectly intoan issuevia a SPV should be
entitled to the sam e information disclosure as those investors
investingdirectly. Addressingtheseissueswillrequireaconsid-
eration ofhow tofitanynew ECF regulation within thepreexist-
ingcorporatelaw fram ework.
Finally, nationalregulatorswillneedtoconsidertowhatextent,
ifany, oversightofECF andP2PL platformsshouldbesharedwith
self-regulatory organizations. In the United Kingdom , the UK
Crowdfunding Association hasassum ed a role by prom ulgating
regulatory standards and rules affecting both non-FCA and
FCA-authorized ECF providers. British P2PL providers have
also launched a peer-to-peer finance association (P2PFA). The 
emergenceofsuchself-regulatorybodiesislikelytopromotegreater
responsivenessandregulatoryinnovation.
Somejurisdictions, such asNew Zealand, havegrantedcrowd-
funding interm ediariesan im portantsupervisory role, allowing
intermediariestodeny issuersaccesstotheirplatformsifthere
isreason tobelievethattheissuerhasengagedin, orislikelyto
engage in, m isleading and deceptive conduct.759 Furtherm ore,
interm ediariesareexpectedtocarryoutduediligenceandcheck
theidentityoftheissuerandthatofitsdirectorsand seniorman-
agers.760 Theyarealsotaskedwitheducatinginvestorsaboutthe
risksofcrowdfunding. Whereinvestorsaresubjecttoinvestment
caps, intermediariesmustalsoensurethatany investmentlimits
imposedontheinvestorsarenotbreached.761 Inaddition, interme-
diariesmusthaveprocessesin placetoensurethattheanti-money
laundering requirementsarenotbreached. Thecrowdfunding in-
termediaries, therefore, playacriticalrolein investorprotection.
To an extent, we are witnessing a form of merit regulation, 
wheretheroleofthelicensedintermediaryisakintothatofagov-
ernmentagency deciding on the meritsofthe offer. Indeed, we
could characterizetheNew Zealand m odelasa hybrid ofm erit
anddisclosureregulation.
759 FinancialMarketsConductRegulations2014, s195 (N.Z.).
760 Id.
761 Id.
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CONCLUSION
Accesstofinanceisa pressing concern forSMEsaround the
globe, particularlyin theaftermath oftheGFC. In thisArticle, we
explored the potentialofcrowdfunding and P2PL to fostereco-
nomicgrowth and innovation and bridgethefinancinggap that
manystartupsandSMEsface. Asshown, crowdfundingprovides
a novelmethod for entrepreneurs to obtain financing without
having torely on traditionalfunding mechanism s, such asdebt
finance, venturecapital, orbusinessangels.762
Technological innovation and the financial crisis of 2008
2009 are the key drivers behind crowdfunding. By harnessing
Internettechnology, crowdfundingandP2PL havealteredthespec-
trum ofcapitalraising optionsby allowing entrepreneursusing
socialmediawebsitesoronlinecrowdfundingplatformstoattract
smallamountsofcapitalfrom a largenumberofindividualsto
finance new venturesorsupportexisting businesses. The main
fundersofearly startup ventureshavetraditionally been venture
capitalistsand angelinvestors. Thiswillchangewith theemer-
genceofECF andP2PL. Attheveryleast, ECF andP2PL arelikely
toincreasecompetition among suppliersofcapitaltoSMEsand
earlystartups.
Wehaveconsideredavarietyofdifferentcrowdfundingmodels
thatcanbeusedtosupportavarietyofpurposes, includingcrowd-
fundingwithfinancialrewards(crowdinvestingandcrowdlending)
andcrowdfundingwithoutfinancialrewards(crowdsponsoring).
Ourconclusion isthatdifferentform s ofcrowdfunding require
differentregulatoryfram eworks, astheyareassociatedwith dif-
ferentrisks, differentlevelsofcomplexity, aswellasdifferentuser
groups and purposes. For exam ple, donation-based crowdfund-
ingism ostapplicabletocom m unity-relatedandart-relatedproj-
ects, whileECF isapplicabletostartupsthathaveahigh-growth,
sale, merger, or IPO strategy.763 This may be contrasted with
P2PL, which ism ostrelevanttobusinessesseeking to improve
theircashflow.
Thefocusofourdiscussion hasbeen on thefinancialreward
modelofcrowdfunding. In particular, weexaminedtheregulatory
762 See supra PartsI.A, II.B.5.
763 WORLD BANK, supra note63, at34.
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approach taken tocrowdinvestingandcrowdlendingin anumber
ofjurisdictions, includingtheUnitedStates, theUnitedKingdom,
Germ any, Italy, andNew Zealand. Although crowdfundingisin-
creasinglygainingprominenceintheEuropeancontext, particularly
in jurisdictionssuch astheUnited Kingdom, nounified regulatory
framework has been adopted atthe E.U. level.764 The European
Commissionhasexploredthepotentialofcrowdfunding, andinthe
United States, theJOBS Acthasbeen enacted with theaim of
introducinga crowdfundingexemption tofacilitatecapitalraising
from thepublic.765 Themain thrustoftheregulatoryinterventions
surveyedhasbeentoextendECF tonon-accreditedinvestors, with
regulation structured in a way thatfocuseson thecrowdfunded
enterprises, theinterm ediaries, orthecrowd. Therearem arked
differencesbetweencountriesastohow theseactorsareregulated.
This, in turn, involvescertain tradeoffsbetween fostering capi-
talaccessandprotectinginvestors.
Weconsidered thepotentialofcrowdfundingin thedeveloping
world. Whilecrowdfundingmarketshavebeen operatingin many
countriesofthedevelopedworld, thedevelopingworldmaybeable
tocapitalizeon thisnew form offunding. Themain prerequisites
forcrowdfunding to emerge are access to technology, entrepre-
neurialactivity, and the presence oflightregulatory structures,
which facilitatethenecessarymarketconditionsforinvestmentin
thestartupecosystem .
Crowdfunding isalreadya well-established financing instru-
ment. The Internetand crowdfunding have revolutionized the
waysin which fundsareraised in thesm allbusinesscontext.766
Nevertheless, thebulkofcrowdfundingisdirectedtowardsphilan-
thropicprojectsandthecreativeindustries, whereartisticcommu-
nitiesplayanimportantroleinsupportingcrowdfundingprojects.
Equity crowdfunding, on theotherhand, playsa smallerrolein
thecrowdfundingmarket. Thisisduetoanumberoffactors, in-
cludingthecomplexityoffinancingyoungandinnovativestartups
and a legalcontextthatm ayconstrain orinhibitECF. Thereis,
therefore, considerablescopeforim provem entin thisarea. The
main points forregulators to address are securities regulation
764 See supra PartV.D.1.
765 See supra PartV.C.1.
766 See supra text accompanying notes 2224. 
458 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:347
carveouts, prospectusrequirem ents, investorprotection, andthe
regulation ofECF andP2PL platforms.767
Thecrowdfundingmarketforprovidingseed and early-stage
financingcan befurtherdeveloped toensurethatcrowdfunding
becom esavalid alternativetotraditionalfinancingchannelsfor
firm s. Infact, given thelimitednumberofinstitutionalinvestors
willingtofinanceSMEs, andtheeffectsoftheGFC on thebank-
ingsector, crowdfundingmaybetheonlyviablemeansforsome
firmstoobtain early-stagefinancing. Thisisparticularlythecase
in marketswherethereisashortageofseedcapitaloran under-
supplyofprojectsthathavethelevelofmaturitytobefundedby
thetraditionalbankingsector. Accordingly, com pared todebtfi-
nanceandprivateequity, crowdfundingmayenablealargernum-
beroffirm sto obtain financing. In addition, firm smay benefit
from otheradvantagesassociated with crowdfunding, including
markettesting and crowdsourcing. Although nota panacea to
SME financingproblems, P2P and crowdfundingplatformsmay
improvetheSME-financingmarketin thelongterm, andmaybe
viewedasasourceofcompetitiontobanksorasafinancingalter-
nativethatincreasesconsum erchoice, prom otesinnovation, and
facilitatesentrepreneurship and economicgrowth. Crowdfunding
isnotintendedtodisplacetheroleofthebanks, angelinvestors,
orventurecapitalsin providinglater-stagefunding.768 Rather, the
potentialofcrowdfundingliesin pluggingexistingfinancinggaps
in theearlystagefundingcycle.
767 See supra PartVI.
768 See supra PartII.B.5.
